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Working primarily with George Eliot's and Henry
James's fictional and non-fictional works, I have
formulated an organic theory of the imagination which can
be used as a critical approach to any good novel.
Eliot's and James's analogy between an organism and a
literary work in their respective essays, 'Notes on Form
in Art' and 'The Art of Fiction', conveys three important
tenets of organicism: incompleteness; the
interrelationship of the parts to the whole; and the
synthesis of diverse materials. The emphasis which Eliot
and James place upon the visual in literature has led me
to consider images as the parts of a novel which display
the primary concepts of organicism outlined above.
In the first chapter, I rely on Coleridge as the
primary spokesman for organicism. I have taken into
special consideration his comments in Biographia
Literaria and Shakespearean Criticism because they
elucidate Eliot's and James's ideas on organic unity. My
focus is on explaining key concepts such as: beauty;
taste; feeling; proportion; germ; and reconciliation of
opposites. Images, I show, embody all these concepts.
An understanding of images, their genesis, form, and
transformations, necessitates a closer study of their
life-cycle—perception, memory, and imagination. This is
the subject of the second chapter in which I begin with
Coleridge's concept of the imagination and establish its
affinities with Eliot's and James's theories. At the
same time, I outline the important effect Eliot's and
James's ideas have had on twentieth-century philosophical
and psychological studies of the imagination and its
affiliated faculties—perception and memory. My choice
of different authorities in psychology and philosophy has
been based on the fact that their insights seem but parts
of a coherent whole. The interrelationships of
imagination, perception and memory in a creative act and
in a creative reading of a novel are also concerns of
this chapter.
The reader's or critic's perspective is the subject
of the third chapter. Coleridge's sympathetic criticism
has taken into account the primary concepts of organicism
and prefigures Eliot's and James's aesthetics. My focus
is on four principles of recreative or sympathetic
criticism which have been adopted by modern organicists:
an attempt to recapture the artist's feeling; a
concentration on the excellences, not the defects of a
work; a judgement derived from intrinsic rather than
extrinsic rules; an oscillation from the parts to the
whole. Images express Coleridge's critical concepts.
Images provide the means by which the writer's, the
character's, and the reader's imaginations merge. Gaston
Bachelard's visual rather than linguistic approach to
images seems to evolve from Coleridge's, Eliot's, and
James's aesthetics; his organic theory of imagination
calls for abandoning traditional classifications of
images, for enjoying their visual form.
I consider images as pictures in my analytical
chapters on Middlemarch and The Portrait of a Lady.
Simultaneously, I approach the two novels as the
embodiments of an organic theory of the imagination,
demonstrating how from a single image, the germinal
image, all other images, events, and characters evolve.
Part of the chapter on The Portrait of a Lady is devoted
to exploring the novel as James's recreative criticism of
Middlemarch. The primary consideration in both chapters
is on the imagination, its growth and refinement.
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The very first time I came across George Eliot's
'Notes on Form in Art' and Henry James's 'The Art of
Fiction', I was struck by the analogy which both authors
use between a novel and an organism. That in itself
crystallizes the close relationship of the aesthetical
and philosophical convictions held by both Eliot and
James. Working closely with their letters, notebooks,
and critical essays, I have been delighted to find what
appears to be a complete theory of organic unity, a
stimulating approach to the novel.
Tightly enmeshed with organic unity is an organic
theory of the imagination, which Coleridge has
attractively and convincingly expounded in his own
criticism and prose. The Romantic roots of Eliot's and
James's philosophical notions have already been subjects
of long studies. This is why I have not dwelt upon the
roots only, but have also explored the modern directions
to which Eliot's and James's theories of the imagination
have extended. Indeed, twentieth-century critics of
organicism and the imagination have taken up and enlarged
upon points previously made by Eliot and James.
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My emphasis in this study is upon recreative
criticism, a critical approach to a literary work, which
Coleridge, Eliot and James formulate. Such an approach
respects the integrity of a given work and disregards
external sources of evidence such as biography,
psychology, or sociology. After establishing that images
constitute the life of the fictional worlds of both
George Eliot and Henry James as well as the individual
parts of an organic unity, I develop a theory of imagery
which calls for abandoning the traditional categories of
images, and shows how we can feel what Coleridge calls
'freshness of sensation' and experience the
reconciliations of the imagination in a novel.
The images of a novel, both Eliot and James teach,
are the means by which a writer's and a reader's
imaginations merge. The path from the writer's, to the
character's, to the reader's imagination is a very simple
but a wondrous one: this is the direction I have taken in
my approach to Middlemarch and The Portrait of a Lady.
These two masterpieces appealingly embody the
philosophical and aesthetical notions which both writers
share; furthermore, they depict how imaginative
reconciliations capture aesthetic and psychological
integrations.
For the sake of consistency I have used as far as
possible the Penguin English Library series of novels by
George Eliot and the 1922 reprint of the New York edition
of novels and short stories by Henry James (with the
exception of The Bostonians for which I have used the
vii
1966 Penguin edition). References to these works are to
these editions given after quotations in the text in
brackets, without 'p.' preceding page numbers. When
referring to James's novels in more than one volume, I
have used the Roman numeral II, before Arabic numbers
when quoting from the second volume of a novel; Arabic
numbers without a Roman numeral preceding them refer to
the first volume.




Abbreviations in the text are followed by page numbers
without a 'p' preceding them.
AN Henry James, The Art of the Novel, edited by
Richard Blackmur (London, 1939)
BL Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria,
edited by J. Shawcross, 2 vols (London, 1907)
CCL Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge,
edited by Earl Leslie Griggs, 6 vols (London,
1956-71)
CCW The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge,
edited by W. G. T. Shedd, 7 vols (New York,
1884)
CCW, Coburn The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge,
edited by Kathleen Coburn, 16 vols (London,
1969-78)
Essays Essays of George Eliot, edited by Thomas Pinney
(London, 1963)
GEL The George Eliot Letters, edited by Gordon S.
Haight, 9 vols (London, 1954-78)
HJL The Letters of Henry James, selected and edited
by Percy Lubbock, 2 vols (London, 1920)
HJL, Edel The Letters of Henry James, edited by Leon Edel,
4 vols (London, 1974-80)
MP John Ruskin, Modern Painters, in The Works of
John Ruskin, edited by E. T. Cook and Alexander
Wedderburn, Library edition, 39 vols (London,
1903-12), III-VII
NN Henry James, Notes on Novelists (London, 1914)
NR. Henry James, Notes and Reviews, edited by Pierre
de Chaignon de la Rose (Cambridge, Mass., 1921)
PP Henry James, Partial Portraits (London, 1888
rept. 1894)
ix
PR Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Reverie,
translated by Daniel Russell (Boston, 1969)
PS Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space,
translated by Maria Jolas (Boston, 1969)
SC Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Shakespearean
Criticism, edited by Thomas Middleton Raysor
(London, 1930)
TS George Eliot, Theophrastus Such, in The Works
of George Eliot, Standard edition, 24 vols
(Edinburgh, 1878-85)
VR Henry James, Views and Reviews, edited by Le Roy
Phillips (New York, 1908, rept. 1968)
BRIDGING THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE AUTHOR AND THE READER
Coleridge's high admiration, and lavish praise for
Wordsworth's poetry not only highlight his fellow-poet's
'excellences', but also distinctly crystallize
Coleridge's own ideas of an artist's role in society.
His sensitive response to Wordsworth's poetry embodies
his own belief in the true artist's responsibility to
train man to respond to, and derive pleasure from,
simple, ordinary, insignificant occurrences. It was
precisely for this attempt to awaken man's latent
sensibility that in Biographia Literaria (1817) he called
Wordsworth a genius, distinguished for his ability 'to
carry on the feelings of childhood into the powers of
manhood; to combine the child's sense of wonder and
novelty with the appearances, which every day for perhaps
forty years had rendered familiar', and 'so to represent
familiar objects as to awaken in the minds of others a
kindred feeling concerning them and that freshness of
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sensation which is the constant accompaniment of mental,
no less than of bodily, convalescence' (BL, I, 59-60).
Mental and physical 'convalescence' derived from an
active interchange with nature, unorthodox perception
triggering imagination, are no doubt beliefs strongly
held by Romantics and Victorians alike, concepts which,
as we shall see, are especially crucial and vital in
nineteenth-century novels.
But why such an emphasis on a unique perspective on
our daily lives? Imagination for both Coleridge and
Wordsworth represented a noble power which could solve
major problems, redress wrongs of the times. Parts of
Wordsworth's preface to the Lyrical Ballads (1801)
accurately describe not only issues current in the
nineteenth century, but also some of the maladies of our
own times, significant reasons for the anxious, restless,
discontented modern temperament. To Wordsworth, man's
decision to uproot his mind from Nature's vital, dynamic
processes, in order to implant it in sterile,
sophisticated urban surroundings, resulted in a dull
sensibility, a state of 'almost savage torpor'. Such a
state, he attributed primarily -to the 'increasing
accumulation of men in the cities, where the uniformity
of their occupations produces a craving for extraordinary
incident.... To this tendency of life and manners the
literature and theatrical exhibitions of the country have
conformed themselves'.1 Indeed, a century ago Wordsworth
1
Poetical Works, edited by Thomas Hutchinson
(London, 1975), p. 735.
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distinctly saw what modern psychologists like Erich Fromm
2
and Rollo May, have, in recent times, sharply described.
The monotony and enervating routine of modern
occupations, so these writers have often pointed out,
have reduced man to an apathetic automaton that can be
shaken out of its inertia only by violent stimulus. It
is to gratify what Wordsworth trenchantly rendered as
'degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation' that
gruesome crimes today occupy headlines on the front pages
of our newspapers, are the first items of news to be
announced and, eventually, are often transformed into
scripts of sensational popular movies.
Yet Wordsworth and Coleridge believed that man's
divine part, his nobility and dignity, could not possibly
be entirely destroyed, but could be revived, restored,
and nourished by the artist. Even though approaches,
methods, themes, and forms, whether in poetry or in
fiction, may vary radically from the nineteenth to the
twentieth century, the belief in the artist's enchanting
power to transform the ordinary into the extraordinary
remains the same. Only he can cure our blindness to
beauty, and at times capture us and hold us spellbound at
the sight of objects or events which we daily regard with
indifference. In somewhat Coleridgean terms, George
Eliot makes this issue even more specific; as early as
1855 she believed that the artist's goal should not be to
'theorize illogically' or to 'moralize absurdly', but to
2The Art of Loving (New York, 1957); Man's Search
for Himself (London, 1953).
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'be a teacher in the sense in which every great artist is
a teacher—namely, by giving us his higher sensibility as
a medium, a delicate acoustic or optical instrument,
bringing home to our coarser senses what would otherwise
be unperceived by us' (Essays, 126) .
Without a stimulation of our senses, no doubt,
comprehension often lacks precision, interest, and
pleasure. And in order to refine or to sculpture our
'coarser senses', the literary artist makes greatest use
of images, because images are the bridges with which our
minds and the literary artist's mind are connected.
Indeed, our daily world and the fictional world
interchange whenever images appear.
Like a poet, a novelist builds, weaves, sometimes
sketches, and very often draws or paints images. More
appealingly, more vividly, and, certainly, more
effusively than any other novelist, Henry James has
expounded the affinities between fiction and painting.
Very early in his career in 1884, he succinctly expressed
the belief which pyf^meates his critical and fictional
writings; for him, 'the analogy between the art of the
painter and art of the novelist is ... complete. Their
inspiration is the same, their process (allowing for the
different quality of the vehicle), is the same, their
success is the same. They may learn from each other,
they may explain and sustain each other'(PP, 378).
George Eliot, whose affinity to Henry James is one
of the primary concerns in this study, was highly aware
of 'the picture' as an important vehicle of communication
between the novelist and his audience. In a letter to
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Frederic Harrison on August 15, 1866, she very definitely
remarks: 'I think aesthetic teaching is the highest of
all teaching because it deals with life in its highest
complexity. But if it ceases to be purely aesthetic—if
it lapses anywhere from the picture to the diagram--it
becomes the most offensive of all teaching' (GEL, IV,
300). Even Theophrastus Such (1878), although highly
theoretical, does not lack pictures. In fact, 'Looking
Backward' seems to describe the genesis of Eliot's own
philosophical beliefs as an interplay between images and
thoughts, a fusion of the physical with the mental world:
'My philosophical notions, such as they are, continually
carry me back to the time when the fitful gleams of a
spring day used to show me my own shadow ... riding ...
over the breezy uplands'. And later on the effect is
even more vivid: 'I often smile at my consciousness that
certain conservative prepossessions have mingled
themselves for me with the influences of our midland
scenery, from the tops of the elms down to the buttercups
and the little wayside vetches'(34, 36-37). Here, as
quite frequently in her novels, it is difficult to
determine where images fade and thoughts emerge.
Elsewhere, she even states that convictions are images,
and that story-telling cannot exist without images: 'The
modes of telling a story founded on these processes of
outward and inward life derive their effectiveness from
the superior mastery of images and pictures in grasping
the attention ... our earliest, strongest impressions,
our most intimate convictions, are simply images'
(Essays, 445).
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Stories and paintings, then, are founded on the same
basis—pictures. Describing the genesis of his own
fictions, Henry James very often, as we shall see,
believes that a novel or a short story has its origin in
'the image en disponibilite'. For instance, trying to
'retrace and reconstruct' the origin of the germ for The
Portrait of a Lady (1880), he very firmly asserts: 'The
conception of a certain young woman affronting her
destiny, had begun with being all my outfit for the large
building of "The Portrait of Lady"'. And the image
becomes even more distinct as he continues:: 'It came to
be a square and spacious house—or has at least seemed so
to me in this going over it again; but, such as it is, it
had to be put up round my young woman while she stood
there in perfect isolation'(AN, 44, 42, 48).
To James and Eliot a novel was meaningless and
lifeless without 'the picture'. Consequently, most of
their novels can be approached as pictures at an
exhibition—an exhibition that has been arranged with
sensitively scrupulous care. But an understanding of
such an arrangement can be enhanced only through a
comprehension of the image-producing faculty. The
tranformations, tranfigurations, and manifestations of
this faculty in Middlemarch and The Portrait of a Lady
are the main concerns of this study.
To say that imagination is the faculty which
produces images seems somewhat redundant. But it is
precisely the image-producing function which
distinguishes imagination from memory and perception. An
understanding of images, their genesis, form, and
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transformations, necessitates primarily a comprehension
of what we could call their life-cycle, involving
perception, memory, and imagination. But this is running
ahead, since such is the subject of a later chapter. Here
I will only touch upon some very basic distinctions which
will define my approach and justify my choice of images
as the paths to clearer vistas from which any good novel
can be viewed.
Imagination and perception are the most significant
subjects in Coleridge's prose and poetry; specifically,
in his famous distinction between primary and secondary
imagination, Coleridge attributed to imagination a
synthetic function: 'It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates,
in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered
impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to
idealize and to unify' (BL, I, 202). Like Coleridge,
George Eliot very often emphasized the creative and
holistic force of imagination, believing that 'powerful
imagination is not false outward vision, but intense
inward representation, and a creative energy constantly
fed by susceptibility to the veriest minutiae of
experience, which it reproduces and constructs in fresh
and fresh [sic] wholes' (TS, 197).
But what exactly constitutes a whole? Anticipating
criticism of his ending of The Portrait of a Lady, James
remarked that the main objection would be 'that I have
not seen the heroine to the end of her situation— that I
have left her en 1'air—This is both true and false. The
whole of anything is never told; you can only take what
groups together. What I have done has that unity—it
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groups together'.^ But in 'The Art of Fiction' (1884),
Henry James spoke of a different kind of whole—the
organic whole: 'this sense of the story being the idea,
the starting point, of the novel, is the only one that I
see in which it can be spoken of as something different
from its organic whole'. He called this whole 'organic'
because he compared it to an organism which for him
represented the ideal unity of the novel: 'a novel is a
living thing, all one and continuous, like any other
organism, and in proportion as it lives will it be found,
I think, that in each of the parts there is something of
each of the other parts'(PP, 400, 392). Years earlier,
in 1868, defining form in art, George Eliot also spoke of
wholes, stating that 'form ... as distinguished from
merely massive impression, must first depend on the
discrimination of wholes and then on the discrimination
of parts', and she saw the 'highest Form' as 'the highest
organism ... the most varied group of relations bound
together in a wholeness which again has the most varied
relations with all other phenomena. It is only in this
fundamental sense that the word Form can be applied to
Art in general'. Her definition of form in relation to
the organism, though it did not refer to the form of the
novel in particular, is strikingly similar to that of
Henry James, especially when she describes the
interdependence of parts: 'the outline defining the
wholeness of the human body is due to a consensus or
3
Notebooks, edited by F. 0. Matthxessen and K. B.
Murdock (New York, 1947), p. 18.
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constant interchange of effects among its parts. It is
wholeness not merely of mass but of strict and manifold
dependence' (Essays, 432, 433, 435).
It is apparent then that James's famous definition
of unity in the novel, in 1884, echoed that of George
Eliot's of form in art, in 1868. The two novelists have
been long compared and associated with each other but not
for their ideas on organic unity. In the comparison of
the two, even critics favourable to George Eliot have
often found James superior to her, in spite of their
conscious and conscientious attempt to approach and
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evaluate each novelist separately. F. R. Leavis in The
Great Tradition shows the profound effect Eliot had on
James, but he asserts that it is difficult to ascertain
the kind of influence an author has had on another: 'What
one great original artist learns from another, whose
genius and problems are necessarily very different, is
the hardest kind of "influence" to define, even when we
see it to have been of the profoundest importance'.^
Acknowledging Leavis's above assertion, my aim is to show
in what ways the concept of organicism is related to
imagination, and how an understanding of the two can
enhance our appreciation of George Eliot's and Henry
James's novels.
4
See for example, W. J. Harvey, The Art of George
Eliot (London, 1961), pp. 15, 19, 94-95; Joan Bennett,
George Eliot: Her Mind and Her Art (London, 1974), p.
196.
^(London, 1977), pp. 24-26, 18-19.
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Modern critics have often used the word 'organic',
but quite frequently they have avoided fully defining or
examinining it. Rene Wellek, for example, is somewhat
suspicious of the term, and believes 'organicism' to be
'misleading, since it stresses only one aspect, that of
"unity in variety", and leads to biological parallels not
always relevant'Barbara Hardy often uses the term
without defining its implications. In her book The
Appropriate Form, she alludes to Henry James's use of the
term, 'organic form', but she concludes that the term has
'outlived its usefulness'; yet she often employs the term
in her two later books, Critical Essays on George Eliot
7
and Tellers and Listeners. Referring to Henry James's
The Portrait of a Lady, Washington Square (1880), and The
Bostonians (1886), F. R. Leavis points out that these
books 'have the abundant, full-blooded life of well-
8
nourished organisms'. Joan Bennett, in her book on
George Eliot, uses the term in a still different sense.:
First, to show the development of a character: 'it is the
growth of the plant, the gradual unfolding of character
in its environment, that compels attention, not the mere
concatenation of events'; and secondly, to define the
relationship of an individual's life to his social
milieu—'an inner circle ... surrounded by an outer
circle'.
^Theory of Literature, (Middlesex, 1978), p. 27.
7(London, 1964), p. 30; (London, 1970), p. x;




Whereas most critics use the term rather loosely and
generally, David Cecil, in his Early Victorian
Novelists, implicitly and perhaps unintentionally, refers
to a distinction with which romantic critics who
developed the concept of organicism were closely
concerned. Comparing George Eliot's plots to those of
Jane Austen's, he remarks 'we do not feel them to have
grown naturally from their situation like a flower, but
to have been put together deliberately and calculatedly
like a building'.
The distinction betwen mechanical and organic was
one of Coleridge's primary concerns in his Biographia
Literaria^ as well as in his Shakespearean Criticism
(1836-39). In the latter, he distinguishes between
organic and mechanical talent, defining mechanical as the
ability to conceive parts separately and to put them
together afterwards. Form, in this case, is imposed on
the material rather than arising out of it. By contrast,
organic form is 'innate; it shapes as it develops itself
from within' (SC, I, 198).
Very often Coleridge defines organic unity in terms
of the dependence of the whole on its parts. Poetry, he
explains in Biographia Literaria is an 'imitative' art
and 'imitation, as opposed to copying, consists either in
the interfusion of the SAME throughout the radically
DIFFERENT, or of the different throughout a base
radically the same' (II, 56). The principle of 'sameness
in variety' or of 'unity in multeity' is another
"^first edition (New York, 1935), p. 331.
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important concept of organicism, which Coleridge also
includes in his definition of beauty. In this case the
emphasis is on the interdependence of the parts. Beauty,
he very definitely declares, is 'THE REDUCTION OF MANY TO
ONE'; and he continues: 'The sense of beauty subsists in
simultaneous intuition of the relation of parts, each to
each, and of all to the whole' (BL, II, 238-39). It is
important that Coleridge expanded the meaning of organic
unity to encompass, besides poetry, 'works in all the
branches of the fine arts' (BL, II, 261-62).
The interdependence between the parts and the whole
is an important concept in modern definitions of
organicism. For James Benziger, to take one example,
organic unity 'is a comparison of the unity of a work of
art to that unity which ordinary men imagine they
perceive in a tree, a unity which is the expression of
one indwelling force or spirit'; for M. H. Abrams, as for
Benziger, organicism is the philosophy 'whose major
categories are derived metaphorically from the attributes
of living and growing things'."'"''" But Orsini adds another
dimension by objecting to Abrams's definition;
organicism, Orsini believes, ought to be defined,
instead, as an 'aesthetic doctrine whose major category
is the synthetic unity of a multiplicity, to be found,
actually and literally, in works of art, and only
metaphorically, and so less exactly, in living beings'.
In support of this assertion he cites Plato's definition
i i
'Organic Unity: Leibniz to Coleridge', PMLA, 66,
no. 2 (March 1951), 24-48 (p. 33); The Mirror and the
Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (London,
1960), p. 168.
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which likens, rather than equates, a work of art to an
organism, in order to facilitate our understanding, but
the simile itself is not indispensable to the definition
12
of organic unity. Thus Orsini liberates the theory of
organicism from the 'biological parallels not always
relevant'—Wellek's objection, and typical of critical
scepticism about organicism.
Yet the simile of organism does elucidate our
understanding of two important tenets of the theory of
organicism: 'incompleteness', and synthesis of 'diverse
materials'. An organic growth is an open-ended process,
Abrams explains, so should a work of art nurture 'a sense
of the promise of the incomplete, and the glory of the
imperfect'. And as 'a plant assimilates the most diverse
materials of earth and air, so the synthetic power of
imagination "reveals itself", in Coleridge's famous
phrase, "in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or
13
discordant qualities"'.
Whether it be the assimilation of 'diverse
materials', or the reconciliation of opposites,
organicism does share with imagination a synthetic or an
integrative quality. It is not then unreasonable to
assume that organicism is an outgrowth of the synthetic
function of the imagination or, rather, that it is a
philosophy which seeks to explain the way the imagination
integrates 'diverse' or 'discordant' qualities.
Integration is the principle of c^jpanicism which Stephen
12
'The Organic Concepts of Aesthetics', Comparative
Literature, 21, no. 1 (Winter 1969), 1-30 (p. 27).
14
Pepper examines in his book The Basis of Criticism in the
Arts, demonstrating that under this principle
observations which seemed unconnected turn out to be
integral parts of the whole, and an inability to perceive
them as such is seen by the organicist as 'the weakness
of the spectator'. Such a theory, Pepper claims, leads
to a recreative criticism, according to which 'artist,
critic, and spectator all come intimately together ...
for they all have the common enterprise of finding the
maximum integration and satisfaction for the materials
14
before them'. And the most significant aim of
recreative criticism is to enhance the pleasure derived
from our encounters with the literary world by showing us
the ways we can bridge the distance between the author's
and the reader's imagination.
The value of organicism as a critical theory has
been expressed by critics like Cleanth Brooks, who sees
organicism as the basis of practical criticism, and
attributes to it 'the best hope that we have for reviving
the study of poetry and of the humanities generally'.^
Basic to our comprehension of organicism as a critical
theory, Orsini remarks, is our understanding of the
difference between organic unity and organic form.
'Organic unity', he believes, 'consists in the harmony of
the parts of a work with the whole and with each other,
as in a living body (organic simile), the parts being
"^(Cambridge, Massachussetts, 1949), pp. 74, 89.
Irony and "Ironic" Poetry', College English, 9,
no. 5 (February 1948) , 231-37 (p. 237) .
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materially separable (as in a living body), such as the
lines or stanzas of a poem, the words of a sentence, the
sentences of a text.... But organic form is not
materially separable from its content, and is present in
all the parts of the whole'. Elsewhere, Orsini further
delineates the advantages as well as the problems of such
a critical concept. To begin with, under such a theory,
one has to derive one's judgement of value from an
analysis of the work itself, and such an approach
eliminates subjective judgement as well as reliance on
external sources of evidence, such as sociology or
psychology. Furthermore, the organic principle respects
the individuality of a work of art because it cannot
determine in advance the 'division or character of the
parts'. But determining which are the actual parts of a
a given work is the primary difficulty of this
V, 16approach.
Before deciding which are the constituents of a
novel, we ought to look more closely at some of the
priciples of organicism which we have isolated so far.
'Unity in multeity' implies the relationship of the parts
to the whole, their integration or synthesis into the
whole, but also their mutual interdependence as well as
their independence from the whole as complete or
'rounded' units. Furthermore, we have observed that
imagination and organic unity display a synthetic
quality.
16'Coleridge and Schlegel Reconsidered', Comparative
Literature, 16, no. 2 (Spring 1964), 97-118 (p. 113);
'The Organic Concepts of Aesthetics', pp. 5-6, 10.
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Perception and imagination also share a synthetic
quality. Following experiments on visual perception,
Ulric Neisser concludes that the 'perceiver synthesizes a
model or schema of the scene before him using information
from each successive fixation to add detail or to extend
construction. This constructed whole is what guides his
movements'. Because of the constructive rather than
copying process of perception, Neisser explains, it is
difficult to defend the long-held assumption of students
of perception that dreams and phantasies are
'"hallucinatory" and thus irrelevant to mental seeing',
because 'logically a sharp distinction between perception
and hallucination would be easy enough if perception were
copies of the retinal image; hallucinations would then be
experiences that do not copy that image. But since
perception does more than mirror the stimulus (and since
hallucinations often incorportate stimulus information),
this distinction is not clear-cut. Moreover, a number of
recent findings seem to point up very specific relations
17
between the processes of seeing and of imagining'.
With this in mind, we can readily accept Gaston
Bachelard's invitation to consider 'literary documents as
realities of the imagination ... as real as those of
perception'(PS, 158). Or to see the literary image as
vivid and lively as a perceptual image.
Since both Henry James and George Eliot believed
that the literary work of art is based on images, and
since we have already seen that imagination is the image-
' The Processes of Vision', Scientific American,
219, no. 3 (September 1968), 204-214 (pp. 208, 210).
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producing and integrating faculty, it is not unreasonable
to accept images as being the 'parts' of their novels.
Images display the 'interfusion of the same' (imagination,
governing idea) throughout the 'radically different'
(each image); they are interdependent (emerging from each
other, deriving their significance from the whole);
independent or rounded (since they can be regarded
separately); and incomplete (they cannot be fully
understood in isolation from the whole).
But the license permitting us to enter a novel
should involve an exchange of the subjective or objective
critical alternatives for what Bachelard calls a state of
'non-knowing' which 'is not a form of ignorance but a
difficult transcendence of knowledge' (PS, xxviii-xxix).
For Bachelard the essence of our enjoyment of images
depends on our ability to 'dephilosophize' ourselves, in
order to experience 'the shocks that being receives from
new images, shocks which are always the phenomena of
youthful being' (PS, 236). His motto in Poetics of Space
that images should 'be lived directly', that they should
'be taken as sudden events in life' (p. 47), certainly
seems congenial to Coleridge's 'sense of wonder' and
'freshness of sensation'. But, what is even more
important to this study is the fact that Bachelard's goal
clearly echoes Eliot's purpose in Middlemarch (1871) and
James's aim in The Portrait of a Lady. Unless we are
willing to see, so James suggests, we cannot look at
Isabel's portrait. And unless we are willing to abandon
our 'theoretic' nature, or unless we are eager to
perceive the physical world of Middlemarch, Eliot
18
indicates, we will fail to grasp the significance of the
book, just as Dorothea fails whenever she does not see
what she looks at.
CHAPTER 1
'LOSING THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF WORDS'
'Should children', Coleridge asks in a letter to
Thomas Poole (1797), 'be permitted to read Romances, and
Relations of Giants and Magicians, and Genii?' And he
answers: 'I have formed my faith in the affirmative. I
know no other way of giving the mind a love of "the
Great" and "the Whole"'(CCL, I, 384). More than a
hundred years later, Bruno Bettelheim was advocating the
same view in his book The Uses of Enchantment. A
holistic perspective has often been adopted by
nineteeenth and twentieth-century philosophers and
1
scientists. Carlyle, for instance, speaks of society as
a whole and man as its integral part: 'Society was (in
the days of Roman Republic) what we call whole, in both
senses of the word. The individual man was in himself a
whole, a complete union; and could combine with his
1
(London, 1976). See for example, D. C. Phillips,
'Organicism in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Century', Journal of the History of Ideas, XXXI, no. 3
(July-September 1970), 413-32; Joseph Needham, 'S. T.
Coleridge as a Philosophical Biologist', Science
Progress, 20, (1926), 692-702.
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fellows as the living member of a greater whole'; and the
individual's work, so he believes, 'lies not isolated,
stranded; a whole busy World, a whole native-element of
mysterious never-resting Force, environs it; will catch
2
it up; will carry it forward, or else backward'. In a
similar vein, T. S. Eliot states that individual works
can be better interpreted and appreciated when regarded
as parts of a cultural whole: 'I thought of literature
then', he says in 'The Function of Criticism', 'as I think
of it now, of the literature of the world, of the
literature of Europe, of the literature of a single
country, not as a collection of the writings of
individuals, but as "organic wholes", as systems in
relation to which ... individual works of literary art,
and the works of individual artists have their
significance'.^
That Coleridge's influence can be traced in all
these fields is, of course, a matter difficult to
ascertain, especially since the idea of organicism was
first developed by Plato. Coleridge, has, nevertheless,
been recognized as 'the father of holism in English
criticism', and he, more clearly and fully than modern
organicists, developed a theory of art and literary
criticism in his aesthetical essays, 'On Taste', 'The
2
Critical and Miscellaneous Essays: Collected and
Republished, 4 vols (London, 1857), III, 12, IV, 11.
^Selected Essays, 1917-1932, first edition (New
York, 1932), pp. 12-13
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Principles of Genial Criticism', and 'On Beauty'. His
comments in Biographia Literaria and Shakespearean
Criticism, I believe, often elucidate some of the ideas
expressed in his essays and are especially relevant to
George Eliot's and Henry James's organic theory of the
novel.
We have already briefly touched upon Eliot's and
James's concept of an organic whole. In this chapter we
will examine some of the most important concepts of
organic unity, such as balance or proportion, feeling,
germ, and reconciliation of opposites; furthermore, we
will explore some of the ideas which, besides organic
form and organic unity, are necessary for the composition
of a given work.
George Eliot's knowledge of Coleridge is evident in
her many references to him in her letters and critical
essays. In an early letter to Maria Lewis (1841), she
promises to make some 'delicious extracts' of Coleridge
(GEL, I, 136), and a year later, she claims: 'I feel with
Coleridge, that the notion of Revelation abandoned, there
is ever a tendency towards Pantheism, and the personality
of the Deity is not to be maintained quite satisfactorily
apart from Christianity' (GEL, I, 136). Her intimate
knowledge of Coleridge is evident when we see that he
4 . .
"W. K. Wxmsatt, ed., Explication as Criticism
(London, 1963), p. 5.
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says, 'as we recede from anthropomorphism we must go
either to the Trinity or Pantheism'.^
Quite frequently, her commments on Coleridge are
condenscending, as, for instance, in her allusion to
Carlyle's Life of Sterling, which, she writes to Mr and
Mrs Charles Bray , contains 'an inimitable description of
Coleridge and his eternal monologue, "To sit as a passive
bucket and be pumped into, whether one like it or not,
can in the end be exhilarating to no creature"' (GEL, I,
370). And in a letter to Elma Stuart, she comments in
the same spirit, 'but I will not be like Coleridge and
talk humility, which somehow never is active when one
thinks one's audience likely to assent' (GEL, VI, 82).
Her review of Collier's Seven Lectures on Shakespeare and
Milton (1857) is also diminishing: 'Coleridge was not so
great a man that every scrap of his must needs be
interesting; indeed the public is already in possession
of volumes published by himself which it declines to
read; and these scraps of lectures would scarcely gain
admittance into any good periodical if they were now
offered as original articles'. Yet even these
disparaging remarks reveal that Eliot had read Coleridge
very closely. But besides Coleridge, Eliot was also
familiar with A. W. Schlegel, Goethe, and Kant, all of
them writers who first explored some of the organic ideas
^Anima Poetae, edited by E. H. Coleridge (London,
1895), p. 14.
^'Belles Lettres', Westminster Review, American
edition, 67 (January 1857) , 306-326 (pp. 319-20).
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on which Coleridge based his own philosophy and
aesthetics.
Henry James was familiar with Coleridge too. This
is especially evident in his preface to 'The Coxon
Fund' (1894), the subject of which, he muses, 'has long
been with me, but was, beyond doubt, to have found its
interest clinched by my perusal ... of Mr. J. Dyke
Campbell's admirable monograph on S. T. Coleridge. The
wondrous figure of that genius had long haunted me and
circumstances into which I needn't here enter had within
a few years contributed much to making it vivid' (AN,
229). No doubt James's 'My Friend Bingham' (1867) with
its explicit and implicit allusions to 'The Ancient
Mariner' also owes its germ to Coleridge. James's
prefaces, his own Biographia Literaria, as Percy Lubbock
calls them, are permeated with organic terms and
definitions. Naturally, authorities on organicism, such
as Rene Wellek and Richard Fogle have recognized James as
an important spokesman of organicism, or appropriately,
7
as Fogle calls him, a 'thorougoing organicist'.
The powerful effect of Coleridge's organic theory on
Henry James and George Eliot becomes even more striking
when we consider for a moment Coleridge's analogy between
the human mind and a living plant, the analogue which, as
The Letters of Henry James, 2 vols (London, 1920),
I, xviii. See 'Henry James's Literary Theory and
Criticism', American Literature, XXX (1958), 293-321;
'Organic Form in American Criticism: 1840-1870' in Floyd
Stovall, ed., The Development of American Literary
Criticism (North Carolina, 1955), pp. 75-112 (p. 86).
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M. H. Abrams says, was 'destined to alter more
drastically the conceptions of mind, art, and the
universe than all the apparatus of lamps, fountains, and
g
wind-harps' :
Lo! with the rising sun it
commences its outward life and enters
into open communion with all the
elements, at once assimilating them
to itself and to each other. At the
same moment it strikes its roots and
unfolds its leaves, absorbs and
respires, steams forth its cooling
vapor and finer fragrance, and
breathes a repairing spirit, at once
the food and tone of the atmosphere
that feeds it. Loi—at the touch of
light how it returns an air akin to
light, and yet with the same pulse
effectuates its own secret growth,
still contracting to fix-what
expanding it had refined (CCW, I,
462).
It was precisely the analogy of a plant which Eliot used
when she was writing to John Blackwood in 1859 of The
Mill on the Floss; 'But my stories grow in me like
plants, and this is only in the leaf-bud. I have faith
that the flower will come. Not enough faith, though, to
make me like the idea of beginning to print till the
flower is fairly out—till I know the end as well as the
beginning' (GEL, III, 133). Contraction and expansion,
internal and external: this is a rhythm crucial not only
to The Mill on the Floss (1860) but to her other novels,
as we shall see.
James's concern with the same vital rhythm is
primary in his novels and is often explicitly articulated
g
The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 68.
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in his critical prefaces. Darkness and light, expansion
and contraction, are indeed the elements and the forces,
we are told, which have determined the growth of the germ
of The Portrait of a Lady: 'These are the fascinations
of the fabulist's art, these lurking forces of expansion,
these necessities of upspringing in the seed, these
beautiful determinations, on the part of the idea
entertained, to grow as tall as possible, to push into
the light and the air and thickly flower there' (AN, 42).
The same rhythm exactly permeates his preface to The
American (1876); here James's seed seems to grow into
Coleridge's plant: 'I was charmed with my idea ... and
precisely because it had so much to give, I think, must I
have dropped it for the time into the deep well of
unconscious cerebration; not without, the hope,
doubtless, that it might eventually emerge from the
reservoir, as one had already known the buried treasure
to come to light, with a firm iridescent surface and a
notable increase of weight' (AN, 23).
For Coleridge a plant or a tree remained a
fascinating figure, which he often used to illustrate his
conceptions of life, poetry, and beauty. Parts and their
interrelationships, 'the many, still seen as many',
becoming one are the primary concerns in Coleridge's
definition of beauty. The frost on a window pane, which
by Coleridge's imagination is transformed into a tree,
distinctly illustrates 'the parts, and their relations to
each other, and to the whole! Here is the stalk ... and
here the branches ... or flowers. Nor will our pleasure
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be less, should the caprice of the crystallization
represent some object disagreeable, to us, provided only
we can see or fancy the component parts each in relation
to each, and all forming a whole' (BL, II, 232). In his
view beauty is inextricably bound to pleasure and a
poet's duty should be to imitate only the beautiful in
nature, which he defined as 'the union of the shapely
(formosum) with the vital' (BL, II, 257). In the
organic, Coleridge emphasized, beauty is not 'mere
regularity of form', since 'it may be present in a
disagreeable object, in which the proportion of the parts
constitutes a whole; it does not arise from association
... but sometimes lies in the rupture of association'
(BL, II, 257).
Both George Eliot and Henry James believed that the
novelist ought to create and shape the beautiful. Beauty
and form are Eliot's concerns in her essay on Wilhelm
Meister in 1855: 'A ray of sunlight falling on the
dreariest sandbank will often serve the painter for a
fine picture; the tragedian may take for his subject the
most hideous passions if they serve as the background for
one divine deed of tenderness or heroism, and so the
novelist may place before us every aspect of human life
where there is some trait of love, or endurance or
helplessness to call forth our best sympathies' (Essays,
146). For James too a great work of art 'must lift up
the reader's heart' and a subject v/hich is 'morally
hideous' should be avoided in preference for 'moral
beauty' (NR, 225-26).
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Beauty, furthermore, Coleridge believed to be
independent of proportion, as is the case of a beautiful
swan: 'We ask not what proportion the neck bears to the
body;—through all the changes of graceful motion it
brings itself into unity, as an harmonious part of an
harmonious whole. The very word "part" imperfectly
conveys what we see and feel; for the moment we look at
it in division, the charm ceases' (BL, II, 245). Since
their work quite frequently seems to move ahead of them,
it is small wonder that both George Eliot and Henry James
saw beauty as independent of proportion. George Eliot,
for instance, succumbs to the 'imperious activity' the
germ of a new work has within her (GEL, V, 388).
Specifically in reference to Middlemarch (1870), she
speaks about beginning a story, 'Miss Brooke', 'without
any very serious intention of carrying it out lengthily.
It is a subject which has been recorded among my possible
themes ever since I began to write fiction, but will
probably take new shapes in the development' (GEL, V,
124). In a similar vein, Henry James claims that he
originally conceived of The Sacred Fount as a short story
but saw it growing 'by a rank force of its own' into a
book (HJL, I, 408).
If the author is to allow a book to 'grow by a force
of its own', then it is only natural that he should not
worry about proportion. This is well illustrated by some
comments James makes in his preface to The Tragic Muse
(1889), where, he admits, 'again and again, perversely,
incurably, the centre of my structure would insist on
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placing itself not, so to speak, in the middle'.
Proportion, undoubtedly, has not been one of his goals in
the composition of his novels: 'I urge myself to the
confession that in very few of my productions, to my eye,
has the organic centre succeeded in getting into proper
position' (AN, 85). Like Coleridge, Eliot too was
sensitive to the effect created by the part seen 'in
division' and thought in 1873 that critics who judge a
work as a whole were rare; most of them, she regretted,
'pick out morsels to suit their own palate' (GEL, V,
373). In the same year, in a letter to her editor, John
Blackwood, she urges her readers to adopt a holistic
perspective: 'Unless my readers are more moved towards
the ends I seek by my works as wholes than by an
assemblage of extracts, my writings are a mistake' (GEL,
V, 458-59).
To illustrate the interdependence of the parts and
the whole Coleridge quite often chose the figure of the
circle. One of his examples included an old coach wheel
'disfigured with tart and dirt'. Yet if we '"regard the
figure abstractly"', he says to an imaginary companion,
'"there is beauty in that wheel, and you yourself would
not only admit, but would feel it, had you never seen a
wheel before. See how the rays proceed from the centre
to the circumferences, and how many different images are
distinctly comprehended at one glance, as forming one
whole, and each part in some harmonious relation to each
and to all"' (BL, II, 232-33). Later on he vividly
demonstrates how the circle is the configuration which
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determines the beauty in Raphael's 'Galatea'; the circle,
he says, is 'perceived at first sight; but with what
multiplicity of rays and chords within the area of the
circular group, with what elevations and depressions of
circumference ... is the balance, the perfect
reconciliation, effected between these two conflicting
principles of the FREE LIFE, and the confining FORM!'
(BL, II, 234-35). The figure of the circle and its
meaning is even better elucidated in one of Coleridge's
lectures on Shakespeare, in which he compares Shakespeare
with a geometrician, who 'when tracing a circle, had his
eye upon the centre as the important point, but included
also in his vision a wide circumference; so Shakespeare,
while his eye rested upon an individual character, always
embraced a wide circumference of others, without
diminishing the separate interest he intended to attach
to the being he pourtrayed' (SC, II, 33-34).
Circles are identified with nature in the 'Essay on
Beauty'. Without curvilinear lines, Coleridge declares,
rectilinear lines are mechanical and lifeless, 'the
determined ab extra..♦. The curve line is a modification
of the force from without by the force from within, or
the spontaneous. These are not arbitrary symbols, but
the language of nature, universal and intuitive' (BL, II,
251). Coleridge amplifies the significance of circles in
the 'law of bicentrality' in nature, according to which
'every Whole, whether without parts, or composed of parts
... must be conceived as a possible centre in itself, and
at the same time as having a centre out of itself and
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common to it with all other parts of the same System'.
Philip Ritterbush, a modern organicist, also sees the
'curvilinear motifs' in painting as 'images of growth,
interdependence of parts, and differentiation directed
9
from within'.
The figure of the circle was often appealing to
George Eliot; it is the 'sphere of art', for instance, to
which she refers in her essay on Wilhelm Meister. In
Middlemarch it is easy to see how the law of bicentrality
could be applied to the depiction of her characters,
since each character can be seen as having a 'centre' in
himself and 'at the same time as having a centre out' of
himself, and 'common to it with all other parts of the
same System' (society). Alluding to Dorothea as an
example, the narrator in the novel explains, 'we are all
of us born in moral stupidity taking the world as an
udder to feed our supreme selves'. And she proceeds with
Dorothea's case: 'Dorothea had early begun to emerge
from that stupidity, but yet it had been easier to her to
imagine how she would devote herself to Mr Casaubon, and
become wise and strong in his strength and wisdom, than
to conceive with that distinctness which is no longer
reflection but feeling—an idea wrought back to the
directness of sense, like the solidity of objects—that
9
Quoted by Gordon McKenzie in Organic Unity in
Coleridge (Berkeley, 1939), p. 41; 'Organic Form:
Aesthetics and Objectivity in the Study of Form in the
Life Sciences', in Organic Form: The Life of an Idea,
edited by G. S. Rousseau (London, 1972), pp. 25-59 (p.
52) .
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he had an equivalent centre of self, whence the lights
and shadows must always fall with a certain difference'
(p. 243). In this case George Eliot directly connects
bicentrality with an organic expression, 'to feed'.
But more fully than George Eliot, Henry James has
elaborated the figure of the circle as the figure of
unity in a novel. 'Really, universally, relations stop
nowhere', he says in the preface to Roderick Hudson, 'and
the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally to draw,
by a geometry of his own, the circle within which they
shall happily appear to do so' (AN, 5). In this case,
James compares the artist with a geometrician, exactly as
Coleridge does in his description of Shakespeare. In his
preface to The Wings of the Dove (1902), James admits
that he has always proceeded by centres and sees this as
'the logic' of a 'superior process' (AN, 300). The
centre of the novel is most often placed in the
consciousness of the most important character, as he says
in his account of the germ of The Portrait of a Lady:
'"Place the centre of the subject in the young woman's
own consciousness", I said to myself' (AN, 51). And in
his criticism of other novelists, the centre is most
frequently his criterion of excellence. Thus, for
instance, he praises Howard Sturgis for 'sticking to the
real line and centre of your theme—the consciousness and
view of Sainty himself, and your dealing with things,
with the whole fantasmogoria, as presented to him only,
not otherwise going behind them' (HJL, I, 429). The
significance of the centre, as the key to composition, is
32
revealed in his preface to The Tragic Muse (1889), where
it is called 'the organic centre* (AN, 85). And the
building of the novel through a centre and a circle is
given in detail in his preface to The Awkward Age (1899):
'I drew on a sheet of paper ... the neat figure of a
circle consisting of a number of small rounds disposed at
equal distance about a central object. The central
object was my situation, my subject in itself, to which
the thing would owe its title, and small rounds
represented so many distinct lamps, as I liked to call
them, the function of each of which would be to light
with all due intensity one of its aspects' (AN, 110).
This process clearly echoes once again Coleridge's
analogy between Shakespeare and a geometrician.
On this principle of unity, Coleridge also believed,
depends the writer's success at holding the reader's
attention: 'In order to derive pleasure from the
occupation of the mind, the principle of unity must
always be present, so that in the midst of the multeity
the centripetal force be never suspended, nor the sense
be fatigued by the predominance of the centrifugal force.
This unity in multeity I have elsewhere stated as the
priciple of beauty' (BL, II, 262). Also referring to
reading, though in a different sense, Northrop Frye in
The Anatomy of Criticism echoes Coleridge when he says,
'whenever we read anything, we find our attention moving
in two directions at once. One direction is outward or
centrifugal, in which we keep going outside our reading,
from the individual words to the things they mean....
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The other direction is inward, or centripetal, in which
we try to develop from the words a sense of the larger
verbal pattern they make.... In all literary verbal
structures the final direction of meaning is inward'.^
In Shakespearean Criticism the figure of the circle
is even more significant, for Coleridge identifies the
main characters with the centre of the play from which
the rest should evolve. His lectures and notes on
Shakespeare are valuable sources for anyone exploring the
philosophy of organicism; there Coleridge, more fully
than in any of his other works, defines the meaning of
the germ and the principle of the reconciliation of
opposites, both significant principles of organic unity.
Repeatedly, Coleridge praises Shakespeare for his
characters, because they are 'never introduced for the
sake of the plot, but his plot arises out of his
characters' (SC, II, 315). At another point, in some
lecture notes on Shakespeare's characteristics, Coleridge
remarks that we are interested in the plot only as it
reveals the characters: 'Shakespeare did not take the
trouble of inventing stories. It is the man himself that
Shakespeare for the first time makes us acquainted with'
(SC, I, 226).
George Eliot seems to be summarizing all these
points very early in her career in a letter to John
Blackwood in 1857, where she declares, 'but I am unable
to alter anything in relation to the delineation or
10
(London, 1957), pp. 73-74.
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development of character, as my stories grow out of my
psychological conception of the dramatis personae. For
example the behaviour of Caterina in the gallery is
essential to my conception of her nature and to the
development of that nature in the plot' (GEL, II, 299).
Similarly, Henry James stated in 1884 in his 'Art of
Fiction', that there should not be a distinction between
novels of character and those of plot, since 'when one
says picture one says of character, when one says novel
one says of incident, and the terms may be transposed at
will. What is character but the determination of
incident? What is incident but the illustration of
character? What is either a picture or a novel that is
not of character?' (PP, 392). Referring to the same
distinction, in an essay on Trollope in 1883, James
declares: 'character, in any sense in which we can get at
it, is action, and action is plot, and any plot which
hangs together, even if it pretend to interest us only in
the fashion of a Chinese puzzle, plays upon our emotion,
our suspense, by means of personal references' (PP, 106).
Thus James echoes Coleridge not only in his belief that
plot should grow from the character, but also in
connnecting the character with action, and, in turn, in
relating action to the reader's emotional involvement.
Through Hamlet, Coleridge says, 'Shakespeare wished to
impress upon us the truth, that action is the chief end
of existence—that no faculties of intellect, however
brilliant, can be considered valuable, or indeed
otherwise than as misfortunes, if they withdraw us from,
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or render us repugnant to action, and lead us to think
and think of doing, until the time has elapsed when we
can do anything effectually' (SC_, II, 197).
Coleridge's objection to a plot superimposed upon a
play was congruous with his idea of organic or vital form
as developing ab intra. To the organic or vital was also
connected his belief that Shakespeare 'became Othello,
and spoke as Othello, in such circumstances, must have
spoken' (SC, II, 136). Genius, according to Coleridge,
'imitated', did not 'copy' nature and this is why
Shakespeare 'makes men on the stage what they are in
nature, in a moment transports himself into the very
being of each personage, and, instead of cutting out
artificial puppets, he brings before us the men
themselves' (SC, II, 171). Echoing Coleridge, but
sounding much more modern and matter-of-fact, George
Eliot also used character presentation as a basis for her
distinction between a genius and a writer in 1856:
'Doubtless there is a great deal of nonsense talked about
genius and inspiration, as if genius did not and must not
labour; but, after all, there remains the difference
between the writer who thoroughly possesses you by his
creation, and the writer who only awakens your curiosity
and makes you recognise his ability; and this difference
may as well be called "genius" as anything else. Perhaps
a truer statement of the difference is, that the one
writer is himself thoroughly possessed by his creation—
he lives in his characters; while the other remains
outside them and dresses them up' (Essays, 329).
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As in poetry so in drama Coleridge believed feeling
to be the unifying force. His comments on Romeo and
Juliet describe the significance of feeling especially
wel 1:
A unity of feeling pervades the whole
of his plays. In Romeo and Juliet
all is youth and spring—it is youth
with its folies, its virtues, its
precipitancies; it is spring with its
odours, flowers, and transiency:--the
same feeling commences, goes through,
and ends the play. The old men, the
Capulets and Montagues, are not
common old men; they have an
eagerness, a hastiness, a
precipitancy—the effect of
spring.... With Juliet love has all
that is tender and melancholy in the
nightingale, all that is voluptuous
in the rose, with whatever is sweet
in the freshness of spring; but it
ends with a long deep sigh, like the
breeze of the evening. This unity of
character pervades the whole of his
dramas (SC, II, 265).
Feeling is often expressed in terms of contrasting or
opposing qualities within a character, as in York's
personality where we see 'the weakness of old age and the
overwhelmingness of circumstance struggling with his
sense of duty; and the function of both exhibited in
boldness of words and feebleness in act. How (like all
Shakespeare's plays) the characters are connected, all by
likeness or contrast' (S£, I, 154). In Romeo and Juliet
we see the contrast between Tybalt and Capulet in the
first act when we witness 'the old man's impetuosity at
onde contrasting , yet harmonized with the young
Tybalt's' (SC, I, 7).
George Eliot too saw contrast as the fundamental
element of organic unity. In her article 'Liszt, Wagner
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and Weimar' (1855), the Coleridgean overtones are
striking: 'certainly Wagner has admirably fulfilled his
own requisition of organic unity in the opera. In his
operas there is a gradual unfolding and elaboration of
that fundamental contrast of emotions, that collision of
forces, which is the germ of the tragedy; just as the
leaf of the plant is successively elaborated into
branching stem and compact bud and radiant corolla'
(Essays, 104). Contrast and organic unity are fused in
James's preface to The Tragic Muse: 'the happy and
fruitful truth, at all events, was that there was
opposition—why there should be was another matter—and
that the opposition would beget an infinity of
situations' (AN, 80).
For Coleridge too contrast is fundamental to the
growth of a composition, and his definition of the germ
is remarkably similar to that of James and Eliot. The
intense conflict within Hamlet's character, for instance,
his attention to 'outward objects' constrasted with his
'meditation on inward thoughts' is the opposition from
which, Coleridge affirms, all the other characters in the
play develop. But even when speaking of Shakespeare's
plays in general, Coleridge describes a character or a
play as being the germ of a later one. In Richard III,
for example, we are told, we can see Bolingbroke
contrasted to Richard, and at the same time we can see
the germs which were fully developed later on in Henry
IV. Organic unity is even tighter in Shakespeare's
historical plays: Henry IV is in a way the germ of Henry
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V; 'and the whole of Gloucester's character in Henry VI.
is so different from any other that we are prepared for
Richard III' (SC, II, 281). We can see how this could be
true of James's and Eliot's works. Quite explicitly
Henry James admits that Christina Light in Roderick
Hudson was the germ of Princess Casamassima. The
interrelationships among the characters of the different
novels by James or by Eliot are at times evident. It is
not difficult, for instance, to see how Maggie Tulliver's
renouncing nature could be the germ of Romola, and how
Romola, in turn, anticipates Dorothea, or how Gwendolen
echoes Dorothea.
The germ of a play, Coleridge believes, appears in
the first scenes. Speaking of Richard II, he applauds
'the judgement with which Shakespeare always in his first
scenes prepares, and yet how naturally and with what a
concealment of art, for the catastrophe. How he presents
the germ of all the after events in Richard's
insincerity, partiality, arbitrariness, favoritism, and
in the proud tempestuous temperament of his barons' (SC,
I, 153). George Eliot seems to refer to precisely the
same idea in 1855 in her definition of an organic whole,
which she describes as growing 'like a palm, its earliest
portion containing the germ and prevision of all the
rest' (Essays, 102).
Since Shakespeare conceived his characters, as
Coleridge often points out, in terms of an opposition, it
follows that the germ could often embody a contrast or an
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opposition. This idea is consistent with Coleridge's
concept of organic unity as Richard Fogle claims:
Coleridge's method of analysis may be
deduced from his doctrine of organic
unity. He looks first for an
informing principle, correspondent to
the all-pervading life of an organic
body: the "germ" that contains the
oak potentially the completed form,
as the acorn contains the oak. The
principle or germ appears
intelligibly (since reality is
intelligible only in the form of
polar opposites) as an an opposition;
in drama, for example, it appears as
a dislocation in the hero's mind
which is the source of the drama's
action. This dislocation is
psychological, a disproportion of
mental faculties..
Coleridge, then, saw the germ of a play as appearing in
its first scenes, and he identified the germ with
opposition embodied in the main character. This
opposition is psychological, in other words it involves
emotions. Speaking of Edmund he points out that 'he is
the known and acknowledged son of the princely Gloster
[sic]. Edmund, therefore, has both the germ of pride and
the conditions best fitted to evolve and ripen it into a
predominant feeling' (SC, I, 56). And of Shakespeare's
technique in the first scenes of his plays, he says,
'Shakespeare shewed great'judgement in his first scenes;
they contained the germ of the ruling passion which was
to be developed hereafter' (SC, II, 279).
But before examining how Coleridge believed an
artist can express feeling, it is worth looking into some
"^The Idea of Coleridge's Criticism (Berkeley,
1962), p. 12.
40
of the ways in which he described oppositions in his
literary criticism. Again we have to turn to Hamlet, the
character who first stimulated Coleridge's philosophical
criticism. 'What then was the point', he asks, 'to which
Shakespeare directed himself in Hamlet?' And he answers:
'He intended to pqurtray a person, in whose view the
external world, and all its incidents and objects, were
comparatively dim, and of no interest in themselves, and
which began to interest only, when they were reflected in
the mirror of his mind. Hamlet beheld external things in
the same way that a man of vivid imagination, who shuts
his eyes, sees what has previously made an impression on
his organs' (j3C, II, 192). It is clear, in this case,
that Coleridge sees opposition as the dialectic between
the external and the internal, which he clarifies
elsewhere as being Hamlet's 'thoughts, images and fancy
[being] far more vivid than his perceptions, and his very
perceptions instantly passing thro' the medium of his
contemplations; and acquiring as they pass a form and
color not naturally their own' (SC, I, 37).
External and internal, the rhythm which as we have
seen permeates the analogy of the plant, is also the
polarity which a genius can reconcile in a work of art,
simply by making 'the external internal, the internal
external ... nature thought, and thought nature' (BL, II,
258). And in 'every work of art', Coleridge goes on to
say, 'there is a reconcilement of the external with the
internal; the conscious is so impressed on the
unconscious as to appear in it' (BL, II, 258). The
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importance of the dialectic between the external and
internal is revealed in Coleridge's analysis of Venus and
Adonis. In this case, the outward and inward are seen as
constituting the whole: 'It is throughout as if a
superior spirit more intuitive, more intimately
conscious, even than the characters themselves not only
of every outward look and act, but of the flux and reflux
of the mind in all its subtlest thoughts and feelings,
were placing the whole before our view' (BL, II, 15).
Another facet of the external-internal opposition is
the subject-object dialectic. Art, for Coleridge, is the
reconciler of subject and object, or of 'nature and man.
It is, therefore, the power of humanizing nature, or
infusing the thoughts and passions of man into every
thing which is the object of his contemplation' (BL, II,
253). Elsewhere, Coleridge expresses this reconciliation
more concretely as the fusion between the poet and his
subject matter. Such fusion is enacted through intense
sympathy as in the case of Wordsworth, whose excellence
is evident in the 'Affliction of Margaret': 'Here the man
and the poet lose and find themselves in each other, the
one as glorified, the other as substantiated' (BL, II,
123) .
Twentieth-century critics explain Coleridge's
fusion of the subject with the object in terms of an
active interchange which results in a higher form of
knowledge. I. A. Richards, for instance, explains how
the subject and the object exchange places mementarily:
'The subject (the self) has gone into what it perceives,
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and what it perceives is, in this sense, itself. So the
object becomes the subject and the subject the object'.
Through this interchange the subject is somewhat
expanded, since 'the subject is what it is through the
12
objects it has been'. In the Romantic period, the
merging of the subjective with the objective is some kind
of creation, the foundation of 'all true knowledge'.
/
This is how Albert Gerard approaches Coleridge's concept
/
of 'vital knowledge'; such a knowledge, Gerard explains,
is possible by a means of an 'intimate fusion' taking
place 'between the consciousness and its object' during
which 'the percept becomes an integral part of the
percipient's mind'. But the subject-object fusion, Ren^
Wellek asserts, is only a feature of Romanticism, an
'attempt apparently doomed to failure and abandoned by
.13
our time .
The merging of the subject and the object, though,
has not been abandoned by our time, but has been adopted,
instead, as a way of explaining different experiences in
various fields. An aesthetic experience, for instance,
John Dewey claims, cannot be possible unless the observer
identifies with the object: 'An esthetic product results
only when ideas cease to float and are embodied in an
object, and the one who experiences the work of art loses
12
Coleridge on Imagination (Indiana, 1960), p. 57.
13
'On the Logic of Romanticism', Essays in
Criticism, VII, no. 3 (July 1957), 262-73 (p. 267);
'Romanticism Re-examined' in Romanticism Reconsidered,
edited by Northrop Frye (London, 1963), pp. 107-33 (p.
132).
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himself in irrelevant reverie unless his images and
emotions are also tied to the object, and are tied to it
in the sense of being fused with the matter of the
object'. In perception, one modern scientist observes,
'the thing perceived is an inseparable part of the
function of perceiving, which in turn includes all
aspects of the total process of living.... Object and
14
percept are part and parcel of the same thing'. This
echoes Coleridge's belief that the poet and the object of
his contemplation become one.
Furthermore, the fusion between subject and object
has been used to explain the process which occurs in
reading. 'It is true that they [books] consist of ideas
thought out by someone else', Wolfgang Iser states, 'but
in reading ... the reader becomes the subject that does
the thinking. Thus there disappears the subject-object
division that otherwise is a prerequisite for all
knowledge and all observation, and the removal of this
division puts reading in an apparently unique position as
regards the possible absorption of new experiences'.
Georges Poulet, discusssing the same topic, claims that
'thanks to the intervention of language, the opposition
between the subject and its objects has been considerably
attenuated'. Literature, he believes, alleviates our
sense of 'incompatibility between our consciousness and
Art as Experience, (New York, 1934), p. 276; W. H.
Ittleson and F. P. Kilpatrick, 'Experiments in
Perception', Scientific American, 185, no. 2 (August
1951), 50-55, p. 55.
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its objects', since 'the extraordinary fact in the case
of a book is the falling away of the barriers between you
and it. You are inside it; it is inside you; there is no
longer either outside or inside'."1"^
Subject and object, external and internal—these are
among the opposites that the artist, according to
Coleridge, tries to reconcile. His concept of the
reconciliation of opposites is a part of his theory of
organic unity and not, as Gordon McKenzie in Organic
Unity in Coleridge assumes, incompatible with it.^
Henry James knew very well the interconnection between
the reconciliation of opposites and organic unity. This
is why 'unreconciled parts' constituted for him a major
flaw in a composition, as in the case of The Ring and the
Book, which he considered to be a 'great loose and
uncontrolled composition'; consisting of a 'great heavy-
hanging cluster of related but unreconciled parts'(NN,
307). Like Coleridge, James found unity and beauty to
depend on the reconcilement of opposites and saw all
expressed in the novel, because it 'finds its order and
its structure, its unity and its beauty in the
The Implied Reader (London, 1974), p. 292;
'Criticism and the Experience of Inferiority' in The
Structuralist Controversy, edited by Richard Macksey and
Eugenio Donato (London, 1970), pp. 56-73 (pp. 58, 57).
p. 105; Rene Wellek affirms: 'The dialectical
reconciliation of opposites is a development of the
organic principle'. See 'Coleridge's Philosophy of
Criticism' in The English Romantic Poets: A Review of
Research and Criticism, third revised edition (New York,
1972), pp. 209-225 (p. 225).
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alternation of parts and the adjustment of differences'
(NN, 280).
Embodying the reconciliation of opposites, external-
internal, darkness-light, Coleridge's living plant, as we
have seen, very often served as an illustration for his
concept of organic unity. This is one of the reasons
that organicism has long been associated with the analogy
of the plant. But G. N. G. Orsini brings our attention
to the original use of organicism, and thus broadens its
meaning. Plato, Orsini, emphasizes, did not always
identify organic unity with the organic metaphor. In the
Gorgias, for instance, Plato says,
the orator, like other craftsmen
(demiourgoi), has his own particular
work in view and thus selects the
things he requires for that work, not
at random, but with the purpose of
giving a certain form (eidos) to
whatever he is working upon. You
have only to look, for example, at
the painters, (zographous), the
builders, the shipwrights, or any
other craftsmen, to see how each of
them arranges everything according to
a certain order (taxis) and forces
one part to fit with another, until
he combines the whole into a regular
and well-ordered production.
This confirms, Orsini claims, that the 'organic metaphor
is not indispensable to the principle' of organic
17
unity. Indeed, Coleridge himself often rendered the
whole in terms of a building or a structure, as was the
case in his comparison between Greek and contemporary
^"Quoted by G. N. G. Orsini, 'The Ancient Roots of a
Modern Idea' in Organic Form: The Life of an Idea, pp. 7-
23 (p. 20).
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architecture. Whereas 'the Greeks reared a structure,
which, in its parts and as a whole, filled the mind with
the calm and elevated impression of perfect beauty and
symmetrical proportion', contemporary architects,
Coleridge claims, 'blending materials, produced one
striking whole' (SC, II, 262).
Like Coleridge, James also at times preferred the
analogy of a building to the organic metaphor, when
explaining the composition of a novel. Thus, instead of
intricate plants or beautiful flowers we often have just
'solid blocks of wrought material, squared to the sharp
edge', or 'close-packed bricks' (AN, 296, 297).
Furthermore, James seems to have anticipated John Dewey,
who sees the continuity between the organic and the
mechanical, between nature and architecture: 'The trait
that characterizes architecture in an emphatic sense is
that its media are the (relatively) raw materials of
nature and of the fundamental modes of natural energy....
No other products exhibit stresses and strain, thrusts
and counterthrusts, gravity, light, cohesion, on a scale
at all comparable to the architectural, and it takes
these forces more directly, less mediately and
18
vicariously, than does any other art'.
Coleridge perhaps avoided the organic metaphor
because he did not consider artistic creation to be
entirely spontaneous. In the case of Shakespeare's
poems, for instance, we are told that 'the creative power
18
Art as Experience, p. 230.
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and the intellectual energy wrestle as in a war embrace.
Each in its excess of strength seems to threaten the
extinction of the other. At length in the DRAMA they
were reconciled, and fought each with its shield before
the breast of the other' (BL, II, 19). Both the
spontaneous and the voluntary, he believed, are necessary
for the creation of a work of art, a belief which becomes
especially evident in Coleridge's account of metre: 'The
elements of metre', he states, 'owe their existence to a
state of increased excitement', but 'these elements are
formed into metre artificially, by a voluntary art, with
the design and for the purpose of blending delight with
emotion, so the traces of present volition should
throughout the metrical language be proportionately
discernible'. And he continues: 'there must be not only
a partnership, but a union; an interpenetration of
passion and of will, of spontaneous impulse and of
voluntary purpose' (BL, II, 50).
Although both George Eliot and Henry James believed
that the whole existed before the parts in the artist's
mind, they did not feel that a composition was entirely
spontaneous. In one of her earliest essays, 'How to
Avoid Disappointment' (1847), Eliot remarks: 'I love to
think how the perfect whole exists in the imagination of
the artist, before his pencil has marked the canvass'
[sic]. And in her last essay, 'Notes on Form in Art'
(1868), she expresses the same belief when she refers to
structure as being 'a set of relations selected and
combined in accordance with ... the preconception of a
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whole which he [the constructor] has inwardly evolved'.
But her remarks on poetry in the same essay clearly echo
Coleridge, especially when she defines it as 'the
continual intercommunication of sensibility and thought'
/
(Essays, 17-8, 433-4, 436). Referring to Zola's Verite
(1902), James claims that 'a "majestic whole", a great
balanced facade, with all its orders and parts ... a
singleness of mass and a unity of effect, in fine, were
before him from the first' (NN, 27). But like Coleridge,
he does not believe that a work springs spontaneously out
of the imagination. Speaking about the central incident
in The Ambassadors (1903), he says of Strether: 'the
philosophy imputed to him in that beautiful outbreak, the
hour there, amid such happy provision, striking for him,
would have been then, on behalf of my man of imagination,
to be logically ... "led up" to ... would have in short
to be finely calculated. Where has he come from and why
has he come, what is he doing...? To answer these
questions plausibly ... was to possess myself of the
entire fabric' (AN, 313).
In spite of his belief in the blending of the
spontaneous and the voluntary in the composition of a
work of art, Coleridge pointed to the ideal unity in
Milton's and Shakespeare's works: 'I was wont boldly to
affirm, that it would be scarcely more difficult to push
a stone out from the pyramids with the bare hand, than to
alter a word, or the position of a word, in Milton or
Shakespeare, (in their most important works at least,)
without making the author say something else, or
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something worse, than he does say' (BL, I, 15). This is
an idea originating in Aristotle's Poetics. When
discusssing drama, Aristotle maintains that 'the parts of
the scheme of incidents must be so arranged that if any
part is transposed or removed the whole will be
disordered and shattered; for that of which the presence
or absence makes no appreciable difference is no part of
19
the whole'. Modern organicists have devoted a great
deal of work to an explanation of this interrelationship
between the whole and the parts. Harold Osborne explains
the problem best in his book Theory of Beauty and in a
recent article, 'Some Theories of Aesthetic Judgement'.
A work of art, he elaborates, differs fundamentally from
an organism; whereas the removal of a part of an organism
will often destroy the organism, the absence of a part
from a work of art may not always affect its quality:
'Though minor changes in proportion or totality may ruin
a piece of architecture or a symphony, the characteristic
aesthetic quality of a statue may survive in an amputated
torso and the quality of a symphony may be manifest in
part in a movement'. Aristotle's distinction between
'parts of essence' and 'parts of accident' seems to
resolve the problem, as Catherine Lord very convincingly
. . . 20
maintains.
19
Quoted by Bernard Bosanquet m A History of
Aesthetic, (New York, 1953), pp. 32-3.
20
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 38
(1979), 135-44 (p. 142); 'Organic Unity Reconsidered',
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism' 22 (1964), 283-
68 (p. 265).
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And the critic should determine the significance of
a part by relating it to the whole. This is the point
David Lodge makes in The Language of Fiction where he
argues that 'only the critical intelligence can make the
continual reference between part and whole which permits
discrimination between degrees of significance'. In
general, modern organicists do not accept the notion that
each part of a work of art is 'irremovable or
irreplaceable'; they seem to agree that 'the presence of
such unity in a work is a sign of sheer perfection and
not easily found'; or that 'extreme holism is obviously
21
contrary to our experience of literature'.
'The value of a whole poem', W. K. Wimsatt
convincir^ly states, 'while undoubtedly reflecting
something back to the parts, has to grow out of parts
which are themselves valuable.... We may add that good
2 2
poems may have dull parts; bad poems, bright parts'.
Yet Coleridge would argue against Wimsatt's idea, as he
felt that there should be a balance between the parts and
the whole. A critic, he thought, ought to judge a poet
by the questions: 'Is there more pleasure in the
particular lines than is consistent with the whole? Is
the sense of totality injured, or not injured, by the
splendour of particular passages? For the great object
of the poet must be to produce the great total effect'
21
(London, 1966), p. 85; Orsini, 'The Organic
Concepts of Aesthetics', p. 3; Wimsatt, p. 5.
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(SC, II, 79). Similarly, James asserts that the
'splendour' of the parts could 'injure' the total effect:
'whereas the beauty of a thing of this order really done
as a whole is ever, certainly, that its parts are in
abject dependence, and that even any great charm they may
individually and capriciously put forth is infirm so far
as it doesn't measurably contribute to a harmony' (AN,
136) .
This harmony, James claims, depends on the kind of
fusion the writer achieves between the parts and the
whole. 'The thing "done", artistically, is a fusion, or
it has not been done....But his [the artist's] ground
once conquered, in this particular field, he knows
nothing of fragments and may say in all security: "Detach
one if you can. You can analyse in your way, oh yes—to
relate, to report, to explain; but you can't disintegrate
my synthesis; you can't resolve the elements of my whole
into different responsible agents' (AN, 116). Though
James felt that a good work of art illustrates an
indissoluble synthesis, he did allow for analysis of the
whole into its component parts. The process of criticism
which Harold Osborne proposes in his Aesthetics and
Criticism resolves the problem of the whole and its
parts, and would perhaps appeal even to James:
It is owing to this universal
pervasiveness of structure that
attention can be allowed to oscillate
between the whole as a whole and the
various contained parts which compose
the whole. And it is by this process
of oscillation that aesthetic objects
are studied and appreciation matures,
as the whole in awareness becomes an
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increasingly vivid integration of
articulated parts. It must be a
process of oscillation. Exclusive
and continual attention to the whole
can hardly result in a more vivid and
opulent awareness of the whole; the
normal mind is limited in its grasp
and capacity. But attention to
details out of relation to the w^le
distorts the details themselves.
In his preface to The Tragic Muse, Henry James
speaks of the situation in which he has left Miriam Rooth
at the end of the novel. Though he admits, 'there would
be still more to be said' about her relationship with
either Nick Dormer or Peter Sherringham, he prefers to
have the ending 'left over' to the reader. As in the
case of The Portrait of a Lady, The Tragic Muse is open-
ended. George Eliot was also implicitly referring to
such incompleteness in Adam Bede, when she wrote to John
Blackwood in 1858, 'I'm very sorry to part with her [Mrs
Poyser] and some of my other characters—there seems to
be so much more to be done with them' (GEL, II, 512).
Both writers, then, were well aware of the promise of the
incomplete, another aspect of organicism, and one which
Coleridge articulates in his comparison between Greek and
Shakespearean drama. Whereas in Sophocles there is a
'completeness, a satisfying, an excellence, on which the
mind can rest', in Shakespeare 'we see a blended
multitude of materials, great and little, magnificent and
mean, mingled, if we may say, with a dissatisfying, or
falling short of perfection, yet so promising of our
^(London, 1955), pp. 258-59.
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progression, that we would not exchange it for that
repose of the mind which dwells on the forms of symmetry
in acquiescent admiration of grace' (SC, II, 262-63).
The paradox of the perfection of the incomplete is
accepted, and indeed cultivated, by modern organicism; it
is the meaning of the one and the many 'in consisting
both at the same time of oneness and manyness, sameness
2 4
and difference, unity and disunity'.
But organic unity, 'if a necessary condition for the
composition of work of art, is not sufficient for it'.
There are other factors involved in the composition of a
work of art, and these, G. N. G. Orsini maintains, are
'imagination, feeling and taste'. Orsini's notion is
congruous with Coleridge's idea of organic unity.
Imagination, feeling, and taste are at times inextricably
fused with Coleridge's concept of unity. He might very
well agree with Orsini that 'without them, we may obtain
a well-constructed work of the intellect or of the
25
practical reason but not a work of art'.
Coleridge defined taste in terms similar to those he
applied to the imagination. For him, taste was the
faculty 'which connects the active with the passive
powers of our nature, the intellect with the senses; and
its appointed function is to elevate the images of the
latter, while it realizes the ideas of the former' (BL,
24
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II, 227). In order to see how images and ideas are
combined or fused we ought to look at the qualities that
Coleridge attributes to the imagination. One of these
qualities is the power of 'modifying one image or feeling
by the precedent or following one' (SC, I, 216).
Elsewhere, Coleridge connects images with feeling more
explicitly, as in saying, for instance, that one of the
qualities of Shakespeare's imagination is that 'it acts
by impressing the stamp of humanity, of human feeling,
over inanimate objects', and he gives the following image
as an illustration: 'the pines shorn by the sea wind and
seen in twilight' (SC, I, 213). Images themselves, no
matter how beautiful, are not effective unless, Coleridge
believes, they 'are modified by a predominant passion'.
In one of his lectures on Shakespeare, Coleridge cites
different images from Venus and Adonis in order to
illustrate that 'there was accuracy of description
blended with the fervour of the poet's mind, thereby
communicating pleasure to the reader' (SC, II, 95).
Unless images are triggered by a 'genuine feeling',
George Eliot also believed, they cannot be effective.
In fact she felt that imagery was 'vicious' when it
resulted from 'insincerity' (Essays, 367). Furthermore,
she connected feeling with image, by seeing the one as
the expression of the other. Heine, she tells us in one
of her articles in 1856, 'excels ... in the more
imaginative expression of feeling: he represents it by a
brief image, like a finely-cut cameo' (Essays, 249).
Henry James voiced the same opinion in his essay 'The New
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Novel' (1914) when referring to Edith Wharton, who, he
thought 'even encourages her expression to flower into
some sharp image or figure of her thought when that will
make the thought more finely touch us' (NN, 281). Like
Coleridge, James believes that an image can be an
effective vehicle to express the author's feeling and to
affect the reader with it.
Only when images embody feeling, Coleridge
maintains, they become 'proofs of original genius'; and
by expressing a predominant feeling within a composition,
they simultaneously possess a unifying quality. Images
then are the expressions which characterize a superior
mind, when they 'are modified by a predominant passion;
or by associated thoughts or images awakened by that
passion, or when they have the effect of reducing
multitude to unity, or succession to an instant; or
lastly, when a human and intellectual life is transferred
to them from the poet's own spirit' (BL, II, 16).
Indeed, the miraculous power of Shakespeare's
imagination, Coleridge demonstrates, is at once revealed
when 'one image or feeling is made to modify many others
and by a sort of fusion to force many into one', as in
Lear, 'where the deep anguish of a father spreads the
feeling of ingratitude and cruelty over the very elements
of heaven' (SC, I, 212-13). In fact Lear's anguish is
extended and identified with the image of the storm and
the image is so powerful that it is equated to the play.
'What is Lear?' Coleridge elsewhere asks, and he answers:
'It is storm and tempest—the thunder at first grumbling
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in the far horizon, then gathering around us, and at
length bursting in fury over our heads,—succeeded by a
breaking of the clouds for a while, a last flash of
lightning, the closing in of night, and the single hope
2 6
of darkness'. Since Coleridge saw each major
Shakespearean character at the centre of each play, it is
not surprising that from this centre he saw emanating the
feelings and images controlling the rest of the
characters or the rest of the play. Similarly, Henry
James saw the most important character in the centre of
his novel, and as in the case of Fleda Vetch described
her position in organic terms—'she planted herself
centrally' (AN, 127).
But in what ways are the polarities between
external-internal, subject-object (through which the
character is often portrayed) reconciled? Again we have
to turn to the imagination for an answer because it is
the faculty which 'reveals itself in the balance or
reconciliation of ... the idea, with the image' (BL, II,
12). In Coleridge's 'Treatise of Method' (1817), we can
see how the internal/subject is identified with the idea,
and the external/object with the image. In this long
essay we are often reminded of the plant, especially when
we are told: 'events and images, the lively and spirit-
stirring machinery of the external world, are like light,
and air, and moisture, to the seed of the Mind, which
2 6
Miscellaneous Criticism, edited by Thomas
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would else rot and perish. In all processes of mental
evolution the objects of the senses must stimulate the
Mind; and the Mind must in turn assimilate and digest the
food which it thus receives from without'. As in the
case of the imagination, the Fine Arts, Coleridge
continues, also reconcile the image with the idea, for
the Fine Arts 'belong to the outward world, for they all
operate by the image of sight and sound, and other
sensible impressions ... but as certainly he [an artist]
must always be a poor and unsuccessful cultivator of the
Arts if he is not impelled first by a mighty, inward
power, a feeling ... nor can he make great advances in
his Art, if ... the obscure impulse does not gradually
2 7
become a bright, and clear, living Idea!'
George Eliot expressed the interconnection between
image and idea in her comments on Graigerook Castle, a
collection of poems; she had read these poems, she
claims, 'with growing dissatisfaction, from a growing
perception that the writer's profuse imagery is an end
instead of a means. It does not serve to bring more
vividly before us an object, an idea or an emotion, but
rather thrusts itself forward as a substitute or a
2 8
screen'. Thus she reminds us of Coleridge's comments
that images 'however beautiful though faithfully copied
from nature, and as accurately represented in words, do
not themselves characterize the poet', unless they are
27
Treatise on Method, edited by Alice D. Snyder
(London, 1934), pp. 7, 62-63.
^Westminster Review, 67, p. 310.
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unified by feeling. In an essay on Guy de Maupassant
(1888), Henry James also recognized the linking of the
image with the idea and saw their fusion as the basis for
a successful story: 'Every good story is of course both a
picture and an idea, and the more they are interfused the
better the problem is solved' (PP, 69). And in his
famous 'Art of Fiction' image becomes idea in the story
of an English novelist who had once successfuly described
the life of young French Protestants. Her description,
James tells us, grew from a single glimpse she once had
as she was passing by an open door of a house where some
young Protestants lived: 'the glimpse made a picture; it
lasted only a moment, but that moment was experience.
She had got her direct personal impression, and she
turned out her type. She knew what youth was, and what
Protestanism; she also had the advantage of having seen
what it was to be French, so that she converted these
ideas into a concrete image and produced reality' (PP,
289) .
Coleridge too saw images as essential to poetic
representation, but stated that 'to judge with fairness
of an author's works we must observe firstly what is
essential, and secondly what arises from circumstances'.
In this respect he anticipated the modern organicists
who, as we have seen, distinguish between 'parts of
essence' and 'parts of accident'. And he agreed with
Milton that poetry should be 'simple; sensuous; and
impassionate;—simple, that it may appeal to the elements
and the primary laws of our nature; sensuous, since it is
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only by sensuous images that we elicit truth as at a
flash; impasssionate, since images must be vivid, in
order to move our passions and awaken our affections'
(SC, II, 260). Images, no doubt, dominate Coleridge's
definitions of poetry and drama.
So far, then, images have been connected with the
most important concepts of organic unity—they can
express beauty, since 'only objects of the eye and the
ear can have parts'; they embody feeling and truth;
through them a character is developed and the
reconciliation of opposites is possible; and an image is
very often the germ which in turn is the story. Indeed
images can be the parts of an organic whole, as Orsini
declares: 'the elementary particles of which a work is
composed could be the images which are to be found in it,
each ... endowed with its own particular power of
2 9
expression'. Furthermore, by means of images a
novelist has the enchanting 'power of so carrying on the
eye of the reader as to make him almost lose the
consciousness of words—to make him see everything—and
this without exciting any painful or laborious attention'
(SC, I, 214).
Seeing in literature involves our imagination,
especially its image-making faculty. Perception and
memory, though, are also activated, and stimulated during
reading. And the creative process itself is interwoven
with the perception-memory-imagination cycle. But before
29
'The Ancient Roots of a Modern Idea', p. 10.
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we can examine how the reader can participate in the
creative process, we need to look more closely at the
life-cycle of images, the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 2
THE DISTANT AND THE IMPERCEPTIBLE
Reminiscing about his first reading of Madame
Bovary, Henry James beautifully sketches the interplay
between the internal and the external, and, as he goes
on, the dialectic is gradually replaced by a delicate
fusion of memory, perception, and imagination : 'taking
it in with so surprised an interest ... that the sunny
little salon, the autumn day, the window ajar and the
cheerful outside clatter of the Rue Montaigne are all now
for me more or less in the story and the story more or
less in them' (NN, 61). Undoubtedly, perception, memory,
and imagination become inextricably fused in our reading
of a novel, and it is often difficult to distinguish
sharply when, where, or how, one process ends and the
other begins.
Starting with perception and imagination in our
daily lives, we can move on to understand better the role
of the imagination in our encounters with the literary
world. The figure-ground phenomenon, an instance drawn
from the visual arts, may serve as an apt illustration of
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the important role imagination plays in our comprehension
even of perceptual events.
Ambiguous figures like these often serve as
illustrations in studies of perception, demonstrating how
our recognition of parts can lead us to an identification
of the whole. In the case of Rubin's reversible goblet,
for instance, once we identify a curve as a nose, the
rest of the lines support our assumption and we see two
profiles facing one another, while the rest recedes to
the background. The same happens in the rabbit-duck
figure in which the parts 'lock-in' to support one whole
at a time. It is obvious that in such cases, as Fred
Attneave points out, 'the identification of wholes and of
parts will likewise be reciprocally supportive,
contributing further to the locking-in process'. Such
figures also illustrate the relationship between
perception and memory; that is, we recognise the familiar
figures of the duck or the rabbit, and we tend to agree
with Attneave's claims that in ambiguous figures 'the
visual inputs can be matched to some acquired or learned
schemata of classes of objects' and that 'one reason
ambiguity exists is that a single input can be matched to
different schemata'
Yet Mary Karnock's approach to ambiguous figures is
even more appealing, and no doubt more expansive. In the
concluding chapter of her study on imagination, she
borrows the duck-rabbit figure from Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations and shows how we can
complete the duck or the rabbit in the mind's eye by
adding, for instance, to the head the rest of the body
which is missing from the picture itself. She also
relates this example to 'the more complex case of seeing
a painting as a portrait, that is seeing the original in
the painting and perhaps conjuring up other aspects of
^'Multistability in Perception' in Recent Progress
in Perception: Readings from the Scientific American,
edited by Richard Held and Whitman Richards (San
Francisco, 1976) , pp. 142-51 (p. 145) .
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him, to complete the portrait-painter's image, as the
likeness dawns'. In such a case, she believes, we cannot
sharply distinguish between perceptions which call for
elucidation and those which do not; our understanding of
them, she feels, very often involves our imagination,
simply because imagination 'is our means of interpreting
the world, and it is also our means of forming images in
the mind'. Then she goes on to amplify this point:
The images themselves are not
separate from our interpretations of
the world; they are our way of
thinking of the objects in the world.
We see the forms in our mind's eye
and we see these very forms in the
world. We could not do one of these
things if we could not do the other.
The two abilities are joined in our
ability to understand that the forms
have a certain meaning, that they are
always significant^of other things
beyond themselves.
Warnock's enthusiasm for the role of the imagination in
our lives is not, however, shared by other twentieth-
century philosophers, who approach imagination with
distrust. Jean-Paul Sartre, for instance, speaks of the
"essential poverty"'of the imagination; Merleau-Ponty
describes the 'pseudo-presence of the imagination'; and
Wittgenstein claims that 'images tell us nothing, either
3
right or wrong, about the external world'. Even
Bachelard, whose books are primarily rhapsodies of the
2
Imagination (London, 1976), p. 194.
3
The Psychology of Imagination, translated by B.
Frechtman (London, 1972), p. 170; Zette1, edited and
translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1967), p. 109e;
Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Colin Smith
(London, 1962), p. 184.
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imagination, admits, at the beginning of his book The
Poetics of Reverie, that imagery is a 'fluid and
unstable' subject (p. 2).
A suspicious attitude towards the imagination has
never been unusual in any century. Even George Eliot,
before her literary career (1840), saw imagination as 'an
enemy that must be cast down ere I can enjoy peace or
exhibit uniformity of character. I know not which of its
caprices I have most to dread—that which incites it to
spread sackcloth "above, below, around," or that which
makes it "cheat my eye with blear illusion, and beget
strange dreams" of excellence and beauty in beings and
things of only "working day" price' (GEL, I, 65-66). But
even in these accusations, which George Eliot voiced as a
young woman, we can detect her awareness of the close
relationship between imagination and perception, a
relationship which, as we shall see, she constantly
explored in her novels. She would very probably have
agreed, even then, with Henry James's narrator in 'The
Special Type'(1900), who comments that 'imagination and
observation' are 'twin demons' that will not allow one
A
to detach himself from life or from others' problems."
As we look mere closely into George Eliot's and
Henry James's ideas on imagination, we become
increasingly aware of the profound effect which
Coleridge's organic theory of the imagination has had on
them. No doubt, we can assert that the roots of Eliot's
4
Complete Tales of Henry James, edited by Leon Edel,
12 vols (London, 1961-64), XI, 179.
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and James's theories of the imagination are within the
Romantic soil. They both seem to have taken over where
Coleridge left off and, quite frequently, their concepts
seem to complete what Coleridge left incomplete. But
what is even more striking is the fact that Eliot's and
James's insights into imagination, perception, and
memory, reach over to the twentieth century. We could
say, then, that their concepts, to borrow James's
metaphor, are 'hinged doors opening straight upon life'
(AN, 46); that is, their criticism and their fiction
embody ideas which have played an important role in
philosophical, psychological, and scientific studies of
the imagination and its affiliate faculties, perception
and memory. Both Eliot and James effectively break the
insularity associated with literary figures—indeed,
their fictional works 'open straight to life'.
Trying here to recapitulate an organic theory of the
imagination, I have started with Coleridge's concepts and
have moved on to Eliot's and James's Coleridgean echoes.
Simultaneously, I try to show how lucidly Eliot and James
have anticipated modern figures. It is almost impossible
to speak of imagination without taking into consideration
pereception as well as memory. The more we try to
distinguish imagination from perception and memory the
clearer and sharper its meaning becomes. Although my
emphasis here is on an organic theory of the imagination,
I have also taken into account the affinities which it
shares with memory and perception. Finally, I have tried
to show how all three faculties are interrelated in a
67
creative act and in a creative reading of a novel.
Coleridge's, Eliot's, and James's insights seem but parts
of a coherent whole—valuable for our study not only of
novels by these particular writers but of any good novel.
We have already seen that Coleridge is the primary
spokesman for an organic theory of the imagination. His
approach to the imagination was not entirely
metaphysical. Like other modern philosophers, he tried
to explain its role in man's creative thinking. His
comparison of the human mind to a water-insect
beautifully illustrates the reconciling role of the
imagination between activity and receptivity, both
essential to the composition of poetry or any other
creative act:
Most of my readers will have observed
a small water-insect on the surface
of rivulets, which throws a cinque-
spotted shadow fringed with prismatic
colours on the sunny bottom of the
brook; and will have noticed, how the
little animal wins its way up against
the stream, by alternate pulses of
active and passive motion, now
resisting the currrent, and now
yielding to it in order to gather
strength and a momentary fulcrum for
a further propulsion. This is no
unapt emblem of the mind's self-
experience in the act of thinking.
There are evidently two powers at
work, which relatively to each other
are active and passive; and this is
not possible without an intermediate
faculty, which is at once both active
and passive. (In philosophical
language, we must denominate this
intermediate faculty in all its
degrees and determinations, the
IMAGINATION) (BL, I, 85-86).
Coleridge then, did not regard imagination as purely
an originating force but rather as the bridge between the
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mind and nature. And the fusion of the subject and the
object could become possible both through concentration
and receptivity. According to Coleridge, the human mind
is divided into three parts: 'the passive sense, or what
the school-men call the merely receptive quality of the
mind; the voluntary; and the spontaneous, which holds the
middle place between both' (BL, I, 66).
Coleridge's receptive state of mind seems to be a
state of relaxed attention, effusively articulated by
Bachelard in his book The Poetics of Reverie. Early in
this book, without referring to Coleridge specifically,
Bachelard distinguishes between reverie and poetic
reverie. Whereas reverie is usually identified with lack
of attention and is 'often without memory', poetic
reverie is a time when 'all the senses awaken and fall in
harmony.... Poetic reverie listens to this polyphony of
the senses, and the poetic consciousness must record it*
(pp. 5-6). In order to emphasize the consciousness of
the one who experiences a reverie, Bachelard also
contrasts him with the dreamer. While we are not
conscious of our dreams, we are conscious enough of our
reveries to say, 'It is I who dream the reverie, it is I
who am content to dream my reverie, happy with this
leisure in which I no longer have the task of thinking'
(p. 22). Like Bachelard, Coleridge was intensely aware
of the creative potential in man's ability to be
receptive, and remarked (1804): 'a time will come when
passiveness will attain the dignity of worthy activity,
when men shall be as proud within themselves of having
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remained in a state of deep tranquil emotion, whether in
reading or in hearing or in looking, as they are now in
having figured away for an hour'. For Coleridge, men of
genius 'remain with hearts broad awake, and the
understanding asleep in all but its retentiveness and
receptivity'.^
1Passiveness' did attain 'the dignity of worthy
activity' in George Eliot's and Henry James's works.
George Eliot seems to have been articulating Coleridge's
wish when she said, in Daniel Deronda that,
'receptiveness is a rare and massive power like
fortitude' (p. 553). Henry James expressed the same
belief on numerous occasions; in a letter to Sergeant
Perry in 1860, he wrote: 'there are however no such
fields and meadows and groves as there are near Lily
Pond, places where you can halt and lie out on the flat
of your back and loll and loaf and reverise'(HJL, Edel,
I, 20). Recognizing imagination as both active and
passive, James called it in his preface to 'In the Cage'
'that rash, that idle faculty' (AN, 158). A receptive
quality of mind as the primary condition for creativity
is indeed one of the primary concerns in Roderick
Hudson. During their first visit to Rome, Rowland tells
Roderick that one should live with an open mind, 'open
doors', for as long as possible before one gets too old
and finds oneself confronted with 'a solid blank wall'
against which one is 'thumping ... in vain.... "Open
^Anima Poetae, p. 66.
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doors"? Roderick sounded, "Yes, let us close no doors
that open upon Rome ... for the mind, must be the most
breathable air in the world.... But though my doors may
stand open to-day ... I shall see no visitors; I want to
pause and breathe; I want to give the desired vision a
chance to descend"' (p. 88).
Modern philosophers often relate receptivity or
conscious passivity to the unconscious. In his long,
thorough study of the imagination Harold Rugg, for
example, shows that he believes imagination to be
creative in the 'conscious, nonconscious continuum', what
he calls the 'transliminal state'.^ Rugg's 'transliminal
state' seems to be also very close to Coleridge's
receptivity or Bachelard's reverie; like Coleridge, he
considers imagination as the reconciler between active
and passive faculties, which in his terms become the
conscious and nonconscious states.
The vitality and dynamism of the imagination are
glowing in Coleridge's often quoted statement in his
Biographia Literaria. Since one cannnot treat
Coleridge's theory of imagination without taking his
famous definition into consideration, I propose to
approach it from others' viewpoints, in order to show its
effect on nineteenth and twentieth-century studies of the
imagination. 'The IMAGINATION then, I consider either as
primary, or secondary', Coleridge very definitely states
^Imagination, first edition (London, 1963), p. 97.
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at the end of Chapter XIII in Biographia. And he
continues:
The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be
the living Power and prime Agent of
all human Perception, and as a
repetition in the finite mind of the
eternal act of creation in the
infinite I AM. The secondary
Imagination I consider as an echo of
the former, co-existing with the
conscious will, yet still as
identical with the primary in the
kind of its agency, and differing
only in degree, and in the mode of
its operation. It dissolves,
diffuses, dissipates, in order to re¬
create; or where this process is
rendered impossible, yet still at all
events it struggles to idealize and
to unify. It is essentially vital,
even as all objects (as objects) are
essentially fixed and dead' (BL, I,
202) .
James Baker's interpretation of Coleridge's definition
places emphasis on the creative quality of the
imagination. In his study The Sacred River, Baker
declares that imagination is not 'merely spontaneous,
unconscious, and passive', but 'active in the highest
degree'. A poet's creative act, Baker continues, 'is
similar to the creative act by which God ordered the
world out of chaos'. But he modifies this statement by
adding, 'if the poet's creative act is not a creation ex
nihilo, it is a process of organic becoming through which
old materials are transformed into something absolutely
7
new and also, very likely, strange'. But better than
Baker or, it seems, any other of Coleridge's critics,
P.uskin in his Modern Painters, vividly and simply
7Coleridge's Theory of the Imagination (Louisiana
State U. P., 1957), pp. 3-4.
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explains the creative function of the imagination in
organic terms: 'Look back to the greatest of all
creation, that of the world. Suppose the trees had been
ever so well or so ingeniously put together, stem and
leaf, yet if they had not been able to grow, would they
have been well created? Or suppose the fish had been cut
and stitched finely out of skin and whalebone; yet, cast
upon the waters, had not been able to swim?' Without
mentioning Coleridge, he echoes him in attributing to the
imagination a godlike quality: 'It will, perhaps, appear
to you, after a little farther thought, that to create
anything in reality is to put life into it. A poet, or
creator, is therefore a person who puts things together,
not as a watchmaker steel, or a shoemaker leather, but
8
who puts life into them'.
In Ruskin's statements we can see very clearly the
essence of an organic theory of the imagination. The
poet or the artist, like God, breathes life into his
creation and the creation itself becomes a living being.
With this in mind, we can understand why Coleridge
equates (does not just compare) imagination with growth:
'the rules of the IMAGINATION are themselves the very
powers of growth and production' (BL, II, 65). We have
already seen how Coleridge likened the poet's mind to a
plant, assimilating diverse materials into an integral
whole. Ruskin, again, shows us the link between organic
Q
The Works of John Ruskin, edited by E. T. Cook and
Alexander Wedderburn, 39 vols (London, 1903-12), VII,
215. Further references to Modern Painters are given
after quotations in the text.
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unity and the imagination more directly and convincingly
than Coleridge:
The imagination will banish all that
is extraneous; it will seize out of
the many threads of different feeling
which nature has suffered to become
entangled, one only; and where that
seems thin and likely to break, it
will spin it stouter, and in doing
this, it never knots, but weaves in
the new thread; so that all its work
looks as pure and true as nature
itself.... so that herein we find
another test of the imaginative work,
that it looks always as if it had
been gathered straight from nature,
whereas the unimaginative shows its
joints and knots, and is visibly
composition (MP, II, 246-47).
His statements in this case also echo Coleridge's
attempts to distinguish between the mechanical and the
organic, which in Ruskin's terminology become
'unimaginative' and 'imaginative' or 'unnatural' and
•natural' (MP, II, 247).
In (twentieth century a work of art often is said to
mirror Nature's qualities. For Bachelard, an exuberant
spokesman for the imagination, Coleridge's plant seems to
have become a tree. In fact, imagination itself is a
tree: 'It has the integrative virtues of a tree. It is
root and boughs. It lives between earth and sky.
Imagination lives in the earth and in the wind. The
imagined tree is imperceptibly the cosmological tree, the
tree which summarizes a universe, which makes a
9
universe'. Like Coleridge, then, Bachelard sees the
imagination as both creative—since it 'makes a
9
La Terre et les reveries du repos (Paris, 1948), p.
300,
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universe'—and synthetic—since it 'summarizes a
universe'. The plant or the tree, which live 'in the
earth and in the wind' have other appealing implications.
I would like to concentrate here on the part that lives
in the earth, the root.
The analogy of the tree or the plant is in itself
interesting because it almost displays the architectonics
of the imagination. We can see that it has both height
and depth. James illustrates these dimensions in his
preface to The American, as we have seen, when he says,
referring to the germ of the novel: 'Precisely because it
had so much to give, I think, must I have dropped it for
the time into the deep well of unconscious cerebration;
not without the hope, doubtless, that it might eventually
emerge from the reservoir, as one had already known the
buried treasure to come to light, with a firm iridescent
surface and a notable increase of weight' (AN, 23).
It was precisely with the depth of the imagination
that Ruskin was dealing when he spoke of its penetrating
quality. The metaphysician's definition of the
imagination is inadequate, Ruskin believed, 'when we look
at the imagination neither as regarding, nor combining,
but as penetrating (MP, II, 227). In fact, he
considered this quality to be one of the most significant
characteristics of the imagination and called it
'intuitive and penetrative perception' (MP, II, 228).
Later, in the same volume of Modern Painters, Ruskin
explains more clearly the penetrative quality of the
imagination, in a paragraph with the heading, 'The
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Imagination seizes always by the innermost point'. Here
he remarks that, the imagination 'never stops at crusts
or ashes, or outward images of any kind; it ploughs them
all aside, and plunges into the very central fiery
heart.... its function and gift are the getting at the
root, its nature and dignity depend on its holding things
always by the heart' (MP, II, 250-51). Whereas the
imagination delves into the substance, below the surface,
fancy sees only the outside. 'The virtue of the
Imagination', Ruskin points out, 'is its reaching, by
intuition and intensity of gaze ...a more essential truth
than is seen at the surface of things' (MP, II, 284).
In his criticism of other writers, James often
praised those who dealt with depth, and criticized those
who concentrated on the surface. Describing Hawthorne's
imagination, he calls it not only 'delicate' but also
'penetrating'—the very term Ruskin uses. Hawthorne's
imagination, we are told, delved into human nature
'always engaged in a game of hide-and-seek in the region
in which it seemed to him that the game could be best
played—among the shadows and substructions, the dark-
based pillars and supports of our moral nature'.10 By
comparison with Hawthorne, James's view of Flaubert was
rather different. Flaubert was an 'apostle of surface'
and his novels, in James's view, often revealed his
'superiority ... as a painter of aspects and sensations,
and his lapses and limitations, his general
10Nathaniel Hawthorne (New York, 1879), p. 28.
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insignificance, as a painter of ideas and moral
states'.^
When describing the circumstances of the composition
of his own works, James is intensely aware of penetrating
the surface, of exploring the depth; his experiences in
London before writing Princess Casamassima illustrate
his passion for what is not accessible to perception: 'to
haunt the great city and by this habit to penetrate it,
imaginatively, in as many places as possible—that was to
be informed, that was to pull wires, that was to open
doors, that positively was to groan at times under the
weight of one's accumulations (AN, 77). Quite clearly,
his own characters are often described exploring the
world within, and in his late novels they are hardly
conscious of the external world. Hyacinth's imagination,
for instance, we are told, 'plunged again and again into
the flood that whirled past it and round it, in the hope
of being carried into some brighter, happier vision'
(140-41). As Dencombe, the main character in 'The Middle
Years'(1895), is reading his own book, he feels himself
being 'drawn down, as by a siren's hand, to where, in the
dim underworld of fiction, the great glazed tank of art,
strange silent subjects float' (p. 81).
George Eliot too had the tendency to look inward, to
explore depth. Even Trollope's objection to her analytic
imagination reveals this: 'her imagination is no doubt
strong, but it acts in analysing rather than in creating.
^Essays in London and Elsewhere (New York, 1893) ,
pp. 159, 158.
7.7
Everything that comes before her is pulled to pieces so
that the inside of it shall be seen, and be seen if
12
possible by her readers as clearly as by herself'.
Depth, for George Eliot, is the most important quality.
A 'boldly imaginative poet', in her view is one who can
be 'as sincere as the most realistic: he is true to his
own sensibilities or inward vision, and in his wildest
flights he never breaks loose from his criterion—the
truth of his own mental state' (Essays, 367). Lydgate in
Middlemarch also rejects the type of imagination which
flies 'in distant orbs' in favor of the 'imagination that
reveals subtle actions inaccessible by any sort of lens,
but tracked in that outer darkness through long pathways
of necessary sequence by the inward light which is the
last refinement of Energy, capable of bathing even the
ethereal atoms in its ideally illuminated space'. For
Lydgate, cheap inventions are the product of ignorance;
he yearns to dedicate himself to 'arduous invention which
is the very eye of research... he wanted to pierce the
obscurity of those minute processes which prepare human
misery and joy' (p. 194).
Imagination's penetrative, inward quality is even
more important when it is transformed into the ability to
project oneself into something or someone, to become that
something or someone. We have already seen how Coleridge
extolled Shakespeare for his 'Protean', transforming,
imagination and admired him because he 'darts himself
12
An Autobiography (London, 1950), p. 245.
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forth, and passes into all the forms of human character
and passion, the one Proteus of the fire and the flood'
(BL, II, 20, my italics). No doubt Henry James was
acutely conscious of 'the creative effort to get into the
skin of the creature; the act of personal possesssion of
one being by another at its completest' (AN, 37, my
italics). Strether, to mention one among many,
represents such an identification; his imagination had
'helped him to discriminate', and this quality, in turn,
James happily says, was indeed 'the element that was for
so much of the pleasure of my cutting thick ... into his
intellectual, into his moral substance' (AN, 316, my
italics).
Getting out of one's own self and projecting the
self into the other is another quality of the penetrative
imagination. 'It is easy to cloathe imaginary Beings
with our Thoughts and Feelings', Coleridge wrote in 1802,
'but to send ourselves out of ourselves, to think
ourselves in to the Thoughts and Feelings of beings in
circumstances wholly and strangely different from our own
and who has achieved it? Perhaps only
Shakespeare' (CCL, II, 810). George Eliot expressed the
same idea in a letter to Henrietta Stowe in 1876:
'Moreover, not only towards the Jews, but towards all
oriental peoples with whom we English come in contact, a
spirit of arrogance and contemptuous dictatorialness is
observable which has become a national disgrace to us'.
One of her goals as a novelist has been, she continues,
'to rouse the imagination of men and women to a vision of
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human claims in those races of their fellow-men who most
differ from them in customs and beliefs' (GEL, VI, 301).
This kind of penetrative or sympathetic imagination
Shelley named 'the great instrument of moral good',
because, he believed, 'a man, to be greatly good, must
imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put
himself in the place of another and of many others; the
pains and pleasures of his species must become his
own',13
Similarly, James often defines imagination
explicitly in his stories as the projection of the self
into the other. Maggie, for instance, in The Golden Bowl
(1904), tells her father during one of their intimate
conversations at the end of the novel, '"one must always,
whether or no, have some imagination of the states of
others—of what they may feel deprived of. However"',
Maggie adds, '"Kitty and Dotty couldn't imagine we were
deprived of anything. And now, and now—!" But she
stopped as for indulgence to their wonder and envy' (II,
258). It follows then that lack of imagination is for
James the inability to experience other people's
feelings. Because Owen, in The Spoils of Poynton (1897)
has no imagination, he cannot understand why his mother
hates Mona: 'but this [his mother's hatred] belonged to
an order of mysteries that never troubled him: there were
lots of things, especially in people's minds, that a
13
'A Defence of Poetry' in The Complete Works of
Percy Bysshe Shelley, edited by Roger Ingpen and Walter
E. Peck, 10 vols (London, 1965), VII, 118.
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fellow didn't understand. Poor Owen went through life
with a frank dread of people's minds' (p. 42).
What emerges from George Eliot's works is precisely
the same belief, that imagination is the ability to
experience what others feel. Daniel Deronda seems to be
the embodiment of the goal she expresses in her letter to
Henrietta Stowe, because 'his conscience included
sensibilities beyond the common, enlarged by his early
habit of thinking himself imaginatively into the
experience of others' (p. 570). But the movement 'out of
the self' and 'into the thoughts and feelings' of others
affects us even more powerfully when it is expressed in
poignant irony by Maggie's imagination at the climax of
The Mill on the Floss (1860). Numb to any other thought
but to her intense desire to stay with Stephen, Maggie
suddenly is electrified by a brief glimpse of the effect
of her action: '"Oh, I can't do it", she said in a voice
almost of agony— "Stephen—don't ask me—don't urge me.-
-I can't argue any longer.—I don't know what is wise—
but my heart will not let me do it. I see—I feel their
trouble now; it is as if it were branded on my mind"'(p.
605). Here Maggie's painful concern for others
illustrates Ruskin's concept of 'the reciprocal action
between between the intensity of moral feeling and the
power of imagination'. For Ruskin 'those who have
keenest sympathy are those who look closest and pierce
deepest, and hold securest; and ... those who have so
pierced and seen the melancholy deeps of things are
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filled with the most intense passion and gentleness of
sympathy' (MP, II, 257).
The dimension of depth then, as we have seen, is
related to the organic, the 'inner nature', 'the
adventures of the soul, the projection of the self into
the other. By means of the imagination, one is able to
reach, feel, see, and understand the invisible, the
imperceptible. This was one of the reasons why Coleridge
praised religion and poetry; he believed that both of
these types of expression 'throw the object of deepest
interest to a distance from us, and thereby not only aid
our imagination, but in a most important manner subserve
the interest of our virtues; for that man is indeed
slave, who is a slave to his own senses, and whose mind
and imagination cannot carry him beyond the distance
which his hand can touch, or even his eye can reach' (SC,
II, 147). And one of the aims of education, Coleridge
thought, should be to rescue the child from the
'despotism of the eye' (BL, I, 74). Indeed the distant
and the imperceptible were among George Eliot's concerns.
In her essay on Young, for instance, she urges us to
sympathize with others not because, as Young argues, we
will go to heaven, but simply because, 'through my union
and fellowship with the men and women I have seen, I feel
a like, though a fainter, sympathy with those I have not
seen; and I am able so to live in imagination with the
generations to come, that their good is not alien to me,
and is a stimulus to me to labour for ends which may not
benefit myself, but will benefit them' (Essays, 374).
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In this context, we can understand why the narrator
in 'Amos Barton' (1857) informs us that for Mr. Barton to
leave the parish, to part from Milly's grave, would be
like parting with Milly a second time, 'for Amos was one
who clung to all the material links between his mind and
the past. His imagination was not vivid, and required
the stimulus of actual perception' (pp. 112-13). Yet
this comment does not imply that George Eliot believed
that imagination should not be based on perception. In
fact, she states the opposite in 'False Testimonials', a
chapter in her last work, Theophrastus Such. Contrary to
common belief, she remarks, imagination is not 'a very
usual lack of discriminating perception ... unchecked by
the troublesome need of veracity'. A vivid imagination,
she continues, 'is always based on a keen vision, a keen
consciousness of what jls, and carries the store of
definite knowledge as material for the construction of
its inward visions' (p. 195). 'Definite knowledge' is
the basis of the imagination, as described by George
Henry Lewes in his study, Problems of Life and Mind
(1873), where he speaks of 'illusory hypotheses' in the
same deprecatory manner in which Lydgate refers to cheap
inventions: 'To imagine a natural process', means for
Lewes, 'to see the Agents or Agencies which are really
operative, or which, if present, would act so as to
produce the result observed. But this mental picture of
the unseen process', he continues, 'is given only to the
highest minds equipped with exact knowledge.... But
precision is the one quality which impatient minds least
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appreciate; and therefore Illusory Hypotheses spring up
like mushrooms in half-cultivated minds and are readily
14
accepted by the uncultivated'.
And imagination based upon fact, not illusion, is
what the narrator in Daniel Deronda has in mind when she
states that poetic power lies 'in the force of
imagination that pierces or exalts the solid fact instead
of floating among cloud pictures' (p. 431). Such a
statement seems to include both the dimensions of the
imagination, both its height—'exalts'—and its depth—
'pierces'. It also seems to capture the meaning of
Coleridge's famous assertion that the secondary
imagination 'dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to
recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible,
yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to
unify'. George Eliot's remark, furthermore, resembles
closely Ruskin's idea of the duty of the artist, which he
considers to be 'not only to address and awaken, but to
guide the imagination; and there is no safe guidance but
that of simple concurrence with fact' (MP, III, 179).
Both George Eliot and Ruskin then share Coleridge's
conviction that the creative imagination is often based
on perception. Most of Coleridge's critics, including I.
A. Richards, Harold Rugg, and Basil Willey, agree with
Shawcross that 'the primary imagination is the organ of
common perception, the faculty by which we have
experience of an actual world of phenomena' (BL, I, 272).
^third edition, 2 vols (London, 1874), I, 337.
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But what is the material which the secondary imagination
must 'dissolve, diffuse, and dissipate'? Basil Willey
provides us with a satisfying answer: it is the
'"inanimate cold world" of the Primary Imagination? all
that is allowed to the daily prosaic consciousness of
average humanity, and to poets themselves when power
15
deserts them'.
In The Road to Xanadu, his well-known, fascinating
study of Coleridge's sources for his poems, John
Livingston Lowes repeatedly shows the perceptual origins
of Coleridge's poems. The assumption behind his study
was, Lowes claims, that 'the imagination never operates
in a vacuum. Its stuff is always fact of some order,
somehow experienced; its product is that fact
transmuted'. Lowes's assertion that 'one of the most
momentous functions of the imagination' is 'its
sublimation of brute fact', sounds much like George
Eliot's claim that the imagination 'exalts the solid
fact'. And when he goes on to say that 'without a
knowledge of the crass materials, the profoundly
significant process is unintelligible', he reminds us of
Lewes's similar statements in his distinction between
true and illusory hypotheses."''®
Our interpretation of Coleridge's definition of the
primary and secondary imagination is somewhat shaken,
^Coleridge on Imagination, p. 58; Imagination, p.
197; Coleridge on Imagination and Fancy (London, 1947),
pp. 15, 5.
(New York, 1927), pp. 426-27, 48.
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however, when we come across Coleridge's evaluation of
his own theory, made in June 28, 1834, one month before
his death: 'The metaphysical disquisition at the end of
the first volume of Biographia Literaria is unformed and
immature; it contains the fragments of the truth, but it
is not fully thought out. It is wonderful to myself to
think how infinitely more profound my views now are and
yet how much clearer they are withal. The circle is
completing; the idea is coming round to, and to be, the
common sense' (CCW, VI, 520). Yet these 'fragments of
truth' have affected most theories of the imagination in
both nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Most
philosophers and artists seem to accept the continuity
between perception and imagination. William James, for
instance, in his definition of imagination in his
Psychology (1890), states: 'sensations, once experienced,
modify the nervous organisms, so that copies of them
arise again in the mind after the original outward
stimulus is gone. No mental copy, however, can arise in
the mind, of any kind of sensation which has never been
directly excited from without'. Imagination, he
believes, is exactly that 'faculty of reproducing copies
of originals once felt'. And he proceeds to distinghish
between the 'reproductive' imagination, which produces
'literal' copies, and the 'productive', which brings
together elements from 'different originals' and
17
recombines them in such a way as to 'make new wholes'.
17(New York, 1930), p. 302.
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Twentieth-century psychologists as well as art
critics hold a similar view. Peter McKellar, for
instance, claims that Freud's analysis of dreams
illustrates convincingly that fantasies, no matter how
original they may seem, always originate in actual
experience. The implication of this, McKellar believes,
is that 'not merely man's dreams, but his most
unrestrained imaginings, his original inventions and
ideas, and those thought products we call works of art
and science, all derive from recent and /or remote
perceptions'. Extensive studies on imagination in art
are couched in al^Jjjiost similar terms. Rudolph Arnheim in
Art and Visual Perception and E. H. Gombrich in Art and
I1lusion propose that indeed imagination is based on
perception and that something is not unoriginal if it has
perceptual origins. In this respect especially, they
seem to share McKellar's view that 'originality can arise
from the connection, rearrangement, and fusion of
,18perceptions'.
Ruskin was also referring to the cumulative nature
of the imagination when he described it as the 'great
faculty' which 'the mind exercises in a certain mode of
regarding or combining the ideas it has received from
external nature' (MP, II, 36). Quite clearly imagination
for Henry James does have a perceptual basis; in his
preface to 'Lady Barbarina' (1884) we are told of the
tendency 'perceptive as well as reflective too, of the
18
Imagining and Thinking: A Psychological Analysis
(London, 1957), p. 11.
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braver imagination' (AN, 203); in Roderick Hudson Rowland
says, '"but to an artist who loves his work there is no
lost time. Everything he looks at teaches or suggests
something"' (pp. 60-61). Rowland's words are very close
to James's in his 'Art of Fiction', where he advises the
novelist 'to try to be one of the people on whom nothing
is lost', since
experience is never limited, and it
is never complete; it is an immense
sensibility, a kind of huge spider-
web of the finest silken threads
suspended in the chamber of
consciousness, and catching every
airbourne particle in its tissue. It
is the very atmosphere of the mind;
and when the mind is imaginative ...
it takes to itself the faintest hints
of life, it converts the very pulses
of the air into revelations (PP,
388) .
The genesis of The Princess Casamassima, to mention only
one of James's fictional works, is a fine illustration of
the artist 'on whom nothing is lost'; 'There was a
moment at any rate when they [the London streets] offered
me no image more vivid than that of some individual
sensitive nature or fine mind.... It seemed to me I had
only to imagine such a spirit intent enough and troubled
enough, and to place it in presence of the comings and
goings ... of the more fortunate than himself.... I
arrived so at the history of little Hyacinth Robinson—he
sprang up for me out of the London pavement' (AN, 60).
What James tries to embody in his fiction plays an
important role in modern philosophical studies of the
imagination. Imagination as an extension of perception
is one of Edward Casey's views expounded in Imagining: A
Phenomenological Study: 'a given perceptual experience
is extended, but by means of another kind of act which
differs intrinsically from perception proper. This
supplemental act is one of imagination, even though its
function can be designated as a form of
"paraperception"'. Because of its paraperceptual nature,
Casey continues, 'imagining is an act by which the
inherent partialness of perceptual experience is
momentarily suspended... Through such paraperceiving,
perceived and imagined components become interwoven as
conjoint elements of a perceptual object or event which
we are striving to apprehend more fully than we could by
perception alone'. Perception and imagination, Casey
emphasizes, are interdependent; without our imagination,
our comprehension even of perceptual events is bound to
be incomplete."1"^
This is why James did not stop with perception in
his 'to see, to feel, and to understand', because
perception is incomplete without imagination; perception-
-to see—has to be internalized—to feel in another's
place, to image another's condition—in order to lead to
understanding. In 'Julia Bride'(1908) James sensitively
shows how tightly enmeshed understanding and imagining
are: 'How in fact could you feel interest unless you
should know, within you, some dim stir of imagination?
There was nothing in the world of which Murray Brush was
less capable than of such a dim stir, because you only
"^(London, 1976), pp. 139-40.
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began to imagine when you felt some approach to a need to
understand' (p. 526).
Imagination as the key to understanding our own
actions, our own nature, is involved in one of Mary
Warnock's approaches in her study of Imagination. By
means of our imaginations, she shows, we can interpret
present experience 'in the light of past and future
experience'. Other twentieth-century figures, like Bruno
Bettelheim and Jacob Bronowski, to mention two among
many, share Warnock's view of the timelessness of the
20
imagination. Foreseeing different courses or various
consequences of our actions are powers of the imagination
which both George Eliot and Henry James seriously or
humorously explored in their fictional works. When Tom
in The Mill on the Floss rushes back home and expediently
reports that it was Maggie who had pushed Lucy into the
mud, we are told that 'Tom's imagination had not been
rapid and capacious' enough to foresee that'he too would
be implicated' (p. 165). And in The Tragic Muse we see
how Nick Dormer's imagination rescues him from marrying
Julia: 'He had the impulse .. to see in a touching, an
interesting light any forcibly presented side of the life
of another.... Rapidly, at present, this change of scene
took place before his spiritual eye. He found himself
believing, that it depended but on his own conduct richly
to alter the social outlook of the three women who clung
20
p. 179; The Uses of Enchantment; 'The Imaginative
Mind in Art' in Imagination and the University (Canada,
Toronto U. P. , 1964), pp. 3-19 (p. 8).
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to him and who declared themselves forlorn' (pp. 251-52).
His foresight in this case also prevents him from
indulging in the renuciation of his own desires.
Foreseeing is, of course, some type of anticipating,
and anticipating is what imagining and perceiving have in
common. In a recent article in Psychology Today, Ulric
Neisser states that perception involves more 'than the
pickup of currently available information. There is
always an element of anticipation, of readiness for what
will appear next. Infants' skills of perceiving develop
21
smoothly into skills of expecting and imagining'. It
is easy to understand how skills of perceiving are
related to those of imagining when we consider that to
create often means to look in an unfamiliar way, to view
from an unorthodox perspective. We have already seen how
Coleridge, George Eliot, and Henry James felt that one of
the artist's duties was to sharpen our perception, to
train us to discover novelty in the familiar. Their
conviction seems to be succinctly expressed by William
James , who declares in Psychology: 'genius, in truth,
means little more than the faculty of perceiving in an
unhabitual way'. Connected to such kinds of perception,
William James remarks (reminding us of Rowland's 'open
doors'), is also our ability to resist our tendency, as
we grow older, of 'assimilating impressions in any but
the old ways'
^"'Understanding Psychological Man', Psychology
Today, 16, no. 5 (May 1982), 44-59 (p. 45).
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Assimilation of the object by the subject is another
feature which imagination and perception share. Such
fusion permeates explanations of nineteenth and
twentieth-century theories of perception. Definitely
organic terms, for instance, pervade George Henry Lewes's
definition of perception, which he explains as 'the
assimilation of the Object by the Subject, in the same
way that Nutrition is the assimilation of the Medium by
2 3
the Organism'. In less scientific terms, yet conveying
the same notion Eliot describes Daniel Deronda's
perception, when sitting by the river opposite Kew
Gardens: 'he was forgetting everything else in a half-
speculative, half-involuntary identification of himself
with the objects he was looking at, thinking how far it
might be possible habitually to shift his centre till his
own personality would be no less outside him than the
landscape' (p. 229). The subject-object fusion seems to
be an inevitable explanation of the process taking place
during perception. Even Merleau-Ponty, who rejects such
synthesis as idealistic, cannot help defining perception
as the 'communication or communion, the taking up or
completion by us of some extraneous intention'; or even
more explicitly he asserts that 'to look at an object is
24
to inhabit it', or 'to plunge oneself into it'.
Evidently Coleridge's impact on modern theories of
perception is extraordinary. Whether it be the synthetic
23
Problems of Life and Mind, I, 189.
24
Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 320, 68, 67.
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process or the active nature of perception, twentieth-
century psychologists and philosophers seem to have taken
up and enlarged upon Coleridge's beliefs. This is the
case, for example, in long studies devoted to proving
that perception is active: Ulric Neisser early on his
book Cognitive Psychology recognizes perception as an
'active process'; A. R. Luria proves in The Working Brain
that perception is both active and creative; and Merleau-
Ponty in his Phenomenology of Perception describes
perceptions as compositions—'the text of the external
25
world is not so much copied, as composed'.
Compositions, needless to say, involve the
perceiver's active interchange with the percept. The
information provided by the percept is incomplete without
the perceiver's own memory and imagination, as we saw in
the case of the figure-ground phenomenon. Because of the
knowledge which the perceiver derives from within, he can
understand the world without. Perception then involves
the interaction of both the outer and the inner worlds,
an idea lyrically expressed by Romantics and Victorians.
For George Eliot the inward and outward are often
fused so inextricably that is is difficult to distinguish
sharply the one from the other: 'It seems difficult to
limit—at least to limit with any precision—the
possibility of confounding sense by impressions, derived
from inward conditions, with those which are directly
dependent on external stimulus. In fact, the division
^
(Nev; York, 1967), p. 16; An Introduction to
Neuropsychology (London, 1978), p. 240; p. 9.
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between within and without in this sense seems to become
every year a more subtle and bewildering problem' (GEL,
V, 280). We can, of course, see the romantic overtones
of Eliot's belief; indeed, we can almost hear
Wordsworth's lines from 'Tintern Abbey'
Therefore am I still
A lover of the meadows and the woods,
And mountains; and of all the mighty world
Of eye, and ear—both what they half
create—
and what perceive... (11. 102-106).
We are also reminded of Coleridge's words from 'Dejection
Ode'
0 Lady! we receive but what we give,
And in our life does Nature live
(11. 47-48).
In both cases we witness the active perceiver attributing
qualities to the passive scene. An accurate, although
ambiguous, embodiment of this idea occurs in the image of
the eddy in the last lines of 'Dejection Ode':
To her may all things live, from pole to
pole
Their life the eddying of her living soul!
(11. 135-36)
'Eddying' in this case is attractively effective because
it successfully displays, as M. H. Abrams convincingly
affirms, 'a ceaseless and circular interchange of life
between soul and nature in which it is impossible to
distinguish what is given from what is received'—exactly
2 6
the point George Eliot makes.
2 f)
Wordsworth, Poetical Works, pp. 163-65; The Poems
of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, edited by E. H. Coleridge
(London, 1912), pp. 365, 368; The Mirror, p. 68.
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The role of anticipation in perception is another
manifestation of the inward-outward interaction. 'Even
when we are broad awake, if we are in anxious
expectation', Coleridge explains, 'how often will not the
most confused sounds of nature be heard by us as
articulate sound? for instance, the babbling of a brook
will appear, for a moment, the voice of a Friend, for
whom we are waiting, calling out our names.... a
Likeness in part tends to become a likeness of the whole'
(CCW, Coburn, IV, 118-19). William James seems to take
up and enlarge upon Coleridge's point in his Psychology
where he describes perception in terms of illusions. At
times, he claims, 'we perceive a wrong object because our
mind is full of the thought of it at the time, and any
sensation which is in the least degree connected with it
touches off, as it were, a train already laid, and gives
us a sense that the object is really before us'. To
illustrate this concept he uses as examples the sportsman
who shoots a thrush, taking it for the woodcock he is
expecting; the person who waits in the dark fearing a
certain object and interprets any sudden sensation as
that object; and proofreaders who miss misspelled words
because they do not actually see every single letter of
each word, but 'more than half of the words come out of
27
their mind, and hardly half from the printed page'.
The role of what William James calls 'the mental
supplement' to perception is also well demonstrated in
27pp. 321-22.
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novels. Dorothea's conviction, for instance, that
Rosamond and Will are in love, when she goes to give
Rosamond a letter for Lydgate, is a brilliant example of
perception influenced by anticipation:
Dorothea had less outward vision than
usual, this morning, being filled
with images of things as they had
been and were going to be. She found
herself on the other side of the door
without seeing anything remarkable,
but immediately she heard a voice
speaking in low tones which startled
her as with a sense of dreaming in
daylight, and advancing unconsciously
a step or two beyond the projecting
slab of a bookcase, she saw, in the
terrible illumination of a certainty
which filled up all outlines,
something which made her pause
motionless without self-possession
enough to speak (p. 832) .
The 'mental supplement' to this visual perception is
obvious at the beginning of the paragraph, where we are
informed that Dorothea 'had less outward vision than
usual this morning' and that she was preoccupied with an
imaginative experience, 'things as they had been and were
going to be'. Under the circumstances, how could she see
'in the terrible illumination of a certainty'? The
intended irony here is apparent. A sense of anticipation
of a dreaded event is also revealed by the phrase
modifying certainty--'which filled up all outlines'. And
anticipation, partly explains Isabel's vision of the
ghost Ralph had told her she could see only if she had
suffered enough.
Dorothea's case further illustrates what
psychologists term 'selective attention', which means a
perceptual choice; that is, 'while we are looking at one
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event, we see little of others, even if they are equally
present to the eye'. And both imagining and perceiving,
2 8
Ulric Neisser declares, 'involve choice'. Ruskin also
describes a painter's 'selective attention' and points
out that even a faithful copy of a landscape always
involves some kind of 'selection, and more or less wilful
assertion, of one fact in preference to another'. This
selection, Ruskin believes, should be made 'under the
influence of sentiment' (MP, IV, 32). Merleau-Ponty
seems to be proving Ruskin's point when he asserts in his
Phenomenology of Perception that our first reaction to a
perceptual event is emotional and subjective rather than
objective. His quotation of Koffka's The Growth of Mind
illustrates his point well: '" an object looks attractive
or repulsive before it looks black or blue, circular or
29
square"'. This, in turn, is another maifestation of
the interplay between the inward and the outward that
takes place during perception, and demonstrates the role
that feeling plays in perception.
The role of emotion is even more crucial in our
perception of works of art, which are so tightly
interwoven with emotions that an art lover, as Gombrich
maintains in Art and Illusion, 'may go through life
without ever realizing to what an extent the pictures he
loves are crisscrossed by subjective contours of his own
making. If he were ever to strip them of these
2 8
'Understanding Psychological Man', p. 45.
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projections, merely a meaningless armature might well be
all that would remain'The Spoils of Poynton could
serve as a sensitive illustration of Gombrich's point.
Mrs Gereth obstinately refuses to give up her treasures
to Mona because the girl cannot possibly appreciate
valuable objects to which no memories or feelings have
become attached. But for Mrs Gereth, the passionate art
lovers they are '"living things ... they know me, they
return the touch of my hand. But I could let them all
go, since I have to so strangely, to another affection,
another conscience. There's a care they want, there's
sympathy that draws out their beauty' (p. 31).
Mrs Gereth's statements also reveal the synesthetic
quality of perception? it is not only sight but touch too
that is involved in her enjoyment. 'Synesthetic
perception is the rule', Merleau-Ponty shows in his study
on perception. Sight does not bring us only colours or
light but also other qualities. Because the 'senses
intercommunicate', we can see 'the hardness and
brittleness of glass ... the springiness of steel, the
ductility of red-hot steel'. And, he continues, 'in the
jerk of the twig from which a bird had just flown, we
read its flexibility or elasticity, and it is thus that a
branch of an apple-tree or a birch are immediately
distinguishable'; furthermore, when we hear 'the hardness
and uneveness of cobbles in the rattle of a carriage ...
we speak appropriately of a "soft", "dull" or "sharp"
3 0
A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial
Representation, fourth edition (London, 1972), p. 176.
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sound'. Merleau-Ponty even claims that we 'perceive
hardly any object ... just as we do not see the eyes of
familiar face, but simply its look and its expression'.
In a journey through Paris each perception, 'the cafe's,
people's faces ... the quays ... stands out against the
city's whole being, and confirms that there is a certain
3
style or a certain significance which Paris possesses'.
Henry James describes the same effect in a strikingly
similar manner in his short story, 'A Passionate
Pilgrim' (18 75):
There is a rare emotion, familiar to
every intelligent traveller, in which
the mind seems to swallow the sum
total of its impressions at a gulp.
You take in the whole place, whatever
it be. You feel England, you feel
Italy, and the sensation involves for
the moment a kind of thrill....
Since my landing in England I had
been waiting for it to arrive. A
bottle of tolerable Burgundy, at
dinner, had perhaps unlocked to it
the gates of sense; it arrived now
with irresistible force (pp. 351-52) .
A bottle of burgundy 'unlocks' the senses and the revel
of their intercommunication begins. And in The
Bostonians (1886) music mingles with the warmth and the
fragrance of the burning logs and acquires a perfume of
its own: 'His guests sat scattered in the red firelight,
listening, silent, in comfortable attitudes; there was a
faint fragrance from the burning logs, which mingled with
the perfume of Schubert and Mendelssohn; the covered
lamps made a glow here and there, and the cabinets and
31pp. 229, 230, 281.
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brackets produced brown shadows, out of which some
precious object gleamed' (p. 134).
Is it possible then to follow Bachelard's suggestion
and 'consider literary documents as realities of the
imagination ... as real as those of perception'? (PS, p.
158). From the similarites which perception and
imagination share, this does not seem to be an impossible
task. To begin with, we have found that both imagination
and perception depend on an interplay between the outer
and the inner, are both synthetic, constructive,
integrative processes. How is the one then distinguished
from the other? Ruskin offers an implicit distinction
though he does not, in this case, juxtapose imagination
with perception but concentrates on imagination: 'And
its great function being the calling forth, or back, that
which is not visible to bodily sense, it has of course
been made to take delight in the fulfilment of its proper
function, and pre-eminently to enjoy, and spend its
energy on, things past and future, or out of sight,
rather than things present, or in sight' (MP, III, 181).
In order to understand imagination better, Harold Rugg
suggests, one needs to distinguish it from perception and
memory. And his distinction sounds much like Ruskin's
description of the imagination. Whereas perception
'involves sensory experiences, awareness of present data,
whether external or intraorganic', imagination (and here
Rugg borrows the Oxford dictionary definition) '"is
forming a mental concept of what is not actually present
to the senses ... the power which the mind has of forming
100
concepts beyond those derived from external objects"'.
Rugg's definitions of the imagination, perception and
memory become clearer through his examples of images from
each process: 'I look at the skyline of New York from the
New Jersey palisades, close my eyes and have a memory
image. I read a descriptive account of Chengtu, which I
have never seen, try to imagine what it looks like, and I
3 2 .
have an imagination image'. Although imagination is
frequently based on perception, in literature, quite
clearly, it asserts its independence. By means of our
imagination, we can see objects or events which we have
never before experienced. This is why imagination is
more expansive than perception, an idea vividly embodied
by various images in both The Portrait of a Lady and
Middlemarch as we shall see.
It is with the expansive nature of the imagination,
its openness and freedom that Bachelard is primarily
concerned in L'Air et les songes. Image is not as
appropriate to the imagination as 'imaginary', Bachelard
maintains in this book; more precisely, 'the value of an
image is measured by the extent of its imaginary halo.
Thanks to the imaginary, the imagination is essentially
open, escapist'. And 'unmaking the images furnished by
perception' is one of the powers which characterize the
openness of the imagination: 'It is above all the faculty
of freeing us from the initial images, of changing




union of images, there is no imagination, there is no
action of imagining'. And he continues, briefly touching
upon memory and perception: 'If an image that is present
does not make us think of an image that is absent, if one
occasional image does not set going a whole host of
wandering images, there is no imagination. There is
perception, a memory of perception, a familiar memory,
the customary colors and shapes'. In La Terre et les
a /
reveries de la volonte, disintegration precedes creation:
'a literary image destroys the lazy images of perception.
Literary imagination disimagines to better reimagine'.
Bachelard's 'destroys' here sounds much like Coleridge's
'dissolves' in order to recreate; Coleridge's 'diffuses,
dissipates' has become Bachelard's 'unmaking the images
furnished by perception'. And Coleridge's germ becomes
Bachelard's image which sets 'going a whole host of
wandering images.'
Of course, it is impossible to deal with germinal
ideas or images without taking memory into consideration;
and indeed this is one of James's points in his prefaces.
Modern artists also emphasize the value of a good memory
to creativity and show how perception, memory, and
imagination are all interwoven tightly in the creative
act. A poet's mind, T. S. Eliot remarks, is 'magnetised
... automatical1ly' to 'an image, a phrase, a word' that
he might use years later; a childhood memory, for
example, might lie dormant in the mind for many years and
33
Essai sur 1'imagination du movement (Paris,
1943), p. 7; (Paris, 1948), p. 26.
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then, suddenly it may 're-appear in some verse-context
charged with great imaginative pressure'; for Stephen
Spender, memory is 'the root of creative genius' because
it 'enables the poet to connect the immediate moment of
perception which is called "inspiration", with past
moments in which he has received like impressions'. And
this process of relating 'enables the poet, through the
moment, to strike a kind of chord across time, made up of
notes which are similar impressions felt at different
times 1.
George Eliot's account of the prototype of Sir
Christopher in 'Mr. Gilfil's Love Story'(1858), seems to
illustrate Spender's and T. S. Eliot's ideas: 'Certain
vague traditions about Sir Roger Newdegate ... which I
heard when I was a child are woven into the character of
Sir Christopher Cheverel, and the house he improved into
a charming Gothic place'. The rest of the story though,
George Eliot asserts, 'is spun out of the subtlest web of
minute observation and inward experience, from my first
childish recollections up to recent years' (GEL, II, 459-
60). George Eliot's letters often reveal a conscious
effort to vivify old memories, which, in turn, became
germs for her stories. In August 1859, for instance, she
declined Barbara Bodichon's invitation to visit her in
Hastings, because at that time, she explained, 'my mind
works with the most freedom and the keenest sense of
3 4
The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, second
edition (London, 1964), pp. 78-9; World Within World (New
York, 1951), p. 53.
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poetry in my remotest past, and there are many strata to
be worked through before I can begin to use artistically
any material I may gather in the present' (GEL, III, 128-
29). At the time, Eliot was working on The Mill on the
Floss; and it is a well-known fact that her memories from
childhood have played a major role in this novel. Early
in her biography of George Eliot, Ruby Redinger shows
how, gradually in her career, Eliot discovered that
'Looking Inward' meant 'Looking Backward', that her past
'had been a necessary apprenticeship to what she called
3 5
her "true vocation" of novel writing'. Her fondness
for the past is perhaps the reason why all of her novels
are either set in the past or show the effect of the past
on, and its significance to, the present.
Henry James's remarkable memory is also evident in
his Prefaces and Notebooks as well as in his
Autobiography. Within his novels James also assigned a
past to his characters; his preface to The Aspern Papers
(1888) seems to crystallize the reason: 'I delight in a
palpable imaginable visitable past—in the nearer
distances and the clearer mysteries, the marks and signs
of a world we may reach over to as by making a long arm
we grasp an object at the other end of our own table (AN,
164). At the end of The Wings of the Dove (1902),
Densher's thoughts reveal how imagination often
facilitates memory. Reminiscing about Milly, Densher
recalls that 'his presence on the first occasion, not as
^George Eliot: The Emergent Self (New York, 1975),
p. 11.
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the result of a summons, but as a friendly fancy of his
own, had had quite another value; and though our young
man could scarce regard that value as recoverable, he yet
reached out in imagination to a renewal of the old
contact' (II, 301). James's prefaces to his novels also
reveal the tight interconnection between memory and
imagination, as the germs, after a time of incubation,
spring to life. For George Eliot, similarly, a germ
remained dormant in her mind 'till time had made my mind
a nidus in which it [germ] could fructify' (GEL, III,
176). And in the preface to The American, James refers
to the 'resurrection of the germ for the novel' (AN, 23).
For both novelists, the beginning of the creative act,
the perceived image, becomes the memory image, which is
transformed into the imaginary image, the beginning of
life. Naturally by the time a memory is resurrected it
has undergone transformations; it cannot be the copy of
the original experience.
In this respect, Eliot and James anticipated modern
psychologists like Ulric Neisser and F. C. Bartlett who
regard memory as a constructive faculty. In the
conclusion of Remembering, F. C. Bartlett remarks that
the 'description of memories as "fixed and lifeless" is
merely an unpleasant fiction ... memory is itself
constructive'. Memory, he continues, 'and all the life
of images and words which goes with it, is one with the
age-old acquisition of the distance senses, and with that
development of constructive imagination and constructive
thought wherein at length we find the most complete
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release from the narrowness of presented time and
, , 36place'.
Reading a novel can indeed be a constructive
activity involving memory, perception, and imagination.
Wolfgang Iser in his Implied Reader delightfully shows
how the three activities are enmeshed in reading; his
description of the reading process sounds very much like
an account of the creative process: 'Whatever we have
read sinks into our memory and is foreshortened. It may
later be evoked again and set against a different
background with the result that the reader is enabled to
develop hitherto unforeseeable connections'. Our memory
of literary events though, Iser remarks, 'can never
reassume its original shape, for this would mean that
memory and perception were identical, which is manifestly
not so. The new background brings to light new aspects
of what we had committed to memory; conversely these, in
turn, shed their light on the new background, thus
arousing more complex anticipations'. So, by discovering
the relations among past, present, and future, the reader
'actually causes the text to reveal its potential
multiplicity of connections'. These connections, Iser
believes, are essentially 'the product of the reader's
mind working on the raw material of the text, though they
are not the text itself—for this consists just of
3 7
sentences, statements, information'.
36(London, 1932), pp. 311-12, 314.
^(London, 1974), p. 278.
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But what assists our memory in reading? In her long
study The Art of Memory, Frances Yates demonstrates that
it has been known since the time of classical Greece and
Rome that images have been used for mnemonics. At one
point she quotes one of Bacon's statements from his De
Augmentis scientiarum which sounds much like Simonides's
or Cicero's remarks on menomonics: 'Emblems bring down
intellectual to sensible things; for what is sensible
always strikes the memory stronger, and sooner impresses
itself than the intellectual.... and therefore it is
easier to retain the image of ... an apothecary ranging
his boxes, an orator making a speech ... than the
3 8
corresponding notions of invention, disposition'.
George Eliot was finely aware of the value of images in
capturing the reader's attention: 'the modes of telling a
story founded on these processes of outward and inward
life derive their effectiveness from the superior mastery
of images and pictures in grasping the attention'
(Essays, 445).
It is useful to our understanding of memory to know
that there are two kinds of retention: the iconic and the
verbal. Since most of our experiences occur while 'our
verbal system is alert', Michael Gazzaniga claims in The
Integrated Mind, 'it would seem at first glance to be
unlikely that information is stored in the verbal
system's absence, thereby making the information
inaccessible to language'. Yet, Gazzaniga continues,
38(London, 1966), p. 371.
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this is the case with the very young child, in his
preverbal years: 'Years later, these early states can
39
emerge, to the total surprise of the verbal system'.
Other psychologists, John Seamon for example, agree that
the 'development of an imagery representational system
precedes that of the language system', and that 'early
childhood memories may be available in the visual system,
40
but inaccessible through the verbal system'. Again we
can see George Eliot's acuteness when we recall, in this
case, her statement, 'our earliest, strongest
impresssions, our most intimate convictions, are simply
images'(Essays, 445). Henry James shows his keen
awareness of this truth in his preface to What Maisie
Knew (1897), an idea which the novel itself repeatedly
illustrates: 'Small children have many more perceptions
than they have terms to translate them; their vision is
at any moment much richer, their apprehension even
constantly stronger, than their prompt, their at all
producible, vocabulary' (AN, 145) .
The role of the verbal system, on the other hand,
according to Gazzaniga, is 'to make sense out of the
emotional and other mental systems and, in so doing,
allow man, with his mental complexity, the illusion of a
^(London, 1978), pp. 158, 159.
40
Coding and Retrieval Processes and the
Hemispheres of the Brain' in Hemisphere Function in the
Human Brain (London, 1974), pp. 184-203 (p. 201); see
also, J. S. Bruner, R. R. Olver and others, eds., Studies
in Cognitive Growth (New York, 1966).
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unified self'. Ruskin seems actually to have
anticipated modern psychologists in his explanation of
the verbal and nonverbal encoding. 'Some facts', he
states, 'exist in the brain in a verbal form as known,
but not conceived; as, for instance, that it [an object]
was heavy or light ... and which fact we may recollect
without any conception of the object at all'. Other
facts about the same object, Ruskin continues, are stored
in the brain in 'a visible form, not always visible, but
visible at will, as its being of such a colour, or having
such and such a complicated shape1 (MP, II, 229).
Yet the emotional part of an experience proves that
events are not encoded in two ways only but rather
multidimensionally. Because incidents in our life are
'multifaceted', Gazzaniga points out, 'different aspects
of experience are differentially stored in the brain'.
As a result, when a past experience is remembered, it is
usually a 'multidimensional experience involving time,
space, colors, sounds, smell, temperature, and a variety
4 2
of other stimuli'. Henry James illustrates well the
multidimensionality of memory in Mr. Longdon's case in
The Awkward Age. Early in the novel, we are told that he
appeared to lose himself 'in the deep memories to attest
which he had survived alone; then he sighed out as if the
taste of it all came back to him with a faint sweetness:
"I think they must both have been good to me' (p. 32).
41
The Integrated Mind, p. 155.
42pp. 132, 137.
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Thus a memory here is 'deep', it has a taste of 'faint
sweetness', and it is imbedded in an emotional aura—
'they must have been good to me'.
A novelist, then, tries to record an experience in
our memory multidimensionally. Because of its form, the
novel has to appeal primarily to the verbal encoding.
Yet, through images, the novelist is also stimulating the
nonverbal encoding? furthermore, he has to rely heavily
on the iconic in order to assist our memory of the events
taking place in the realm of the novel. Modern
psychology describes a belief which a good novelist
always takes into consideration: 'the relational
organisation of mental imagery appears to be important in
43
determining its menmonic efficacy'. Unlike a
psychologist, however, a novelist expresses this notion
in more concrete, vivid, and appealing language. The
importance of the place each image occupies seems to have
originated in Simonides's concept of mnemonics.
Simonides urged people who wanted to train their memory
'to select places and form mental images of the things
they wish to remember and store those images in the
places, so that the order of the places will preserve the
44
order of the things'. The 'relational organisation' of
the images in Middlemarch seems to explain why Dorothea
looking out of her window, after the night of internal
turmoil, is an image that will remain in our minds years
43
John Richardson, Mental Imagery and Human Memory
(New York, 1980), p. 144.
44
Frances Yates, p. 2.
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after we have read the novel. It is not the vividness of
the image as much as its place in the novel that
determines its lasting quality.
Experimental psychology, Bachelard contends in his
Poetics of Reverie, fails to explain how imagination and
memory interact; 'the remembered past is not simply a
past of perception. Since one is remembering, the past
is already designated in a reverie as an image value.
From their very origin, the imagination colors the
paintings it will want to see again' (p. 105). The
distinction between memory and imagination, Bachelard
believes, becomes especially difficult in 'the realm of
beloved images harbored in memory since childhood'. And
he continues:
These memories which live by the
image and in virtue of the image
become, at certain times of our lives
and particularly during the quiet
age, the origin and matter of a
complex reverie: the memory dreams,
and reverie remembers. When the
reverie of remembering becomes the
germ of a poetic work, the complex of
memory and imagination becomes more
tightly meshed.... The imagination
ceaselessly revives and illustrates
the memory (PR, p. 20).
Indeed, quite frequently, in Middlemarch and in The
Portrait of a Lady, as we shall see, the imagination
brilliantly colours 'the paintings' it wants to see
again. And although reverie or meditation does play an
important role in both novels, it does not become a germ
of a work, but it initiates an important revelation, a
higher understanding of the self, the world, or others—
indeed, a time of rebirth or regeneration.
Ill
Bachelard's idea that the creative act becomes
possible through the enmeshing of reverie, memory,
perception and imagination had been, anticipated by
Ruskin. In his description of Turner's work in the
fourth book of his Modern Painters, Ruskin seems eager to
make the distinction between reverie (though he does not
use 'reverie' in particular), and dream, which Bachelard
often makes in his Poetics of Reverie. Turner's works,
Ruskin maintains, are not like dreams, 'for in a dream
there is just this kind of confused remembrance of the
forms of things which we have seen long ago, associated
by new strange laws'. Whereas 'common dreams are
grotesque and disorderly ... Turner's dream [is] natural
and orderly'. In the same passage, Ruskin shows how the
creative act is the result of the fusion of memory,
perception and imagination. 'Whenever Turner really
tried to compose, and made modifications of his subjects
on principle', Ruskin contends, 'he did wrong, and
spoiled them'. In Ruskin's view, Turner did well only
when he remained 'in a kind of passive obedience to his
first vision, that vision being composed primarily of the
strong memory of the place itself which he had to draw;
and s^Cje/cndarily, of memories of other places ..#
associated, in a harmonious and helpful way, with the new
central thought'. (MP, IV, 41).
Like George Eliot and Henry James, Ruskin seems to
teach that the artist has to remain receptive and
faithful to the germ (usually originating in perception),
which undergoes transformations by memory and is
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fructified by the imagination. Taking into consideration
the processes involved in the creative act, Coleridge
developed sympathetic or recreative criticism, a critical
approach which takes the reader or the critic through
processes which the artist himself experienced.
Coleridge's criticism, as we shall see in the following
chapter, bridges the distance between the critic and the
artist by training the critic to see and feel and
understand as an artist.
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CHAPTER 3
■INTO THE MAGIC CIRCLE OF CREATION'
As you read, the fictitious universe
of the poem seems to expand and
advance out of its remoteness, to
surge musically about your senses,
and merge itself utterly in the
universe which surrounds you. The
summer brightness of the real world
goes half-way to meet it; and the
beautiful figures which throb with
life in Mr. Morris's stories pass
lightly to and fro between the realm
of poetry and the mild atmosphere of
fact.
The melody in James's criticism of William Morris's
poetry in 1868 is unmistakably romantic. Because of his
receptiveness, a state almost of reverie, James—here the
ideal reader—enters the fictional universe, or allows it
to open and expand towards him; in the process, he sees
the reader's delight as the direct result of the writer's
achievement. Because 'The Earthly Paradise' appeared 'to
reflect so clearly and. forcibly the poet's natural
sympathies with the external world, and his joy in
personal contact with it' the reader has 'obtained
something very like a sense of physical transposition,
without physical or intellectual weariness' (VR, 72).
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What James calls Morris's sympathy with the external
world and 'his joy in personal contact with it' sounds
very much like Coleridge's joy in his 'Dejection Ode',
which he describes as the poet's ability to become one
with the external world, to experience the synthesis of
the subject with the object. Indeed, James, in his
criticism of Morris's poetry, seems to have achieved the
'coalescence' Coleridge revered. But how does the
reader's 'physical transposition' actually occur?
Coleridge gives a convincing answer in his Shakespearean
Criticism. When referring to Shakespeare's works, as we
have seen, he extols their 'power of so carrying on the
eye of the reader as to make him almost lose the
consciousness of words—to make him see everything—and
this without exciting any painful or laborious attention'
(SC, I, 214). In his lyrical criticism of Morris's
poetry, James seems at times 'to lose the consciousness
of words' and actually to see the 'beautiful figures' in
the 'Earthly Paradise', or to 'inhabit the bright and
silent workroom of a great Greek artist ... standing
among shapes and forms of perfect beauty' in 'Pygmalion'
(VR, 78).
James's 'physical transposition' further reminds us
of Coleridge's distinction between prose and poetry in
which he attributed to poetry 'that pleasurable emotion,
that peculiar state and degree of excitement, which
arises in the poet himself in the act of composition;—
and in order to understand this, we must combine a more
than ordinary sympathy with the objects, emotions, or
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incidents contemplated by the poet' (SC, I, 163-64). By
empathizing with Morris's 'natural sympathies', James
does indeed exhibit 'a more than ordinary sympathy with
the objects ... contemplated by the poet', and in so
doing, he experiences 'that pleasurable emotion' which
the poet himself felt while composing his work. James
would most probably have qualified as the ideal critic
whom Coleridge had in mind when he defined 'genial
criticism' as an attempt 'to judge in the same spirit in
which the Artist produced or ought to have produced' (BL,
II, 222).
Although scattered throughout his works, Coleridge's
comments on sympathetic criticism could be summed up by
four principles: an attempt to recapture the artist's
feeling; a concentration on the 'excellences'rather than
the defects of a work; a judgement derived from intrinsic
rather than extrinsic rules; an oscillation from parts to
the whole. I have focused on these four principles,
primarily because they have been adopted and amplified by
modern critics practicing recreative or organic
criticism. We have already briefly touched upon some of
these concepts in chapter one, but my emphasis here will
be on their usefulness as critical approaches to
literature.
To begin with, a critic, according to Coleridge,
should respond to the feeling which inspired the artist's
work. This is a concept congenial to both Gfc%rge Eliot
and Henry James. Writing to one of her admirers in 1873,
Eliot described an author's aim in Coleridgean terms:
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'What one's soul tfrf|ijsts for is the word which is the
reflection] of one's own aim and delight in writing—the
word which shows that what one meant has been perfectly
seized, that the emotion which stirred one in writing is
repeated in the mind of the reader' (GEL, V, 374).
Almost identically James had expressed this idea a few
years earlier in an essay on Alexandre Dumas: 'the
impression that he [the artist] should aim to produce on
the reader's mind with his work must have much in common
with the impression originally produced on his own mind
by his subject' (NR, 226).
In order to capture the artist's feeling, the critic
should not be concerned with the negative but rather with
the positive qualities of a work. In Chapter XXII of
Biographia Literaria, in which Coleridge analyzes
Wordsworth's poetry, he emphasizes that if a critic wants
to 'appreciate the defects of a great mind it is
necessary to understand previously its characteristic
excellences' (II, 97). Using the same word,
'excellences', George Eliot conveys Coleridge's concept
in her review (1856) of the third book of Ruskin's Modern
Painters, where she connects artistic value to the
feeling it arouses in the audience: 'we value a writer
not in proportion to his freedom from faults, but in
proportion to his positive excellences—to the variety of
thought he contributes and suggests, to the amount of
gladdening and energizing emotions he excites'."*"
"*"'Art and Belles lettres', Westminster Review,
American edition, 65 (1856), 343-56 (p. 343).
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Naturally, both beauties and defects can be found within
the work itself, and since, as we have seen, organic form
evolves from within, it follows that the critic should
look into the work itself to discover the rules by which
he will examine it. For James such view represented the
ideal critic 'who has, a priori, no rule for a literary
2
production but that it shall have genuine life'.
The rules, then, are intrinsic not extrinsic. This
is another of the principles of recreative criticism
which Coleridge set forth in his Shakespearean Criticism:
'The spirit of poetry, like all other living powers, must
of necessity circumscribe itself by rules, were it only
to unite power with beauty. It must embody in order to
reveal itself'. Coleridge sees in life order and
organization; this is why he defines a living body as 'an
organized one,--and what is organization, but the
connection of parts to a whole, so that each part is at
once end and means!' (I, 223). Tightly connected with
organic unity, as we have seen, and as Coleridge
indicates here, is the interrelationship of the whole
with its parts. Furthermore, Coleridge felt the need to
justify his critical approach to poetry early in his
Biographia Literaria by anchoring it in the fundamental
processes of the human mind: 'I labored at a solid
foundation, on which permanently to ground my opinions in
the component faculties of the human mind itself, and
their comparative dignity and importance' (BL, I, 14).
2
Introduction to the American edition of Rudyard
Kipling's Mine Own People (Boston, 1899), p.12.
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An emotional response to experience is primary, as
studies on perception, imagination, and memory indicate.
and in most experiences, first we feel, and then we try
to understand or to explain why we felt in a certain way.
This is one of Bachelard's points in his book, L'Eau et
les reves: 'It is not knowledge of the real which makes
us passionately love it. It is rather feeling which is
the primary and fundamental value. One starts by loving
nature without knowing it, W&ithout seeing it well, while
actualizing in things a love which is grounded elsewhere.
Then, one seeks it in detail because one loves it on the
whole, without knowing why'; the same pattern, as
Bachelard has shown in L'Air et les songes, is repeated
in an aesthetic experience—first astonishment, then an
3
attempt to understand it.
Freud's essay on Michelangelo's Moses attractively
illustrates this pattern. First Freud is powerfully
moved by the statue, then he tries to comprehend the
reason why, and finally he realizes that the powerful
impact the statue has on him must lie in the artist's
intention. 'I realize', he says (sounding like the ideal
critic George Eliot and Henry James envisioned) 'that it
[the effect of the statue] cannot be merely a matter of
intellectual comprehension; what he [the artist] aims at
is to awaken in us the same emotional attitude, the same
mental constellation as that which in him produced the
^(Paris, 1942), p. 155; p. 193.
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4
impetus to create'. By responding first emotionally,
and then intellectually, the critic, the reader, the
beholder, follows the steps the artist took.
Feeling is the primary quality of the imagination.
One cannot speak of the imagination without relating it
somehow to feeling, simply because, as Ruskin points out,
the 'Imagination is based upon, and appeals to, a deep
heart feeling' (MP, II, 298). Similarly, Henry James
claims that 'the only lasting fictions are those which
have spoken to the reader's heart, and not to his eye'
(NR, 22). For Ruskin, 'all true and deep emotion is
imaginative, both in conception and expression'. Our
ability to see mentally, he continues, depends on our
ability to feel keenly: 'the mental sight becomes sharper
with every full beat of the heart'. Imagination enables
us to 'forget ourselves and enter, like possessing
spirits, into the bodies of things about us' (MP, II,
204) .
No doubt, feeling was indispensable to the genesis
of a work of art for both George Eliot and Henry James.
'But what is fiction other than an arrangement of events
or feigned correspondences according to predominant
feeling'? Eliot asks in her 'Notes on Form in Art'; and
later on she says, 'poetry begins when passion weds
thought by finding expression in an image'. Earlier in
this essay, she has already mentioned that she considers
poetry 'in its wider sense as including all literary
4
Creativity and the Unconscious (London, 1958), p.
12.
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production of which it is the prerogative and not the
reproach that the choice and sequence of images and ideas
... are more or less not only determined by emotion but
intended to express it' (Essays, 434-35). Similarly, in
his preface to The Portrait of a Lady, James sees feeling
and perception as inextricably interwoven: 'recognising
so promptly the one measure of the worth of a given
subject, the question about it that, rightly answered
disposes of all others—is it valid, in a word, is it
genuine, is it sincere, the result of some direct
impression or perception of life? There is I think no
more nutritive or suggestive truth in this connection
than that of the perfect dependence of the "moral" sense
of a work of art on the amount of felt life concerned in
producing it* (AN, 45).
The emotional and the moral qualities of a work
become fused in Coleridge's criticism of others. Whether
representing the artist's effort in composing a work or
the reader's response in interacting with it, feeling,
for Coleridge, is an internal force. By juxtaposing
constantly the external with the internal, the eye with
the heart, perception with imagination, Coleridge seems
to be primarily responsible for initiating an internal
response to literature. His strongest objection to the
unities of time and place, for instance, was based upon
the belief that they appeal primarily to the senses. He
praised The Tempest highly because he felt 'it addresses
itself entirely to the imaginative faculty'. A
complicated scenery for the production of the play, he
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thought, could undermine its effect, because it would
stimulate an outward response at the expense of an inward
enjoyment: 'For the principal and only genuine
excitement ought to come from within,—from the moved and
sympathetic imagination; whereas, where so much is
addressed to the mere external senses of seeing and
hearing, the spiritual vision is apt to languish, and the
attraction from without will withdraw the mind from the
proper and only legitimate interest which is intended to
spring from within' (SC, I, 132).
Coleridge's analogy between the mind and a living
plant also pointed to the forces within; even its
external form he emphasized, is determined by internal
processes—'with the same pulse effectuates its own
secret growth'. Organic form is defined in similar
terms: it is 'innate', since 'it shapes as it develops
itself from within, and the fullness of its development
is one and the same with the perfection of its outward
form'. And he continues, 'each exterior is the
physiognomy of the being within, its true image reflected
and thrown out from the concave mirror' (SC, I, 224)
Twentieth-century critics offer different
explanations as to the origin and significance of the
cultivation and exploration of the internal world in
preference to the external. The shift from the external
to the internal was the turning point in the history of
art as Giordano Orsini shows in Organic Unity in Ancient
and Later Poetics: 'This basic shift in point of view
from the external to the internal corresponds to the
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general trend of modern speculation inward rather than
outward, or to the subjective rather than the
objective'.^ Already in Middlemarch, we can see
Dorothea's preoccupation with the world within,
especially at times of emotional crises when the external
world seems to offer no solution to her problems. And of
course, with Henry James the internal world takes over
the external and in his later novels the adventures of
the mind seem to be the only subjects developed. The
turn inward is often traced to Romanticism. In speaking
about the Romantic poet in The Romantic Assertion, F. A.
Foakes seems to offer at the same time an
attractive explanation for the novelist's fascination
with the world within: 'The Romantic poet employed the
power of self-intuition to restore order to a world which
had ceased to afford ready-made images of order, in the
way it had done for Shakespeare and for Pope'.®
Whether the movement inward originated in the
Romantic era or earlier in the concept of organic form it
is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that the recreative critic in focusing inward,
that is, in approaching a work by the standards it
dictates, he is also following the processes the creative
act involves; for the creative act, as Harold Rugg
convincingly shows , 'takes its cue primarily from the
^(London, 1975), p. 84.
6(London, 1958), p. 43.
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inside-identification point of view; that is, organically
from the center outward, not mechanistically from the
outside looking in'. Furthemore, the recreative critic's
method is very much like the Romantic poet's purpose
which, according to Albert Gerard, 'is not to fabricate
an artifact according to a formal pattern preexisting in
his mind'. And in following the transformations of the
germ within a certain work, the critic seems to trace
what Albert Gerard calls the Romantic poet's aim 'to
provide a total and accurate rendering of the germinal
7
idea which stirs his imagination'.
From George Eliot's and Henry James's notebooks,
letters, and critical essays, we can see that the
germinal idea for their novels most often originates in
an image. The germ of Adam Bede, for instance, Eliot
relates, 'was an anecdote told me by my Methodist Aunt
Samuel' who 'had visited a condemned criminal, a very
ignorant girl who had murdered her child and refused to
confess' (GEL, II, 502). In a letter to his wife, John
Blackwood alludes to Silas Marner (1861) as the story
which George Eliot claimed that it 'sprang from her
childish recollection of a man with a stoop and
expression of face that led her to think he was an alien
from his fellows' (GEL, III, 427). And there is enough
evidence to believe that the germ of Gwendolen Harleth
was a young girl whom she had seen gambling during her
stay at Hambourg (GEL, V, 314). The same is true for
7
Imagination, p. 291; English Romantic Poetry
(Berkeley, 1968), p. 260.
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most of James's 'germs'. In his account of the germ of
The Ambassadors in his Notebooks, he gives the
particulars of the incident, adding, 'but I mention these
slightly irrelevant things only to show that I saw the
scene of my young friend's anecdote' and later on, he
urges himself, 'but think of the place itself again
first—the charming June afternoon in Paris, the tea
under the trees, the "intimate" nook consecrated to
8
"artistic literary" talk'. Referring to The American,
he echoes Wordsworth's 'feelings recollected in
tranquillity' as he tells us, 'I have ... found it
difficult to write of places under too immediate an
impression—the impression that prevents standing off and
allows neither space nor time for perspective. The image
has had for the most part to be dim if the reflexion was
to be ... both sharp and quiet' (AN, 27). And 'the image
/
en disponibilite', is charged with a germinal property'
in the case of The Portrait of a Lady (AN, 44);
similarly, regarding The Awkward Age, 'the seed sprouted
in that vast nursery of sharp appeal and concrete images'
(AN, 99). Contemplating the origin of the Tragic Muse,
he regrets not being able to recall the 'precious first
moment of consciousness of the idea to which it was to
give form; to recognise in it ... the effect of some
particular sharp impression or concusssion'. Such
moments, such 'remembered glimmers', embody a 'clear
vision of what one may have intended, and without that
8 "3 "7 "D
p. 373.
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vision no straight measure of what one may have succeeded
in doing ' (AN, 79). Eliot's and James's approach to the
composition of their novels resembles Turner's
composition of his paintings. Talking literally about
the pictorial, Ruskin declares that Turner 'never seems
to have gone back to a place to look at it again, but, as
he gained power, to have painted and repainted it as
first seen, associating with it certain new thoughts or
new knowledge, but never shaking the central pillar of
the old image' (MP, IV, 42).
Apparently so dissimilar in their interests, Eliot,
James, and Coleridge share the same conviction about the
nature of the germ. They all agree, as we have seen,
that the germ embodies opposites. Since the germ
potentially contains the whole, as an acorn is
potentially an oak, it is natural to assume that the
novel grows through opposites. Like Coleridge in his
Shakespearean Criticism, Ruskin refers to Shakespeare's
contrasts (Prince Henry opposed to Falstaff, Cordelia to
Regan, and so on) in his description of 'true idealism'
in Modern Painters and he offers a convincing explanation
for the role of contrasts in a work of art. Only the
'meaner idealists disdain the naturalism, and are shocked
at the contrasts', Ruskin maintains. But a 'man who can
see truth at all', Ruskin emphasizes, 'sees it wholly,
and neither desires nor dares to mutilate it' (MP, III,
113) .
In the same section, Ruskin sets forth the principle
of 'naturalist idealism', which seems to have affected
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both George Eliot and Henry James in the writing of their
novels: 'This operation of true idealism holds, from the
least things to the greatest. For instance, in the
arrangement of the smallest masses of color, the false
idealist, or even the purist, depends upon perfecting
each separate hue, and raises them, all, as far as he
can, into costly brilliancy'. The naturalist, though,
Ruskin continues, takes 'the coarsest and feeblest
colours of the things around him, and so interweaves and
opposes them that they become more lovely than if they
had all been bright'. A great artist, Ruskin believes,
follows the same pattern in his treatment of the human
form; he tries to 'associate inferior forms, so as not
only to set off those which are most beautiful, but to
bring out clearly what good there is in the inferior
forms themselves' (MP, III, 111-12).
In her review of this volume of Modern Painters,
Eliot emphasized naturalist idealism, focusing on
contrasts. The naturalist idealist, she says, 'accepts
the weaknesses, faults, and wrongnesses in all things
that it sees, but so places them that they form a noble
whole, in which the imperfection of each several part is
not only harmless, but absolutely essential, and yet in
which whatever is good in each several part shall be
9
completely displayed'. Ruskin's naturalist idealism and
Eliot's explanation of the theory clarify Coleridge's
principle of sympathetic criticism, namely, that even a
9
Westminster Review, 65 (p. 346).
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writer's defects can often be the paths leading us to a
better understanding of his 'characteristic excellences'.
More recently, Orsini explains how the synthesis or the
final aesthetic integration in a given work brings
together both defects and beauties: 'any particular that
becomes part of a synthesis loses any character it may
have had before and acquires the character of the
synthesis. So a beautiful composition need not be made
out of beautiful words or beautiful phrases. Any word or
phrase in an aesthetic synthesis will become a component
of its total beauty, whether originally beautiful or
not'."1"^ Seen in isolation, parts may often seem
unrelated, but an oscillation from the whole to the parts
shows how they are integral of the whole.
This leads us to another principle of recreative
criticism which unites early and modern organicist
approaches. In designing a work of art, Coleridge
thought, the artist should constantly keep in mind the
relationship of the parts to the whole,, should always
have, what he calls, a 'surview' of the whole, 'which
enables a man to foresee the whole of what he is to
convey, appertaining to any one point; and by this means
so to subordinate and arrange the different parts
according to their relative importance, as to convey it
at once, and as an organized whole' (BL, II, 44). And
regarding the critic, Coleridge also emphasized a
holistic perspective; 'a true critic', he claimed, 'can
^Organic Unity in Ancient and Later Poetics, p. 29.
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no more be such without placing himself on some central
point, from which he may command the whole, that is some
general rule, which, founded in reason, or the faculties
common to all men, must therefore apply to each—than an
astronomer can explain the movements of the solar system
without taking his stand in the sun' (CCW, IV, 53).
Coleridge's view of the artist or the critic as
commanding a central position seems to be an integral
part of his theory of art as a cycle in 1815: 'the Common
end of all narrative, nay of all, Poems is to convert a
series into a Whole: to make those events which in real
or imagined History move on in a strait Line, assume to
our Understanding a circular motion—the snake with it's
[sic] Tail in it's [sic] Mouth'. And he goes on to
explain the cycle in metaphysical terms: 'Hence indeed
the almost flattering and yet appropriate Term, Poesy—
i.e. poiesis=making. Doubtless, to his eye, which alone
comprehends all Past and all Future in one external
Present, what to our short sight appears strait is but a
part of the great Cycle--just as the calm Sea to us
appears level, tho' it be indeed only part of a globe'
(CCL, IV, 545).
Because a work, in its organic unity or form,
resembles nature, it is inevitable that it, like nature,
should be cyclical. 'For this is one proof of the
essential vitality of nature', Coleridge in his 'Theory
of Life' asserts, 'that she does not ascend as links in a
suspended chain, but as the steps in a ladder; or rather
she at one and the same time ascends as by a climax, and
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expands as the concentric circles on the lake from the
point to which the stone in its fall had given the first
impulse' (CCW, I, 386). Ruskin too shows how curves are
associated with nature, the organic and angles with the
inorganic: 'A rose is rounded by its own soft ways of
growth, a reed is bowed into tender curvature by the
pressure of the breeze' (MP, IV, 239-40).
Whether we look into nineteenth or twentieth-century
theories of the imagination, we very often encounter the
idea of the imagination's cyclical nature. For Shelley,
poetry 'enlarges the circumference of the imagination by
replenishing it with thoughts of ever new delight'."'""''
George Poulet in his Metamorphoses of the Circle seems to
expound Shelley's point and to concentrate on the centre
in a Coleridgean sort of manner: 'The imagination is a
circle; but chiefly, it is the center of a circle; a
center from which radiate outward lines which place the
central unity in rapport with the peripheral variety; in
such a manner that one can say of the space which they
embrace, that it is at once united and divided, multiple
12
and organized'. Ruskin also spoke of 'Imagination
Penetrative' in terms of the centre. 'Every great
conception of poet or painter', he claims, 'is held and
treated by this faculty'. And every sentence of a work
'as it has been thought out from the heart, opens for us
"'""'"'A Defence of Poetry', p. 118.
12
translated by Carley Dawson and Elliott Coleman
(Baltimore, Maryland, 1966), p. 108.
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a way down to the heart, leads us to the centre, and then
leaves us to gather what more we may' (MP, II, 251-52).
The impact of the centre on the artist, his work,
and his audience, is the subject of Rudolph Arnheim's
recent book, The Power of the Center. 'Perfectly
spherical structures', he explains at the outset, are
rare in works of art, 'but just as almost every organic
and inorganic object is shaped around a center,
centricity is an indispensable structural property of any
composition in the visual arts'. Arnheim also shows that
a centre is not always in the middle, that only in
geometry, 'where a center is defined by location alone'
is this possible. His definition of what he calls the
dynamic centre, 'as a center of a field of forces, a
focus from which forces issue, and toward which forces
converge', is close to Poulet's view of the centre as
both 'receptive and diffusive'. For Arnheim, the
'interplay between various visual objects as centers of
forces is the basis of composition'. Later on in his
book, Arnheim considers, in somewhat Jamesian terms, the
viewer as 'a powerful dynamic center'. Standing before a
picture, the beholder 'acts as a component of the
comprehensive space that involves viewer and picture.
His eyes scan the pictorial surface in order to perceive
its composition as a whole'. Then, at one point, 'the




(Berkeley, 1982), pp. x, 3, 36, 37; Metamorphoses
of the Circle, p. 78.
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Like Arnheim, James demonstrated that the centre is
not always in the middle of a composition. In his
preface to The Wings of the Dove, he speaks of the centre
of the work as 'resting on a misplaced pivot' (AN, 306).
Yet he, like Coleridge in his criticism of Shakespeare's
plays, invariably seems to say that the central
characters 'plant' themselves in the centre, and are both
'diffusive and receptive'. George Eliot's awareness of
the significance of the centre is especially well
illustrated in Middlemarch, where she skillfully merges
the image of the circle with that of the web. Georges
Poulet's explanation of the significance of the web in
eighteenth-century poetry seems to explain George Eliot's
fascination with the image:
Just like the sun (that, in
mythology, is not only an astral body
but a living spirit), the spider web
has the advantage of having, as a
center, not only a base of operations
and of convergence, but a cognitive
and receptive force by whose
operation what comes from outside is
seized and experienced within. The
cobweb is formed by a peripheric
network which intercepts and annexes
a certain number of objects. But it
is also made of an animal and
intelligent centrality, in which
these objects find themselves
metamorphosed in sensations and in
ideas.... The spider not only
devours, in a literal sense, the
insects that it captures: it absorbs
them also figuratively.
Thus Poulet not only attributes to the web the features
of the circle, but he also shows its organic nature;
14
Metamorphoses of the Circle, pp. 55-6.
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furthermore, his interpretation echoes Coleridge's
description of the plant as internalizing the external.
By placing the critic in the centre, both Coleridge
and Henry James seem to want to pull him away from the
very beginning of the novel. The analogy of a work to a
plant itself breaks the linearity of the novel, a
procession of events starting at the beginning and
concluding in the end. Like the plant, the novel grows
not only in two directions—beginning and end—but in
various courses. This is why the circle is an apt image
for the novel; it illustrates well how all directions
converge in one point, the centre. And because the
centre is- the germ, and the germ is potentially the
whole, the centre is both the beginning and the end. The
centre, then, is where the critic should place himself,
if he is to command the whole.
The central position which Coleridge has chosen for
the critic, implies a holistic rather than an analytic
perspective. Yet the parts do have to come into
consideration in both the case of a poem or a novel. In
this respect, the analytic is not incompatible with the
synthetic. Floyd Ratcliff in his article 'Contour and
Contrast' examines the issue as it appears in the study
of biology--a field fascinating to Coleridge. The
analytic approach (used for the study of single cells),
Ratcliff believes, although often productive, is
inadequate when applied to the basic problems of
biological science: 'how unitary structures and
elementary processes are organized into the complex
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functional systems that make up living organs and
organisms'. Ratcliff concludes that the organic and the
analytic approaches are 'neither incompatible nor
mutually exclusive; they are complementary and advances
in one frequently facilitate advances in the other'.^
The compatibility of the organic and the mechanical
is demonstrated by Ruskin in his Stones of Venice (1853)
where he maintains that 'to the Gothic workman the living
foliage became a subject of intense affection', and that
'the original conception of Gothic architecture had been
derived from vegetation—from the symmetry of avenues,
and the interlacing of branches'. The organic and the
mechanical are beautifully brought together in Ruskin's
phrase, 'the look of mountain brotherhood between the
cathedral and the Alp'. For Ruskin, the continuity
between the two concepts is so unbroken that not only
does he compare an architectural structure to a natural
configuration, but he also reverses the comparison. In
his Lectures on Architecture (1853), for instance, he
compares the leaves of the common ash to the parts of a
Gothic building, and does it so gracefully that one
alternates from the natural to the achitectural smoothly,
effortlessly: 'they [the leaves] spring from the stalk
precisely as a Gothic vaulted roof springs, each stalk
representing a rib of the roof and the leaves its
crossing stones; and the beauty of each of those leaves
"^'Contour and Contrast' in Recent Progress in
Perception, pp. 9-19 (p. 19).
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is altogether to its terminating in the Gothic form, the
pointed arch'.1^
Coleridge too often fuses the organic into the
inorganic; in one of his comments in his 'Theory of Life'
he remarks: 'the arborescent forms on a frosty morning,
to be seen on the window and pavement, must have some
relation to the more perfect forms developed in the
vegetable world' (CCW, I, 385). Yet the difference
between the mechanical and the organic was always of
crucial importance to Coleridge, as it is summarized in
his juxtaposition of mechanistic with vital philosophy.
The mechanistic philosophy, Coleridge asserts in the same
essay, demands
for every mode and act of existence
real or possible visibility, it knows
only of distance and nearness,
composition .. and decomposition, in
short the relations of unproductive
particles to each other; so that in
every instance the result is the
exact sum of the component
quantities, as in arithmetical
addition. This is the philosophy of
Death.... In Life, and in the view
of a vital philosophy, the two
component counter-powers actually
interpenetrate each other, and
generate a higher third, including
both the former (CCW, I, 399).
One of Coleridge's strongest objections to the
mechanistic philosophy was the fact that it regarded the
mind as passive. Precisely because he believed the mind
to be active, he even later rejected the analogy of the
mind to an Aeolian harp. In such an image, Coleridge
thought, the mind is passive and has to depend on the
16Works, X, 236, 237, 188; XII, 26.
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wind for its activity, its music. In the margin in his
copy of Kant's Critique he wrote, 'the mind does not
resemble an Aeolian harp ... but rather, as far as
objects are concerned, a violin or other instrument of
few strings yet vast compass, played on by a musician of
, 17genius'.
Coleridge, furthermore, rejected the theories of
association, according to which the mind is a storehouse,
in preference to the analogy of the mind as a plant. His
analogy of the plant especially shows Coleridge's acute
insight into mental processes. Recently, Ulric Neisser
has asserted that the mind does not resemble a storehouse
filled with contents which can be 'discovered,
classified, and analyzed by systematic introspection'.
Besides, Neisser rejects the analogy of the mind to a
computer and affirms that 'metaphors of growth and
construction are more appropriate for mental processes
than the step-by-step sequences of instructions so
18
characteristic of computer modelling'.
Coleridge's metaphor of the plant is one of both
growth and construction. His keen foresight about mental
processes is further revealed in his statements about the
ways the mind functions. In his Biographia Literaria,
for instance, he remarks that the poet 'brings the whole
soul of man into activity' (BL, II, 12); and in his
17
Quoted by John H. Muirhead, Coleridge as
Philosopher (London, 1954), pp. 91-2.
18
'Changing Conceptions of Imagery', in The Function
and Nature of Imagery, edited by Peter Sheehan (New York,
1972), pp. 233-51 (pp. 236, 237).
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criticism of Wordsworth he admits that what mostly
impressed him about Wordsworth's poetry was 'the union of
deep feeling with profound thought; the fine balance of
truth in observing with the imaginative faculty in
modifying the objects observed' (BL, I, 59). All these
statements clearly reveal Coleridge's belief that the
mind works in unity. Referring to Coleridge's critical
remarks on Wordsworth, quoted above, Clarence Thorpe
states that 'union' and 'balance' are the most
significant words Coleridge uses in that case; 'And the
things that are united and balanced in fine equilibrium
are the rational and the sensational with the emotional
and imaginative functions of the mind'. Thorpe concludes
her article by conjecturing that Coleridge's view of the
mind working as one unit would be a view 'approved by
19
modern psychologists'.
And indeed that is the case. Ever since the 1960s
numerous studies have been devoted to relating the
functions of the left and the right hemispheres of the
human brain. Experiments conducted by Drs Roger Sperry
and Michael Gazzaniga in the 1960s have shown that the
right hemisphere can perceive holistically, can
comprehend spatial relations, but has no verbal ability.
The left hemisphere, on the other hand, has the verbal
19
'Coleridge as Aesthetician and Critic', Journal of




ability and explores logical relationships.
Furthermore, the right hemisphere 'is the sensuous half
of the brain, relishing the concrete and here-and-now; it
is also the subjective poet finding valid reality in the
metaphors and perceiving emotional nuances'. By now it
is accepted that the right hemisphere is concerned 'with
the more inventive, exploratory and improvisatory aspects
21
of mental activity'.
Yet in his recent book, The Integrated Mind, Michael
Gazzaniga, who started the experiments on the human brain
with Roger Sperry, concentrates not so much on describing
and demonstrating the specialized functions of the left
and the right hemispheres, but rather on proving (one of
Coleridge's ideas) that the mind works as a unit.
'Intuitively', he remarks, 'it is difficult to accept
specialization theory. If the right half-brain processes
information in a holistic, synthetic fashion, while the
left processes information analytically, where and how is
it that these distinct and neurologically incompatible
processing modes are integrated in the brain?' The
interconnections between the two hemispheres, Gazzaniga
believes, show that both hemispheres share analytic and
synthetic functions: 'While it is the right hemisphere
20
Roger W. Sperry, 'The Great Cerebral Commissure',
Scientific American, 210, no. 1 (January 1964), 42-52;
Michael Gazzaniga, 'The Split Brain in Man', Scientific
American, 217, no. 2 (August 1967), 24-9.
21
Robert McKim, Experiences m Visual Thinking,,
second edition (Berkeley, 1980), p. 21; Stuart J. Dimond
and J. Graham Beaumont, editors, Hemisphere Function in
the Human Brain (London, 1974), p. 75.
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that is viewed as uniquely specialized for holistic,
synthetic processing, the left hemisphere must surely
utilize such processing modes in extracting meaning from
words, sentences, paragraphs, and the like'. The primary
argument in his book is that the two hemispheres 'do not
oppose each other but instead work together to maintain
22
the integrity of mental functioning'.
Gazzaniga seems to approve of Coleridge's theory
that the mind works as a unit, and he further
demonstrates that the emotional and the logical, the
synthetic and the analytic (or the organic and the
mechanical) are not incompatible, but complementary,
processes. Besides, the significance of these studies, I
believe, lies in the fact that they locate man's
creativity, man's imagination, in the right hemisphere of
the brain. Imagination, then, can no longer be
considered as an ethereal, elusive, mysterious goddess
whose existence is accepted only by a few people; it is
indeed a function of the human brain. Coleridge's
criticism then, was based on his sound insights into the
workings of the human brain. As the artist in the
creative act relies on both his emotional and later on
his logical response, so the recreative critic, Coleridge
advocates, should apply his imagination and perception,
his emotion and will, his synthetic and analytic powers,
in order to be able to judge a work in the same spirit in
which the artist has produced it.
^The Integrated Mind, pp. 47-8, 72.
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We have so far seen the soundness of Coleridge's
principles of recreative criticism. Modern recreative
critics have adopted some of Coleridge's principles and
have tried to show how the reader through his imagination
and perception can complete that which the artist has
intentionally left incomplete—how he, like the artist,
can also create. Wolfgang Iser in The Implied Reader
sees the literary work from two perspectives, which he
calls the 'artistic' and the 'esthetic' poles. Whereas
the artistic pole refers to the text created by the
author, the aesthetic is 'the realization of the text
accomplished by the reader'. In this view, the text
itself is never complete, unless a reader is involved.
Only 'the convergence of the text and the reader', Iser
tells us, 'brings the literary work into existence'.
This convergence, Iser explains, 'can never be precisely
pinpointed, but must always remain virtual, as it is not
to be identified either with the reality of the text or
with the individual disposition of the reader'. It is
this virtuality, he believes, that gives the work a
dynamic nature. Reading, in this sense, then, 'causes
the literary work to unfold its inherently dynamic
23
character'.
Iser, then, sees the text in Coleridge's living
terms, and endows the reader with the creative power of
the artist—that of breathing life into the work. This
power, Iser suggests, is actualized in the same way that
23pp. 274-75.
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the artist's creativity takes effect; that is, by the
identification of the subject with the object, in this
case 'the convergence of text and reader'. Thus Iser,
through the aesthetic pole, allots to the reader the role
which Arnheim assigns to the viewer of a picture. A
picture, Arnheim claims in his book The Power of the
Center, is 'a perceptual object and exists only in the
consciousness of the viewer. Its properties are aspects
of the viewer's percepts'. Arnheim distinguishes between
the properties that are in the composition of the picture
and those which the viewer contributes to it. One of
these distinctions can also apply to the text and the
reader: 'The location and strength of the various dynamic
centers in a composition', Arnheim states, 'are data
generated by the work itself, whereas the focus of
attention... depends entirely on the viewer'. Or in
reading, we could add, the point of view depends entirely
on the reader. The viewer's contribution to the picture,
Arnheim explains, is especially evident in the viewer's
influence 'upon the depth dimension in pictorial space'.
If one touches the picture, one knows it is flat, but
through the 'dynamism of the observer's glance', it
becomes three-dimensional: 'As the glance strikes the
picture perpendicularly, it strives to continue in the
same direction and in doing so digs into the depth
dimension.... This means that merely looking at a
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picture, the viewer gives it more depth than the
24
structure itself contributes'.
The viewer contributes to a picture the way the
reader contributes to a novel or to a poem, because, as
Jacob Bronowski in 'The Imaginative Mind in Art'
explains, 'you cannot look at a picture and find it
beautiful by a merely passive act of seeing. The
internal relations that make it beautiful to you have to
be discovered and in some way have to be put in by you.
The artist provides a skeleton ... but there is no
picture and no poem unless you youself enter it and fill
it out'. The reader, according to Bronowski, cannot
understand or enjoy the work that the writer or the poet
imagined, unless he re-imagines it for himself. Re-
imagining means re-creating, which involves 'this
personal manipulation of language, this gift of
recreating for ourselves, in a fresh way, the images
25
which other people present to us'.
Like Arnheim and Bronowski, Dewey in his Art and
Experience explains the beholder's act of recreation,
reminding us of Coleridge's concept that the critic
should judge a work in the same spirit in which the
artist created it. 'Without an act of recreation', Dewey
claims, 'the object is not perceived as a work of art'.
'For to perceive', Dewey believes, 'a beholder must






include relations comparable to those which the original
producer underwent. They are not the same in any literal
sense. But with the perceiver, as with the artist, there
must be an ordering of the elements of the whole that is
in form, although not in details, the same as the process
of organization the creator of the work consciously
2 6
experienced'. Thus Dewey seems to divide the work
between the artist and the viewer, or his audience, as
James did when he was referring to the novel in 1866.
'In every novel', James thought, 'the work is divided
between the writer and the reader; but the writer makes
the reader very much as he makes his characters. When he
makes him ill, that is, makes him indifferent, he does no
work; the writer does all. When he makes him well, that
is, makes him interested, then the reader does quite half
the labour' (VR, 18).
The reader's labour, Iser asserts in The Implied
Reader, depends on the 'elements of indeterminacy, the
gaps in the text', because without them the reader's
imagination would remain passive. While the written part
of the literary text gives us the knowledge, the
unwritten part gives us 'the opportunity to picture
things'. By means of his imagination, the reader
synthesizes the information given to him and thus he
visualizes the characters or the events of the novel.
This is why we resist watching the film of a novel. We
can use our powers of imagination to visualize, we can
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have numerous images, a vast number of possibilities for
one character, or one event. But 'the moment these
possibilities are narrowed down to one complete and
immutable picture, the imagination is put out of action,
and we feel we have somehow been cheated'. Iser explores
this issue even more forcefully in his most recent book,
The Act of Reading. In comparing the pictures of a film
to the images of a literary work, Iser brings out the
mobility and constant shifting of the images and one
important difference between perception and imagination.
When we imagine Tom Jones, for instance, Iser claims, 'we
have to put together various facets that have been
revealed to us at different times--in contrast to the
film, where we always see him as a whole in every
situation'. Unlike perceiving, which requires the
presence of the objects, imaging depends upon their
absence, 'and brings to life aspects which could not have
emerged through direct perception of the objects'. The
actual reason for our disappointment with a film version
of a novel is not the fact that the film is different
from our imaginary version but rather the realization
that we have been exduded 'and we resent not being
allowed to retain the images which we had produced and
which enabled us to be in the presence of our products as
27
if they were real possessions'.
A clear and thorough explanation of the problem is
given in Modern Painters where Ruskin describes an
27
p. 283; A Theory of Aesthetic Response (London,
1978), pp. 139, 137, 139.
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interesting characteristic of the imagination—its
susceptibility to fatigue. The artist, Ruskin suggests,
should keep this in mind when composing a picture. A
good picture 'need not present too much at once' and
'what it does present may be so chosen and ordered as not
only to be more easily seized, but to give the
imagination rest, and, as it were, places to lie down and
stretch its limbs in; kindly vacancies, beguiling it back
into action, with pleasant and cautious sequence of
incident'. This is why, Ruskin continues, 'imperfect
sketches, engravings, outlines, rude sculptures, and
other forms of abstraction, possess a charm which the
most finished picture frequently wants. For not only
does the finished picture excite the imagination less,
but, like nature itself, it taxes it more' (MP, III,
186). Ruskin's point explains the misgivings Henry James
had about an illustrated edition of The Golden Bowl,
which he discusses at length in his preface to the novel.
Besides, his frequent moments of silence in The Portrait
of a Lady serve as places of rest and prove his acute
awareness of the imagination's vulnerability to fatigue.
Nineteenth and twentieth-century figures then agree
that pictures come into conflict with the images formed
in the reader's mind; these, no doubt, depend upon the
delicate fusion of the artist's with the reader's
imagination. But how does the object, in this case the
literary text, become part of the subject, in this case
the reader? Wolfgang Iser shows how the reader through
the image-building process overcomes the distance
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between himself and the literary work, because image-
building eliminates the subject-object division. Without
our active participation in the reading process, an image
of an imaginary object cannot exist, and precisely
because an image has no existence of its own, and we are
essentially 'imagining and producing it, we are actually
2 8
in its presence and it is ours'. The image is,
therefore, the key to recreation. In helping images—the
offspring of the writer's imagination—come to life,
through his own imagination, the reader is gradually
making images his own possessions, and he can say and
feel and understand James's words on criticism; 'to
criticise is to appreciate, to appropriate, to take
intellectual possession, to establish in fine a relation
with the criticised thing and make it one's own' (AN,
155) .
Undoubtedly this experience involves some kind of
surrendering, the kind of receptivity we encountered in
Coleridge's definition of the imagination. The
surrendering is a loss of consciousness of the self in
order to discover the consciousness of the writer, a
process attractively expressed in Coleridge's definition
of 'suspension of disbelief'. The poet, Coleridge
claims, 'does not require us to be awake and believe; he
solicits us only to yield ourselves to a dream; and this
too with our eyes open, and with our judgement perdue
behind the curtain, ready to awaken us at the first
^The Act of Reading, p. 13 9.
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motion of our will: and meantime, only, not to
disbelieve' (BL, II, 189). James seems to have had the
same idea in mind when he described in 1897 the
effectiveness of a novel as depending upon the reader's
involvement. Very often, he believed, novels can soothe
the pains of our daily existence, but 'the anodyne is not
the particular picture, it is our own act of surrender,
and therefore most, for each reader, what he most
surrenders to' (NN, 346).
Dewey's explanation of surrendering in his Art as
Experience is satisfactory in that it describes the
experience as an interaction rather than as a simply
passive yielding. In most of our daily experiences,
Dewey says, we tend to withdraw rather than to yield,
either from fear or from our proccupation with other
matters. But his understanding of perception involves
'an act of the going-out of energy in order to receive,
not a withholding of energy. To steep ourselves in a
subject-matter we have first to plunge into it'. Dewey's
description partly explains why Dorothea is unable to
enjoy Rome and is overwhelmed by the experience: 'When we
are only passive to a scene, it overwhelms us and, for
lack of answering activity, we do not perceive that which
29
bears us down'.
An aesthetic response, therefore, involves a
delicate balance betwen intimacy and detachment, the sort
of state which Wordswroth so succintly and effectively
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captured in his well-known phrase, 'powerful feelings
recollected in tranquillity'. A complete surrender to
the object, Coleridge, George Eliot, and Henry James,
believe, would entail a complete loss of the self. The
artist needs to detach himself from the object in order
to understand it, to examine it better. Henry James
seems to voice the effects of detachment through Miss
Erme in 'The Figure in the Carpet' (1897), when she speaks
of the way George found the clue to the story: 'They all
worked in him together, and some day somewhere, when he
wasn't thinking, they fell in all their superb intricacy
into the right combination. The figure in the carpet
came out' (p. 251). The figure in the carpet comes out
in the same way that James's and Eliot's 'germs' suddenly
spring to life. And Miss Erme explains how the
inspiration occurred: 'We knew the change would do it—
that the difference of thought, of scene, would give the
needed touch, the magic shake.... The elements were all
in his mind, and in the secousse of a new and intense
experience they just struck light' (p. 252). Obviously
the critic does not have to undergo an uncommon
experience in order to find the answers he seeks; he
does, nevertheless, have to discover the fine balance of
involvement and dissociation, of proximity and distance.
The role distance plays is even clearer in our
enjoyment of a painting, an issue which Gombrich
interestingly explores in his Art and Illusion. What we
actually enjoy, when looking at paintings, 'is not so
much seeing these works from a distance as the very act
14 8
of stepping back, as it were, and watching our
imagination come into play, transforming the medley of
colour into a finished image'. Gombrich devotes a great
part of his book to the 'beholder's share in the reading
of the artist's image', and to the role of projection in
the creative and aesthetic act. To project the self into
the object means for Gombrich, as we have seen, to
attribute meanings to the object that do not really exist
. . 30
m it.
Furhermore, Gombrich believes, projection or
imaginative participation is triggered by the incomplete.
This is why, he maintains, in his essay 'Meditation on a
Hobby Horse or the Roots of Artistic Form', great artists
invite us to complete their pictures by leaving them
incomplete. Gioconda's changing expressions, for
instance, are the result of her indistinct features.
Leonardo, so Gombrich says, 'achieved his greatest
triumphs of life-like expression by blurring precisely
the features in which expression resides, thus compelling
us to complete the act of creation'. The same principle
of composition, Gombrich remarks, has been used by later
artists: 'Rembrandt could dare to leave the eyes of his
most moving portraits in the shade because we are thus
stimulated to supplement them'.31
The reader, beholder, or critic, is, therefore,
involved in a creative act when he, by means of his
30pp. 167, 155.
31in Aspects of Form, edited by Lancelot Law Whyte
(New York, 1968), pp. 209-28 (p. 228).
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imagination, is compelled to complete the incomplete.
The incomplete, then, appeals to, and stimulates,
imagination, memory, and perception. Because Coleridge
recognized in the literary image its incomplete nature,
he preferred it to actual paintings. The success of the
description of Death in Paradise Lost, Book II, Coleridge
believed, results from the imagination which 'is called
forth, not to produce a distinct form, but a strong
working of the mind, still offering what is still
repelled, and again creating what is again rejected' (SC,
II, 138). Milton's description, Coleridge feels,
illustrates 'the narrow limit of painting, as compared
with the boundless power of poetry: painting cannot go
beyond a certain point; poetry rejects all control, all
confinement' (SC, II, 139). Even the best attempts at
painting Satan and Death meeting at the gates of Hell,
Coleridge says, are clumsy and inadequate, reducing
Milton's sublime description to 'a skeleton, the dryest
and hardest image that it is possible to discover; which,
instead of keeping the mind in a state of activity,
reduces it to the merest passivity' (SC, II, 139).
George Eliot expressed the superiority of language
to painting in Chapter 19 in Middlemarch in the exchange
between Adolf Naumann and Will Ladislaw, when Naumann
tells Will that he wants to paint Dorothea into one of
his historical canvasses. Will reacts negatively, and,
in Coleridgean terms, praises language over painting:
"Your painting and Plastik are poor
stuff after all. They perturb dull
conceptions instead of raising them.
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Language is a finer medium.... This
woman whom you have just seen, for
example: how would you paint her
voice, pray? But her voice is much
diviner than anything you have seen
of her.... Language gives a fuller
image, which is all the better for
being vague. After all, the true
seeing is within; and painting stares
at you with an insistent
imperfection" (p. 222).
Nevertheless, literary works and paintings do share
affinities; paintings, especially impressionistic ones,
may offer us stimulating ideas about the role of the
imagination in our interactions with literature. It
would not be an exaggeration to claim that through images
poets or novelists invite readers to participate as
impressionists compel beholders to 'complete' their
paintings. E. H. Gombrich's explanation of the role of
projection in impressionistic paintings could very well
apply to images:
The beholder must mobilize his memory
of the visible world and project it
into the mosaic of strokes and dabs
on the canvas before him. It is
here, therefore, that the principle
of guided projection reaches its
climax. The image, it might be said,
has no firm anchorage left on the
canvas ... it is only "conjured up"
in our minds. The willing beholder
responds to the artist's suggestion
because he enjoys the transformation
that occurs in front of his eyes....
The artist gives the beholder
increasingly "more to do", he draws
him into the magic circle of creation
and allows him to experience
something of the thrill of "making"
which had once been the privilige of
the artist.
32
Art and Illusion, p. 169.
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Images have neither 'firm anchorage' nor canvas,
unless our minds create both. Concerned directly with
literary images, Bachelard considers a reader's role in
completing images in terms similar to Gombrich's
projection into impressionistic paintings. A reader,
Bachelard maintains, should attempt to experience images
directly—not regard them as 'subordinate means of
expresssion' . Bachelard often relates this experience to
our ability 'to recapture the naive wonder we used to
feel as children', and he connects wonder with a state of
'non-knowing', which he explains, 'is not a form of
ignorance but a difficult transcendence of knowledge'.
To be rewarding, knowing should 'be accompanied by an
equal capacity to forget knowing' (PS, xxviii, xxix).
He attributes this ability to poets, and suggests that
readers, in order to enjoy the freshness of images,
should cultivate such a quality. Again, here, we think
of Coleridge and his 'suspension of disbelief', or his
creative passiveness, or his concept of the genius as one
who is distinguished by his ability 'to combine the
child's sense of wonder and novelty with the appearances,
which every day for perhaps forty years had rendered
familiar' (BL, I, 59).
Both Bachelard and Coleridge, in this case, bring to
mind some of George Eliot's remarks in a very early essay
written for Herald and Observer in 1847: 'The proper
result of intellectual cultivation is to restore the mind
to that state of wonder and interest with which it looks
on everything in childhood'. Her example of Jean-Jacques
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Rousseau could aptly serve Bachelard as an analogy for
his phenomenological approach to images: 'thus, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, couched on the grass by the side of a
plant, that he might examine the structure and appearance
at his ease, would have seemed to a little child so like
itself in taste and feeling' (Essays, 19).
The reader's assimilation of images, Bachelard
suggests, should be such that they become a part of his
memory to the extent that he can say, 'I can no longer
know whether I am remembering or imagining ... when I
come across them in my reverie' (PR, 2). Bachelard's
suggestion here appeals to the fusion of the reader with
the text, the subject with the oj^ect in a way Henry
James beautifulliy articulated, as we have seen, when
reminiscing about his first reading of Madame Bovary in
Paris. In The Poetics of Space, Bachelard describes the
reader's assimilation of the image in clearly organic
terms. The reader 'takes the image just as it is, just
as the poet created it, and tries to make it his own, to
feed on this rare fruit. He brings the image to the very
limit of what he is able to imagine. However far from
being a poet he himself may be, he tries to repeat its
creation for himself and, if possible, continue its
exaggeration' (p. 227, my italics). Bachelards
statements here echo Henry James's idea of criticism as
appropriation.
In The Poetics of Space and The Poetics of Reverie,
Bachelard abandons his archetypal approach to the image
(which he developed in his early works) for what he calls
153
the phenomenology of the imaginatioon or the
phenomenology of the image. Some of the most important
aspects of this approach express, I believe, the organic
concepts which Coleridge, George Eliot, and Henry James,
voiced in their respective theories. The Romantic roots
of Bachelard's theory of imagination give coherence to
his approach, which otherwise seems incoherent and
contradictory. Bachelard's theory has in fact often been
33
related to Coleridge's theory of the imagination.
Indeed, Bachelard's sympathetic or organic approach to
literature seems to be a direct amplification of
Coleridge's recreative criticism. In his later works
Bachelard takes pains to distinguish between the
psychological and phenomenological approaches. His
distinctions are well worth considering, as they refine
and bring into focus his own approach, which he does not
really define explicitly.
Early in his Poetics of Reverie, Bachelard states
the reasons for having given up his archetypal approach
in preference to the phenomenological: 'the poetic image
sheds light on consciousness in such a way that it is
pointless to look for subconscious antecedents of the
image. Phenomenology, at least, is set up to consider
the poetic image in its own being, distinct and
33
See, for example: Margaret Higonnet, 'Bachelard
and the Romantic Imagination,' Comparative Literature,
33, no. 1 (Winter 1981), 18-37; Edward Kaplan, 'Gaston
Bachelard's Philosophy of Imagination: an Introduction',
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 33, no. 1
(September 1972), 1-24; L. G. Christophides, 'Bachelard's
Aesthetics', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 20
(1962), 263-71.
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independent from any antecedent being as a positive
conquest of the world' (p. 3). And at the beginning of
The Poetics of Space, he confirms the independence of
images: 'the relation of a new poetic image is not.... an
echo of the past.... Because of its novelty and its
action, the poetic image has an entity and a dynamism of
its own' (p. xii). These are also the reasons for his
objections to a psychological or rather to a
psychoanalytical approach to images. The psychoanalyst,
he claims, 'will abandon the ontological investigation of
the image, to dig into the past of man. He sees and
points out the poet's sufferings. He explains the flower
by the fertilizer'. The phenomenologist, on the other
hand, does not feel it is necessary to go so far because
'for him the image is there, the word speaks, the word of
the poet speaks to him. There is no need to have lived
through the poet's sufferings in order to seize the
felicity of speech offered by the poet' (PS, xxvi). Thus
Bachelard reminds us of Coleridge's declaration that the
rules by which a work is judged should be intrinsic.
Like Coleridge, George Eliot, Henry James, and other
recreative critics, Bachelard believes that the reader
ought to recapture and experience the emotion the writer
felt while composing his work. Such an emotion, as we
have seen, Coleridge, Eliot, and James, believed to be
expressed though the image, which they also felt displays
the germinal quality. Bachelard expresses exactly the
same at the opening of his Poetics of Reverie: 'By
obliging us to retrace our steps systematically and make
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an effort toward clarity of awareness with respect to a
poet's given image, the phenomenological method leads us
to attempt communication with the creating consciousness
of the poet'. And the poetic image 'thus becomes quite
simply an absolute origin, an origin of consciousness.
In time of great discoveries, a poetic image can be the
seed of a world, the seed of a universe imagined out of a
poet's reverie' (p. 1, my italics).
At the end of his book The Psychoanalysis of Fire,
Bachelard expresses another principal of the recreative
criticism; parts which seemed imperfect, or incongruous,
when examined closely reveal their integral relationship
to the whole: 'There can be no poetic flowering',
Bachelard claims, 'without certain synthesis of poetic
images'. And he goes on to amplify this point: 'At
times some truly diverse images that one had considered
to be quite opposed, incongruous, and non-cohesive, will
3 4
come together and fuse into one charming image'.
The fusion of several images into one, represents
for James also the key to the composition of his
fictional works. This point is especially clear in his
preface to 'The Altar of the Dead' (1895) and 'Julia
Bride' (1908) where he very definitely asserts: 'the
imaged resume of as many the vivifying elements as be
coherently packed into an image at once—is the
predominant artifice' (AN, 263). And the germ of a given
/
novel is, of course, the 'imaged resume' of the other
"^translated by Alan C. M. Ross (Boston, 1964), p.
110.
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images in that novel, which reveal themselves as the
novel unfolds. In fact, James's comments in the preface
to The Wings of the Dove seem to express the technique
which every one of his novels displays: 'the author's
instinct everywhere for the indirect presentation of his
main image' (AN, 306). This, in turn, implies some sort
of theme and variations pattern, one to which Coleridge
perhaps alluded when he attributed to the imagination the
'sense of musical delight, with the power of producing
it' and connected this sense to 'the power of reducing
multitude into unity of effect, and modifying a series of
thoughts by some one predominant thought or feeling' (BL,
II, 14). James too effectively attributed to the
imagination the gift of 'musical delight' in his essay on
Morris's poetry, when he described the 'fictitious
universe of the poem' as advancing 'out of its remoteness
to surge musically'. He explored the idea of the theme
and variations even more suggestively in his preface to
What Maisie Knew, where he illustrates his 'treatment by
scene' in terms of a concert. Each scene, he says, takes
up 'the theme from the other very much as the fiddles, in
an orchestra, may take it up from the cornets and flutes,
or the wind-instruments take it up from the violins' (AN,
158) .
Whether through metaphors of growth, or those of
music, Coleridge, Eliot, and James emphasize the dynamism
of the imagination. For Bachelard also the dynamic
quality of the imagination is one of its most significant
characteristics, and this is why he criticizes
157
psychologists who do not take into consideration the
mobility of images when they try to account for their
constitution. In every study of the image, Bachelard
believes, one has to consider its 'mobility, its
3 5
fecundity, its life'. This is simply because the image
loses its life when it becomes static. Gyorgy Kepes
explains what Bachelard in this case leaves implied; that
is, he tells us why the image needs to remain dynamic.
Although Kepes is referring to paintings, his testimony
is valuable, I feel, if we are to take the image as real
as a perceptual event: 'The limitations of our nervous
system define not only the number and extension of the
individual optical units which can be perceived as a
whole, that is, the space-span, but also the life-span of
the visual experience'. One cannot possibly enjoy
looking at 'a static relationship long without losing
interest any more than one can survive for long in a
sealed room where the supply of oxygen is soon
exhausted'. Kepes's description of a painting as a
'living organism' can very well apply to the novel and
especially to the progression of the germinal image
towards 'ever new spatial relationships' until it
achieves 'spatial saturation' as well as aesthetic
integration:
For the image to remain a living
organism, relationships within it
must be constantly changing. The eye
and the mind must be fed with
changing visual relationships. Only
this changing variety can provide the
35
L'Air et les songes, p. 8.
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stimulation necessary for holding
attention upon the picture surface.
Change implies motion... . The
ultimate aim of plastic organization
is a structure of movement that
dictates the direction and the
progression toward ever new spatial
relationships until the experience
achieves its fullest spatial
saturation. As new relationships
progressively unfold, the spatial
integration of the image gains
momentum until it finds final
clarification in the plastic image as
a whole.
An image, like a painting, often gains its dynamism
from its incompleteness, from inviting the beholder to
participate in its making, in its completion. This is
the point Gombrich makes when he speaks of the
'beholder's share in the reading of images' and defines
it as the beholder's ability 'to collaborate with the
artist and to transform a piece of coloured canvas into a
37
likeness of the visible world'. In the same way, as I.
A. Richards demonstrates in his Coleridge on Imagination,
the reader of something like Shakespeare's 'Look! how a
bright star shooteth from the sky/So glides he in the
night from Venus' eye' finds the connections between the
different images and 'he seems, in becoming more aware of
them, to be discovering not only Shakespeare's meaning,
but something which he, the reader, is himself making'.
The suggestiveness of the images seems to be the key to
the activation of the reader's imagination. Precisely
A
for this reason Bachelard in his La Terre et les reveries
3 6
Language of Vision (Chicago, 1951), pp. 6, 52.
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Art and Illusion, p. 246.
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de la volonte emphasizes: 'There is a big difference
between a literary image which describes a beauty that
has already been realized, a beauty that has reached its
full form, and a literary image that works in the mystery
of matter and which wants more to suggest than to
describe».
Suggestiveness and depth seem synonymous in James's
criticism of others. This is why he objects to some of
Hawthorne's works where an image is 'in danger of seeming
3 9
to stand for nothing more serious than itself'.
Without any insight, Swinburne's images, he declared in
1875, are offensive to the intelligent reader (VR, 51-
59). On the other hand, in his essay on Felix Holt
(1866), James highly praised George Eliot for her 'wealth
of fancy, of suggestion, of illustration'. Her images,
he thought, do not affect the reader only superficially
but rather 'sink slowly into your very brain' (NR, 205).
For George Eliot an image acquired depth by embodying an
idea. Idea and image are inextricably fused in a phrase
incisively referring to ideas as 'thoroughly incarnate'
(GEL, IV,. 300). Her choice of the word 'incarnate' is
especially noteworthy, since Wordsworth himself uses it
in one of his 'Essays upon Epitaphs' and seems to
underline its importance: 'if words be not an incarnation
3 8




of the thought, but only a clothing for it, then surely
4 0
will they prove on ill gift'.
In his criticism of Wordsworth's poetry, Coleridge
succinctly expresses how the idea and the image are
attractively fused. Wordsworth's poetry, he claims,
impressed him for 'the original gift of spreading the
tone, the atmosphere, and with it the depth and height of
the ideal world around forms, incidents, and situations,
of which, for the common view, custom had bedimmed all
the lustre, had dried up the sparkle and the dew drops'
(BL, I, 59). Depth and height were ideas congenial to
Eliot and James, expressions embodying their concepts of
imagination, as we have seen. Coleridge himself saw the
imagination as the reconciler of the idea and the image
(BL, II, 12); in fact, he regarded a 'reliance on the
immediate impressions of the senses' as a 'debility and
dimness of the imaginative power' (BL, I, 19), and
shunned 'the despotism of the eye'. In his observations
in his notebooks and in his poetry, we can see how he
moves from sight to thought, from perception to
meditation, from the image to the idea. In an entry in
his Notebooks in 1804 he lyrically observes:
0 that Sky, that soft blue mighty
Arch, resting on the mountains or
solid Sea-like plain/what an awful
adorable onmeity in unity.... To the
eye it is an inverted Goblet, the
inside of a sapphire Bason;= perfect
40
Prose Works, edited by A. B. Grossart, 3 vols
(London, 1879), II, 55.
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beauty in shape and col^j; to the
mind [it is] immensity.
The shift from the external to the internal brings to
mind Dorothea's remarks when she sees the emerald ring at
the beginning of Middlemarch: '"How beautiful these gems
are! .... It is strange how deeply colours seem to
penetrate one, like scent. I suppose that is the reason
why gems are used as spiritual emblems in the Revelation
of St. John. They look like fragments of heaven"' (p.
35). The search of the imagination from the fragments to'
the whole, from the particular to the universal, from the
external to the internal, exhibits its dynamism and
reveals how intimately related is the image to the idea.
The germs of George Eliot's and Henry James's
novels, as we have seen, very often originated in an
image. Yet James at times seems to trace the origin of a
story to an idea rather than to an image. Referring to
his inspiration for The American, for instance, James
claims, 'it was important for the effect of my friend's
discomfiture that it should take place on a high and
lighted stage... It was all charmingly simple, this
conception, and the current must have gushed, full and
clear to my imagination, from the moment Christopher
Newman rose before me, on a perfect day of the divine
/
Paris, m the great gilded Salon Carre of the Louvre'.
Thus, is this case, the image confirms the conception
(the idea) and gives it clarity and completeness. Once
41
Quoted by Kathleen Coburn m The Self Conscious
Imagination: a Study of the Coleridge Notebooks (London,
1974), pp. 58-9.
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the image appears, any doubts about the conception
dissolve: 'I have, I confess, no memory of a disturbing
doubt; once the man himself was imaged to me (and that
germination is a process almost always untraceable) he
[Christopher Newman] must have walked into the situation
as by having a pass-key from his pocket' (AN, 23-24). In
his Notebooks, he often begins with an idea and waits for
an image to give it substance, as is the case, for
instance, with The Other House (1896): 'The thing can
only be, like the Private Life, impressionistic....
Stated, pen in hand, the whole concetto strikes me as
thinner and less picturesque than when it first occurred
to me. I must think it over a little more and perhaps
something more in the nature of an image—as in the
4 2
Portrait of a Lady—will come out to me'.
Quite frequently, it is difficult to distinguish an
idea from an image, as modern artists and critics
confirm. Yeats concerned with this problem gives us a
helpful insight: 'It is not possible to separate an
emotion or a spiritual state from the image that calls it
up and gives it expression'; Suzanne Langer believes that
'ideas are undoubtedly made out of sense impressions—out
of messages from the special organs of perception, and
vague visceral reports of feeling'; Sir Herbert Read
connects the idea to the image in his study The Forms of
Things Unknown: ' idea iS an offspring of the marriage of
hitherto unrelated images. Newton had to see the apple
42 , . .
p. 144.
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fall before he could "hit upon" (as we say) the theory of
43
gravity*. This is the point Bronowski also makes in
'The Imaginative Mind in Science', when he refers to
ideas in science. Contrary to what most people think,
Bronowski claims, even scientific ideas are not abstract
concepts because 'the human mind works with images, and
even its most subtle ideas have to be composed from
4 4
images'. Einstein illustrates well how images are
often the bedrock of even highly abstract ideas. In a
letter to Jacques Hadamard, he described the role images
played in his thinking:
The words or the language, as they
are written or spoken, do not seem to
play any role in my mechanism of
thought. The psychical entities
which seem to serve as elements in
thought are certain signs and more or
less clear images which can be
"voluntarily" reproduced and
combined.... The above mentioned
elements are, in my case, of visual
and some of muscular type.
Conventional words or other signs
have to be sought for laboriously
only in a secondary stage, when the
mentioned associative play is
sufficiently established and can be
reproduced at will.
The interrelationship of images and ideas warrants
James Baker's assertion that 'images are not pillars
43
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York, 1948), p. 42); (New York, 1960), p. 99.
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supporting vacancy, but caryatids sustaining weight'.
Indeed, an image often captures both the external and the
internal, the visible and the invisible, in the brilliant
way Gombrich describes it in the conclusion of his Art
and Illusion: 'the true miracle of the language of art
is not that it enables the artist to create the illusion
of reality. It is that under the hands of a great master
the image becomes translucent. In teaching us to see the
visible world afresh, he gives us the illusion of looking
into the invisible realms of the mind—if only we know,
47
as Philostratus says, how to use our eyes'. This is
exactly the case with the great masters, George Eliot and
Henry James, who repeatedly assure us that their goal is
to train our sense of wonder at familiar objects, to show
us that surface is insignificant without depth, that the
external cannot sustain itself without the internal, and
that sight is meaningless without insight. Both James
and Eliot would agree that they aimed at painting
'translucent images', and this partly explains their
fascination with images of windows or doors which capture
so effectively surface and depth.
Is an image, then, a picture? In a recent study,
Stephen Kosslyn, a psychologist, categorically asserts
that images are not pictures, that it 'is erroneous to
equate image representations with mental photographs,
since this would overlook the fact that images are
46
The Sacred River, p. 195.
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composed from highly processed perceptual encodings....
It is certainly true that a literal "picture-in-the-head"
48
notion is incorrect'. Yet Coleridge's and James's
testimonies prove the opposite, thus supporting Bachelard
in his attack against the psychologists's treatment of
the image. In his account of the genesis of 'Kubla Khan'
in 1798, Coleridge affirms that he was in a semiconscious
state during which 'all the images rose up before him as
things'; and in a letter to Godwin in 1801 he wrote, 'I
bent down to pick something from the ground ... as I bent
my head there came a distinct, vivid spectrum upon my
eyes; it was one little picture—a rock, with birches and
ferms on it, a cottage backed by it, and a small stream.
Were I a painter, I would give an outward existence to
49
this, but it will always live m my memory'.
James's major and minor works abound in pictures.
His masterpiece, The Portrait of a Lady, as we shall see,
beautifully proves that image is indeed picture. One
short story can serve as a good example here. Granger in
'Flickerbridge' (1902), we are told, is involved in a
situation 'he would scarce have known how to describe--
could doubtless have described best with a full, clean
brush, supplemented by a play of gesture; for it was
always his habit to see an occasion, of whatever kind,
primarily as a picture, so that he might get it ... so
that he might keep it, well together'. Susanne Kappeler,
^Image and Mind (London, 1980), p. 19.
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166
in her recent book on Henry James, notes that the picture
is possible through a projection of the imagination.
Granger's experience, that is, is not a passive
perceptual act, but an imaginative one that forms the
picture and 'keeps it together
If we consider the etymological root of the word
imagining, imago, we can see how the word itself
originally referred to a carved or to a 'sculptured'
likeness. Coleridge, James, and Eliot, I believe, would
all agree with this definition of image, as being three
dimensional, since they all described images as pictures.
James, in particular, seems to be referring to
sculpturing, the original sense of the word, in one of
his comments on Alphonse Daudet in 1883. Nature, James
remarks, has endowed Daudet with 'a light, quick, joyous,
yet reflective, imagination, a faculty of seeing images,
making images ... of conceiving everything in the visible
form, in the plastic spirit' (PJP, 205). It is this
'conceiving in the plastic spirit' that Roderick Hudson
seems to be seeking when he impatiently exclaims: '"I
haven't a blamed idea. I think of subjects, but they
remain mere idiotic names. They're mere words—they're
not images' (p. 149). The emphasis here seems to be on
the three-dimensional nature of images. Images can be
sculptures and they can be pictures; but in the literary
world they do not stand apart as Roderick Hudson sees
them; in fact, images cannot be painted or sculptured
50Collected Tales, XI, 334; Writing and Reading in
Henry James (New York, 1980), p. 106.
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without words. And since imagining often means seeing
something familiar in a new light, an image is often the
product of an original linguistic context. This is why
Bachelard claims that 'every new literary image is an
original text of language' and very often he believes
that the literary image is 'the liaison of the metaphor
and the image'. Yet he insists that you do not have to
be a linguist in order to be able to enjoy the beauty of
4-K • 51the image.
Although Bachelard does not precisely define either
metaphor or image in his works, he frequently attempts to
distinguish between the two, and he, more satisfactorily
than other philosophers, I feel, succeeds in illustrating
the flights of the image beyond its linguistic
boundaries. The poetic image, he says in his
introduction to The Poetics of Space, 'is often mistaken
for metaphor'; this is why, he explains, he has
deliberately included in his books images which are 'not
mere metaphors' (pp. xxx, xxxv). Bachelard's distinction
between images and metaphors becomes relatively clear
when he refers to Bergson's writings, which he feels are
full of metaphors but contain hardly any images: 'Now a
metaphor gives concrete substance to an impression that
is difficult to express. Metaphor is related to a
psychic being from which it differs. An image, on the
contrary, product of absolute imagination, owes its
entire being to the imagination' (PJ3, 75).
51 A '
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The usefulness of metaphors in dealing with
experiences not named by common language, and
particularly in describing nuances of emotion, is
Winifred Nowottny's concern in her book The Language
Poets Use. The world of private emotion, she emphasizes,
'is in particular need of metaphor because the vocabulary
of emotion is comparatively little developed—no doubt
because emotions cannot be pointed to and identified as
one can point to and identify shades of colour'. In
poetry very often, Nowottny demonstrates, compiexity of
52
emotion is embodied by involved syntax. But this is
also true in fiction, one would argue, and is especially
obvious in Henry James's late novels in which the focus
is not so much on physical or external adventures (as in
his earlier novels) as on internal or emotional events.
To see something in terms of something else
certainly involves our imagination. As the linguistic
context changes, our perspective shifts, and as we are
compelled to see things from new perspectives, we enrich
our reading with constant recreations. In this respect,
metaphor, like imagination, provides us with channels to
creativity and discovery. A novelist often guides us
(through metaphors) to see the world from different
viewpoints; or, as Janet Gezari indicates, referring to
Middlemarch, metaphors compel us 'to see many things in
terms of other things and to see as well the shared
qualities that make translations into new terms
^
(London, 1962), pp. 60-2.
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possible.... They may even startle us into the larger
analogical vision which is, in all the novels, the vision
53
of awakened consciousness'.
What does emerge from Eliot's and James's critical
and fictional works is an emphasis on the visual rather
than on the linguistic. Like Coleridge, both novelists
felt that the writer's primary goal was to make the
reader feel as the writer felt when he was composing his
work, and feeling, they all believed, cannot be detached
from seeing. The emphasis on the visual rather than on
the linguistic is crystallized in Eliot's primary
objection to Kathie Brande in 1857; referring to the
scenic passages in this book Eliot claimed the author
'writes about them, does not paint them'. A good writer,
Eliot emphasized, would have 'suffered his imagination to
dwell on such scenes until, aided by his knowledge,
either direct or indirect, the principal details became
so vividly present to him that he could describe as if he
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saw them, and we should read as if we saw them too'.
Similarly, yet more forcefully and more lyrically, in a
review of Alphonse Daudet's works in 1883, James shows
that the reader can see only when the writer himself has
felt and seen. In James's view Daudet's style 'never
rests, never is satisfied, never leaves the idea sitting
half-draped ... it is always ... trying to add a little
more, to produce the effect which shall make the reader
53
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see with his eyes, or rather with the marvellous eyes of
Alphonse Daudet' (PP, 232).
Coleridge, Eliot, and James, all indeed repeatedly
demonstrate that a reader does not have to be a linguist
in order to be able to enjoy images. Analyzing
Shakespeare's lines, 'full many a glorious morning have I
seen/Flatter the mountain-tops with sovereign eye', from
Sonnet XXXIII, Coleridge remarks that many have seen
sunrise without a poetic sensation, but could not help
but experience the beauty of this passage because,
you see not only the sun rising over
the mountains, but you have also the
moral feeling with which the rapidity
of the poet's mind has connected it.
You behold the sun the sovereign of
the world, the elation of the high
mountain flattered by a glance of his
beams, and the activity of the poet's
mind which, in one image, has merged
so many associations. You feel him
to be a poet, inasmuch as, for a
time, he has made you one—an active
creative being (SCI, II, 93-94)
Coleridge's, Eliot's, and James's paths converge once
again. Our enjoyment, they declare, depends directly on
our ability to see images, to feel, and, consequently, to
understand. Only by undergoing these experiences, can we
hope to become 'active, creative beings'.
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CHAPTER 4
THE REFINEMENT OF THE IMAGINATION
'Preludethe single word that introduces us to a
reading of Middlemarch, undoubtedly has the effect of
music: it brings to mind a brief movement before a
musical composition and certainly suggests an
introduction to an opera or an oratorio. Simultaneously,
one cannot help thinking of Wordsworth's autobiographical
poem, The Prelude (1850), a journey inward that traces
the origin and growth of his poetic powers and leads to
self discoveries, or revelations, which are often brought
about through the mind's vital interaction with the
external world. Middlemarch indeed resembles a musical
composition and a journey. Allusions to music extend
from major characters like Dorothea, whom Will very early
associates with an Aeolian harp, to Rosamond, who has
'the effect of exquisite music' (121) on Lydgate, and
even to minor characters like Garth, who thinks of
Messiah when he hears Dorothea's voice.
At the opening of the book, however, before we are
introduced to any of the characters, 'Prelude' brings to
mind the only essay George Eliot ever wrote on music,
172
'Liszt, Wagner, and Weimar'. An opera, she asserted in
this essay, as we have seen, should not be 'a mosaic, of
melodies stuck together', but an 'organic whole, which
grows like a palm, its earliest portion containing the
germ and prevision of all the rest'. In Wagner's operas,
she emphasized, 'there is a gradual unfolding and
elaboration of that fundamental contrast of emotions,
that collision of forces, which is the germ of the
tragedy; just as the leaf of the plant is successively
elaborated into branching stem and compact bud and
radiant corolla' (Essays, 102,104). Her comments locate
the germ of a composition at its beginning and identify
it with collision.
Certainly the 'Prelude' maps out the fundamental
collision to be unfolded in Middlemarch.^ This collision
is expressed in spatial as well as metaphorical terms.
The little girl walking out hand-in-hand with her brother
is brought back home—indoors. Theresa's nature is
dissatisfied with the milieu she lives in, simply because
her passionate nature finds her social life inadequate,
devoid of opportunities for noble deeds and ideal
ambitions. Since she cannot find externally what she
yearns for, she turns inward to weave ideals which the
external world will not furnish: 'her flame quickly
burned up that light fuel; and, fed from within, soared
^"Eliot's use of the 'Prelude' is almost identical to
Coleridge's. Referring to Romeo and Juliet, Coleridge
remarks: 'with his accustomed judgement Shakespeare has
begun by placing before us a lively picture of all the
impulses of the play, like a prelude (SC:, I, 6).
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after some illimitable satisfaction, some object which
would never justify weariness, which would reconcile
self-despair with the rapturous consciousness of life
beyond self' (25). The shift from the external to the
internal seems to mark here the origin of modern
speculation which, as we have seen, prefers the
subjective to the objective. Dorothea often turns inward
relying on her 'self intuition to restore order to a
world which had ceased to afford ready-made images of
2
order'. For the later-born Theresas the conflict
between the internal (thought) and the external ('deed')
is continued, and to 'common eyes' their struggles are
often regarded as mere 'inconsistency' or 'extravagance'.
Collision of the self with society, the kind George Eliot
also described in her essay on Antigone, provides the
concluding tone of the 'Prelude'. Internal and external
come into conflict when a modern Saint Theresa finds
herself 'foundress of nothing, whose loving heart-beats
and sobs after an unattained goodness tremble off and are
dispered among hindrances, instead of centering in some
long-recognizable deed' (26). Here, expressed very
clearly, we have the germ of Dorothea's, Lydgate's, and
Casaubon's characters, since all of them yearn to change
the world but find themselves either defeated or
frustrated by external, often petty obstacles. Even
minor characters are connnected to the 'Prelude' by means
of allusions to martyrdom. Yet this germ is only an idea
2
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at this stage, a theme which will be played by each
character in a different variation. But the effect of
the visual imagination is incomparably superior to that
of the auditory. And the idea is incarnate only when we
can look at it, only when it is transformed into an
image; then we can see, how each image takes up, to use
Henry James's words, 'the theme from the other very much
as the fiddles, in an orchestra, may take it up from the
cornets or flutes, or the wind-instruments take it up
from the violins' (AN, 158).
In Book I we see the transformation of the idea into
the image in the first dramatic presentation of Dorothea.
After describing Dorothea's paradoxical nature, a blend
of puritanical notions with pagan accents, the narrator
focuses on the two sisters, painting their portraits by a
series of contrasts. Celia is eager to see their
mother's jewels, which Dorothea has kept for six months
and has very likely forgotten. After opening the jewelry
case, Dorothea fastens a necklace of purple amethysts
round Celia's neck and refuses to take for herself the
cross, declaring self-righteously, and in a very
puritanical fashion, '"a cross is the last thing I would
wear as a trinket"' (35). One supposes that Celia will
have all the jewels, graciously allowing Dorothea to
indulge in her puritanical renunciation. But when
Dorothea opens the ring-boxes, she is dazzled by a ring
which is set with a fine emerald and diamonds; the lustre
of the stones is brought forth suddenly by a sunray
'passing beyond a cloud', slipping through the window:
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"How very beautiful these gems are!"
said Dorothea, under a new current of
feeling, as sudden as the gleam. "It
is strange how deeply colours seem to
penetrate one, like scent. I suppose
that is the reason why gems are used
as spiritual emblems in the
Revelation of St. John. They look
like fragments of heaven. I think
that emerald is more beautiful than
any of them" (35).
In a few smooth and graceful strokes this image instantly
captures long theories of perception and imagination.
Dorothea's emotional response shows that perception
indeed is initially subjective and her lavish remarks
reveal that synesthetic perception is most often the
case. At once the senses intercommunicate in Dorothea's
exclamation, '"it is strange how deeply colours seem to
penetrate one, like a scent"'. Furthesmore, the staccato¬
like effect of Dorothea's sentences makes us aware of the
powerful feeling the jewels arouse in her and
simultaneously of the way they affect her imagination.
Besides, here the 'new current of feeling' shows how
images 'are modified by a predominant passion; or, by
associated thoughts or images awakened by that passion'
(BL, II, 16).
The image of the emerald and diamond ring finely
embodies the idea of the 'Prelude', the collision between
the self and the others, the internal with the external
world. Without the window, and sunbeam that slips
through it onto the table, the brilliance and fire of the
diamonds would not affect Dorothea. Like a fine painter,
the author, is acutely aware of the fact that the way we
see things depends on how the light strikes them. It is
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no accident that the source of light is outside. This
beam is the most important thing in the picture. If we
were to take it away all the magic would disappear with
it. Light is a force here that raises the importance of
the scene and highlights the interplay between the
external and the internal on which both perception and
imagination depend. The fine spatial interplay of the
gleam from outdoors with the jewels indoors is
simultaneously juxtaposed with the primary conflict in
Dorothea's character (the sensuous justified by the
spiritual), as she tries 'to justify her delight in the
colours by merging them in her mystic religious joy'
(36) .
The polarity between outward and inward acquires
another dimension, as Dorothea's thought moves from the
brilliance of the diamonds to the 'miserable men', who
find them and sell them. Thus she directs our thinking
below the surface, into the mines where diamonds are
found, into the darkness where the precious stones are
dirty and unpolished, lacking any lustre. Her
imagination, no doubt, is of the penetrative kind which
Ruskin described in Modern Painters. Specifically, the
movement from surface to depth, from sight to insight
echoes Ruskin's definition of the virtue of the
imagination which 'is in its reaching, by intuition and
intensity of gaze .. a more essential truth than is seen
at the surface of things' (MP, II, 201).
Her allusion to St. John's Revelation also
emphasizes a private imaginative experience—a series of
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personal revelations which she, as well as the other
characters, will undergo, if only they are receptive
enough and willing to contradict Mrs Farebrother1s
declaration, '"I am not likely to follow new lights,
though there are plenty of them here as elsewhere"'
(200), or can understand the flaw in Mrs Plymdale's
thinking, '"I see very little good in people aiming out
of their own sphere"' (703).
The germinal image then of the novel is beautifully
controlled, guiding our minds in definite directions. It
is an image of sight, an emerald (whose colour was
believed to be good for eyesight) surrounded by diamonds.
By no stretch of the imagination can we see how the
facets of a diamond are all arranged more or less
concentric ..al ly, and how the interconnected planes of a
diamond resemble the interlaced filaments of a web, the
other dominant image in Middlemarch. Indeed the fire and
translucency of the diamonds point backwards and forward:
back to the flame of the 'Prelude' and the reflection of
the water of the pond, and ahead to its future
transformations—into images of water, mirror, fire,
light—and its opposite dark or subterranean images. The
germinal image is in the centre from which the rest of
the images grow; furthermore, it is part of Dorothea, the
central character, and it embodies oppositions—it has
all the elements which Coleridge attributed to the germs
of Shakespeare's plays. Because Dorothea is the only
character who embodies the two opposed directions that
the novel follows and integrates, she alone is the
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aesthetic centre of the novel. The rest of the
characters adopt either an external viewpoint,
disregarding the internal perspective, or remain
preoccupied with the world within, heedless of the world
without.
Middlemarch is a splendid gallery of various
portraits, each painted in contrast to another.
Underlying the apparent contrasts, however, remain
details which all of the portraits share, thus giving us
the impression that each portrait has been the germ or
the inspiration for the next. All characters seem to
evolve from Dorothea's nature, displaying to a greater or
a lesser degree some of her qualities. As in
Wordsworth's Prelude, so in Middlemarch imagination seems
to be the primary protagonist. Through each character,
the author explores and offers popular notions of the
imagination and contrasts these to the creative power
which transforms one's view of the self and the others,
enabling one to move away from the blindness of one's
egotism, to a lucid perception of the self and a
sympathetic view of others.
Instead of following Dorothea's path, from the very
beginning, I propose to pursue a more circuitous route,
the other characters' courses, in order to show how their
tracks converge with Dorothea's path. Through such an
approach, I believe, one can better see how Middlemarch
displays Coleridge's law of bicentrality.
Not only is Dorothea contrasted with Celia but with
Casaubon also—glaringly so. She is young, blooming, and
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ardent; he is old, withered, and coldly indifferent.
Dorothea's early description of Casaubon's words as
specimens from a mine, or 'the inscription on the door of
a museum which might open on the treasures of past ages'
(55) become the germ of his character. Simultaneously,
the image of the mine reveals the cyclical motion of the
novel, a movement which stimulates connections in the
reader's mind and keeps the novel vital and dynamic.
'Mine' refers both to Dorothea's earlier allusion to the
men who find precious stones and work on them, and to
Casaubon's dark character and his future dim
understandings. Casaubon's seemingly humble presentation
of his own character at the first dinner in Chapter II is
similar to Dorothea's impression, but with one
difference—there is no door that might open: '"I feed
too much on the inward sources; I live too much with the
dead. My mind is something like the ghost of an ancient,
wandering about the world and trying mentally to
construct it as it used to be, in spite of ruin and
confusing changes. But I find it necessary to use the
utmost caution about my eyesight"' (40). Yet this
description identifies, and in many ways explains,
Dorothea's attraction to Casaubon before she takes the
time to justify to herself the reasons for marrying him.
Casaubon's 'inward sources' make us think of the flame
'fed from within'. But the allusion to the 'Prelude' is
ironic, since, as we later see, Casaubon is so fettered
by egotism, that he cannot possibly reach a 'rapturous
consciousness of life beyond self' (25). Like Dorothea,
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he is trying to find order; like her, he has poor
eyesight: but his short-sightness is both literal and
metaphorical. His inability to see the futility of his
work, based on premises illusory and false, reveals his
perceptual and imaginative blindness early in the novel:
'having once mastered the true position and taken a firm
footing there, the vast field of mythical constructions
became intelligible, nay, luminous with the reflected
light of correspondences' (46).
The reflected light suggests dim illumination;
certainly, his portrait is painted with very little light
in it. The brightest light is that of a taper, which
Casaubon carries among the tombs of the past which he is
trying to reconstruct. Otherwise, even his smile does
not brighten his face, since it is like 'pale, wintry
sunshine' (48). The lack of any lights about him becomes
even more noticeable when he is identified with his
house. Lowick Manor is depicted on a grey November
morning, without any sunshine, having 'an air of autumnal
decline, and Mr Casaubon, when he presented himself, had
no bloom that could be thrown into relief by that
background' (99). Melancholy or dismalness is the
primary mood controlling the picture of Lowick Manor,
'the sort of house that must have children, many flowers,
open windows ... to make it seem a joyous home' (98-99).
But Casaubon's portrait, like his home at this point, is
drawn without windows, simply because, most often, Mr
Casaubon 'with his taper stuck before him ... forgot the
absence of windows, and ... had become indifferent to the
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sunlight' (230). Absence of light is associated with
lack of feeling and lack of imagination: 'It is an uneasy
lot at best ... to be present at this great spectacle of
life and never to be liberated from a small hungry
shivering self—never to be fully possessed by the glory
we behold, never to have our consciousness rapturously
tranformed into the vividness of thought, the ardour of a
passion, the energy of an action, but always to be
scholarly and unispired ... scrupulous and dim-sighted'
(314). Replete with allusions to the 'Prelude' this
description contrasts Casaubon with Dorothea, who
displays all the positive qualities he lacks. Like
Coleridge and Ruskin, Eliot here emphasizes that feeling
is the primary quality of the imagination. In this case
especially she seems to express Ruskin's belief that
'imagination is based upon, and appeals to, a deep heart
feeling'(MP, II, 298).
The last time we see Casaubon we are intensely
conscious of his approaching death as he walks alone
under the dark, sombre yew trees in the sunset. The
shadows and darkness outweigh the little light, making
his black figure indistinct. Yet his suffering does not
lead to a revelation, a new awareness of the self or
others, but forces him to withdrawal and alienation,
which is made even sharper by his rigidity when Dorothea
attempts to approach him and soothe him. Although he
considers himself a devout Christian, he cannot be
comforted by the belief in a future life, simply because
his imagination, hampered as . is by the present, it is
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not powerful enough to see the distant and the
imperceptible: 'Mr Casaubon's immediate desire was not
for divine communion and light divested of earthly
conditions; his passionate longings, poor man, clung low
and mist-like in very shady places' (462). His last
effort to 'keep his cold grasp on Dorothea's life' (535)
by extracting a promise from her to abide by his wishes
after his death, allies Casaubon's imagination with
Featherstone's: 'in chuckling over the vexations he could
inflict by the rigid clutch of his dead hand, he
inevitably mingled his consciousness with that livid
stagnant presence, and so far as he was preoccupied with
a future life, it was with one of gratification inside
his coffin' (358).
There is, then, no progress in Casaubon's spiritual
life. His 'last moment of dim earthly discerning' is
like the first; there are no revelations in his life, no
epiphanies that would lead to self-knowledge. His
imagination cannot improve or develop because it is
stunned by suspicion. Since he lacks imagination,
Casaubon cannot see the future, does not live with his
past as a guide to his present. Unable to feel
intensely, he sees dimly and understands obtusely.
Next to Casaubon's dark portrait, Will's picture,
radiating light, is a beautiful contrast. Since the germ
embodies contrasts, it is natural that the novel should
grow through opposition. The contrast between Casaubon
and Will (or Dorothea and Rosamond and so on)
simultaneously reveals Eliot's tendency to follow the
183
principle of Natural Idealism in the presentation and
development of her characters. By means of this
technique Eliot, like the naturalist painter Ruskin
describes, is able to 'associate inferior forms, so as
not only to set off those which are most beautiful, but
to bring out clearly what good there is in the inferior
forms themselves' (MP, III, 112). Casaubon's dim figure
certainly sets off Will's brightness. Will is a diamond
properly cleaned, cut, and polished, a diamond whose
exraordinary brilliance does not in any way remind us of
the dark earth where it was formed: 'The first impression
on seeing Will was one of sunny brightness.... When he
turned his head quickly his hair seemed to shake out
light and some persons thought they saw decided genius in
this coruscation' (241). His smile, unlike Casaubon's
'wintry' smile, 'was a gush of inward light illuminating
the transparent skin as well as the eyes, and playing
about every curve and line as if some Ariel were touching
them with a new charm, and banishing for ever the traces
of moodiness' (237-38). This description beautifully
dlineates the external-internal interplay in Will's
personality.
Unlike Casaubon, who is mostly identified with the
indoors, or rather the subterranean, Will is associated
with the outdoors. On his way to Lowick church to see
Dorothea on a bright Spring morning, Will 'looked like an
incarnation of the spring whose spirit filled the air'
(512). And after his conversation with Dorothea in
Chapter XXXVII, Will hurriedly leaves, when the rain
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stops, saying '"I would rather walk the five mile. I
shall strike across Halsell Common, and see the gleams on
the wet grass. I like that"' (403). In fact, he seems to
dread the indoors or to see it as confining. When
Dorothea suggests that perhaps his vocation is to be a
painter, he responds: '"I should not like to get into
their [artists'] way of looking at the world entirely
from the studio point of view"' (239). The interplay of
external with internal is apparent even in Will's private
musings. Will's greatest dread, for instance, is that of
becoming 'dimmed and for ever ray-shorn' (403) in
Dorothea's eyes. And when he thinks of his relationship
to Dorothea, which is threatened after she sees him with
Rosamond, he regrets that, 'until that wretched yesterday
... all their vision, all their thought of each other,
had been as in a world apart, where the sunshine fell on
tall white lilies.... But now—would Dorothea meet him
in that world again?' (862).
Unlike Casaubon, who is constricted in the narrow
space of vaults, Will seems unburdened and free,
"'calling himself Pegasus and every form of prescribed
work 'harness'"'(107). Against Casaubon's close-
mindedness and rigidity, Will's mind stands out receptive
and pliant, showing qualities which Dorothea discovers in-
him very early. In Rome, for instance, when Casaubon
finds Dorothea with Will, she is not so worried about her
husband's anger because Will is there. By then his
presence represents 'a source of greater feedom ... his
young equality was agre'able, and also perhaps his
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openness to conviction. She felt an immense need of some
one to speak to, and she had never before seen any one
who seemed so quick and pliable, so likely to understand
everything' (242). And plasticity, of course means an
ability to be formed, to be shaped, to be changed—all
qualities associated with growth. Yet Will's portrait is
not painted in altogether positive tones. We see the
flaws in Will's openness and unwillingness to choose a
profession, since his genius is 'intolerant of fetters',
waiting for 'those messages from the universe which
summon it to its peculiar work, only placing itself in an
attitude of receptivity towards all sublime chances'.
Will's extreme methods of attaining receptivity,
including wine and opium, are all ironically described
(109) .
Nevertheless, Will's nature is definitely identified
with Dorothea's very early in the novel. When Dorothea
first sees him in the Lowick grounds, after seeing
Casaubon's house, she notices his grey eyes, which are
close together, his 'delicate irregular nose with a
little ripple in it' and his hair that is 'falling
backward (104); all these are features which she had
noticed a little earlier in aunt Julia's miniature. In
Will's absence, aunt Julia often seems to replace Will,
as Dorothea identifies with her at times of loneliness,
sadness, or intense introspection. In Rome, Dorothea's
beautiful figure against the reclining Ariadne is also
identified with Will's. Before we see Dorothea, we see
Will, who had his back turned on the Belvedere Torso in
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the Vatican, 'looking out on the magnificent view of the
mountains' (219); in fact, he is so absorbed that he does
not notice Naumann approaching him. Naumann takes him to
see Dorothea, who is unaware of Ariadne (as Will was of
the Torso), looking on something from outdoors, 'her
large eyes ... fixed dreamily on a streak of sunlight
which fell across the floor' (220).
Indeed Will is the only one who sees and understands
Dorothea's nature, the one who initiates her movement
outward and gently steers her away from her puritanical
tendency to renounce any kind of joy. His first
impression of her is full of opposites, representing his
own passionate personality. Influenced by his dislike of
Casaubon, he assumes that Dorothea must be an 'unpleasant
girl', since she is about to marry Casaubon, and when she
refuses to judge his sketch, he interprets her hesitation
as a covert negative judgement. Yet his negative
impression is swayed by his extreme attraction to her
beautiful voice: 'it was like the voice of a soul that
had once lived in an AEolian harp' (105) . His image of
the Aeolian harp is the germ of Will's insight into
Dorothea's nature, but it also becomes the germ from
which his own personality unfolds; furthermore, the
Aeolian harp is consistent with the initial germ in
displaying the inward-outward dialectic.
This is why Will objects to Naumann's wish to paint
Dorothea's portrait. Painting, in Will's view, does not
accurately express the external-internal interplay and
neglects the internal in favor of the external.
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Naumann's painting, Will passionately declares, cannot
possibly do justice to her voice. Language is a better
medium, since it gives '"a fuller image which is all the
better for being vague. After all, the true seeing is
within; and painting stares at you with an insistent
imperfection"1 (222). Will's rhapsody here, as we have
seen, echoes Coleridge's comments on Paradise Lost, which
praise Milton's (the poet's) painting of Satan, over any
painter's for its complexity and indefiniteness and,
therefore, its greatest appeal to our imaginations.
Will's assertion that true seeing takes place within also
brings to mind Coleridge's belief that The Tempest should
not be extravagantly staged, appealing to the external
senses at the expense of the internal seeing, for 'the
principal and only genuine excitement ought to come from
within,—from the moved and sympathetic imagination' (SC,
If 132)
Later on, Will's definition of the poet is also full
of Coleridgean overtones, especially in identifying the
imagination with feeling, and in acknowledging feeling as
the key to knowledge: 'to be a poet is to have a soul so
quick to discern, that no shade of quality escapes it ...
a soul in which knowledge passes instantaneously into
feeling, and feeling flashes back as a new organ of
knowledge' (265). Will's definition applies to both
Dorothea and himself: to Dorothea, who sees by means of
her spiritual revelations how 'feeling passes into
knowledge', and to Will, who 'was of a temperament to
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feel keenly the presence of subtleties: a man of clumsier
perceptions would not have felt, as he did' (473).
Yet Will is the victim of insensitivity in some of
his encounters with Dorothea. In Rome, for instance,
when she talks about Casaubon's industriousness, he
yields without second thought to his impulse to tell her
of the German progress in the field Casaubon is working,
and he is 'unable to imagine the mode in which Dorothea
would be wounded' (240). But Dorothea's silence checks
his thoughtlessness, and he feels that he has offended
her. Similarly, his confrontation with Rosamond reveals
Will's lack of imagination. His attack against her,
after Dorothea sees him with Rosamond, is certainly
unjustified, since he is as guilty as Rosamond. But
Will's blindness to Rosamond's pain echoes Dorothea's
imperceptiveness to Casaubon's trouble during their first
argument in Rome. Preoccupied with his own suffering,
Will does not feel Rosamond's and even 'when his eyes
fell on Rosamond's blighted face it seemed to him that he
was the more pitiable of the two; for pain must enter
into its glorified life of memory before it can turn into
compassion (837). Gradually, Will does come to the
realization that Rosamond had depended on him for her
happiness, that his outburst had created an obligation
for him (841), that he cannot suddenly cut off his
relationship with Lydgate and Rosamond (861). But his
imperceptiveness to Rosamond's words, is counteracted by
his sensitivity to Lydgate's misfortune, demonstrated
especially by his reluctance to let Lydgate know that he
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himself had rejected Bulstrode's money, when Lydgate has
been destroyed by accepting it (840).
Will then is capable of projecting the self into the
other, and his encounters with others do illustrate
experiences of the sympathetic imagination. In Rome we
also witness the synthetic, holistic power of Will's
imagination. His enthusiastic response to the artistic
panorama of Rome is vividly contrasted to Casaubon's
indifference and Dorothea's bewilderment. To Will, 'the
very miscellaneousness of Rome ... made the mind flexible
with constant comparison, and saved you from seeing the
world's ages as a set of box-like partitions without
vital connection'. Rome, Will tells Dorothea and
Casaubon during their dinner together there, 'had given
him quite a new sense of history as a whole: the
fragments stimulated his imagination and made him
constructive' (244). It is no wonder that Will, who has
had a strong background in art, is able to comprehend the
'stupendous fragmentariness' which oppresses Dorothea,
who has solely 'fed on meagre Protestant histories and
art chiefly of the hand-screen sort' (224, 225). Will
must be one of 'those who have looked at Rome with the
quickening power of knowledge which breathes a growing
soul into all historic shapes, and traces out the
suppressed transitions which unite all contrasts' (225).
Knowledge and imagination are not independent, but
interdependent, as in Will's case.
Our final view of Will cannot be possibly
dissociated from our picture of Dorothea, as they are
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both illuminated by the light of the lightning outside,
coming through the projecting window in the background
The final scene of the two of them together makes the
synthesis of the opposites, within and without, more
vivid. Will, though, unlike Dorothea, does not
experience the inner-outer interplay as a collision,
which he tries to reconcile; does not seek or experience
an integration of the external with the internal. And
though he does suffer for Dorothea, his sympathetic
imagination does not encompass people who have injured
him. Furthermore, his imagination lacks a cyclical
movement which would enable him to use his past
experiences as the guide for his present or future
actions. His insensitivity to Rosamond, following his
past lack of insight into Dorothea's nature, illustrates
the lack of a cyclical imagination.
Lydgate's life highlights what Will's imagination
lacks, and gives prominence to Dorothea's generous and
ardent nature. At the same time, Lydgate's path reveals
that imagination is not always an innate force but rather
a power which becomes more and more refined through man's
perceptual and emotional experiences. Unlike either Will
or Dorothea, who seek the path to their life's
fulfilment, Lydgate has no difficulty finding it. Early
in his life when still a young boy, forced one day to
remain indoors, Lydgate seeks entertainment in the small
family library. There, he climbs on a chair to reach an
old encyclopedia on a high shelf, hoping he will find
something fresh in it. The dusty, dingy volume on
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anatomy offers Lydgate the light he has sought, the germ
of the idea of his profession: 'The page he opened on was
under the head of Anatomy, and the first passage that
drew his eyes was on the valves of the heart. He was not
much acguainted with valves of any sort, but he knew that
valvae were folding doors, and through this crevice came
a sudden light startling him with his first vivid notion
of finely-adjusted mechanism in the human frame'. The
light through the crevice of the folding doors fires his
imagination and illuminates the hitherto unknown and
invisible. At that moment, Lydgate knows that he will
pursue the medical profession: 'the moment of vocation
had come, and before he got down from his chair, the
world was made new to him by a presentiment of endless
processes filling the vast spaces planked out of his
sight by that wordy ignorance which he had supposed to be
knowledge. From that hour Lydgate felt the growth of an
intellectual passion' (173). Lydgate's discovery (the
light between the folding doors) echoes that of Dorothea
('the door of a museum which might open on the treasures
of past ages') and also the light which would help her
see the truth 'as great men have seen it by' (55, 51).
In either case the revelation is drawn in ironic tinges,
since it lacks a realistic basis, disregarding the
external in favor of the internal.
For both Lydgate and Dorothea, discovery signifies
liberation from past limitations and seems to signal the
exploration of endless vistas. Their goals share similar
imlplications and are full of St Theresan overtones.
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Through Casaubon, or so Dorothea believes, she can
acquire enough knowledge 'to see how it was possible to
lead a grand life here--now—in England' (51); through
the medical profession, Lydgate is convinced, he can make
'his life recognized as a factor in the better life of
mankind' (195); his plan for the future is 'to do small
work for Middlemarch, and great work for the world'
(178) .
By identifying with Bichat whose conception of
tissues 'acted necessarily on medical questions as the
turning of gas-light would act on a dim, oil-lit street',
Lydgate sees himself as a Promethean kind of figure, who
will bring light and order to his profession (177). And
indeed, Lydgate very early displays the hubristic
consciousness of a tragic hero: he is confident,
arrogant, and proud of his lucid perception—of his
ability, that is, to recognize and steer clear of
obstacles which could hinder his progress to his goal:
'About his ordinary bearing there was a certain fling, a
fearless expectation of success, a confidence in his own
powers and integrity much fortified by contempt for petty
obstacles or seductions of which he had had no
experience' (152). Monetary matters and other people in
his profession, Lydgate believes, could be obstacles in
his course, but he is certain his progress will not be
hindered by either. His move to Middlemarch away from
the temptations of London, the big city, he thinks, would
guarantee his success, since he would 'live among people
who could hold no rivalry with the pursuit of a great
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idea which was to be a twin object with the assiduous
practice of his profession' (176). Because Lydgate is
certain of his lucid perception, he does not work on its
improvement, he does not proceed cautiously, examining
carefully the obstacles in his way. His conviction of
his own ability to perceive obstacles constitutes his
blindness, his fundamental shortcoming, a flaw which one
would be tempted to call tragic if it were the flaw that
distinguished him from others. Instead, it is only a
'spot of commonness' which he shares with people he
considers inferior. Lydgate's spots of commonness 'lay
in the comlexion of his prejudices, which, in spite of
noble intentions and sympathy, were half of them such as
are found in ordinary men of the world: that distinction
of mind which belonged to his intellectual ardour, did
not penetrate his feeling and judgment about furniture or
women' (179).
Besieged by his perception of beauty, in either
Laure's or Rosamond's case, Lydgate does not allow his
imagination or his judgement to interfere. Thus he seems
to confuse external with internal, identifying surface
with depth, beauty with virtue. His attitude towards
women is crystallized early in the novels in his initial
comparison of Dorothea with Rosamond. A short
conversation with Dorothea serves him as sufficient
evidence that 'she did not look at things from the proper
feminine angle' (122). His superficial remark allies him
with Mr Brooke, whom Lydgate would certainly regard as
his inferior. Yet Lydgate would agree with Mr Brooke's
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condescending view: 'there is a lightness about the
feminine mind—a touch and go--music, the fine arts, that
kind of thing—they should study those up to a certain
point ... but in a light way, you know. A woman should
be able to sit down and play you or sing you a good old
English tune' (89).
In Rosamond, Lydgate believes, he has found that
lightness which is not taxing to a man's mind.
'Polished, refined, docile', Rosamond represents for
Lydgate a diamond of womanhood, possessing 'that feminine
radiance ... which must be classed with flowers and
music, that sort of beauty which by its very nature was
virtuous, being moulded only for pure and delicate joys'
(193). Blinded by the radiance of his ideal type, he
reads appearafce as substance, interpreting 'the sylph¬
like frame ... as the sign of a ready intelligent
sensitiveness' (638).
Lydgate's confusion of the external with the
internal is the primary cause of his fall. Away from his
research, he seems to be imaginative in a Featherstone-
like fashion: his images are the brood of his own desire.
Thus he sees the radiance of Rosamond's eyes brightening
up 'all his future with mild sunshine' (385). His
marriage to Rosamond is bound to dissolve since it is
based on false assumptions of the Casaubon-type. For
Lydgate, as for Casaubon, marriage represents a lopsided
relationship in which 'everything is given to you and
nothing claimed' (385); he dreams that he has found in
Rosamond ocsensitive, adoring, intelligent, but
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submissive creature, 'who venerated his high musings and
mementous labours and would never interfere with them'
(387) .
This is why he is jolted when the real future
replaces the imaginary, that is when he finds that he has
to cope with Rosamond's dominance, not her anticipated
submissiveness. Then even more distressingly he
discovers 'his powerlessness over Rosamond' (631),
Suddenly he is confronted with an unforeseen reversal of
roles; he is no longer the captor but the captive in his
wife's web—the diamond has been transformed into a web:
'He had regarded Rosamond's cleverness as precisely of
the receptive kind which became a woman. He was now
beginning to find out what that cleverness was--what was
the shape into which it had run as into a close network
aloof and independent' (631). His shock at realizing
that his wife has married him for his social prestige is
full of ironic overtones, since Lydgate, who had been
dazzled by his wife's appearance, expects her to have
been attracted to his inner virtues—'his superior
knowledge and mental force' (631). At the moment of his
crisis, Lydgate seems to be confronted with his own
reflection. Instead of the diamond-like radiance he had
perceived, he discovers 'a blank unreflecting surface'
(632), but does not realize that his own pride has also
been a type of 'unreflecting egoism' (383).
Lydgate's pride in his profession is linked to his
pride in his perception. Through his vocation Lydgate
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believes he has achieved an ideal reconciliation of the
internal with the external: 'I should never have been
happy in any profession that did not call forth the
highest intellectual strain, and yet keep me in warm
contact with my neighbours' (194). His profession, he
believes, has guaranteed the right vantage point from
which he can see life; he is sure that, unlike others, he
can see clearly w€[i^iout any 'blinkers' (194). Yet
lurking within the self are the opposites which Lydgate
sees but does not try to reconcile, and he learns instead
to live with the collision. Laure's case, and the loss
of judgement ('the sudden impulse of a madman'(181)) she
represents, bring forth the first occasion on which
Lydgate is torn by opposites: 'He had two selves within
him apparently, and they must learn to accommodate each
other and bear reciprocal impediments. Strange, that
some of us, with quick alternate vision, see beyond our
infatuations, and even while we rave on the heights,
behold the wide plain where our persistent self pauses
and awaits us' (182). And although Rosamond brings
Laure to mind (188), Lydgate does not allow the past to
guide his future and cannot foresee the conflict his
marriage would create early in his career.
At an early stage of his stay in Middlemarch during
his debate over his vote for Farebrother vs Tyke, Lydgate
discovers that the balance he has achieved is tenuous.
In spite of his resolution not to be submissive to
Bulstrode's wishes, not to be hindered by others, Lydgate
casts his vote for Tyke, thus experiencing the effect of
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the web of the social milieu against which Farebrother
had warned him: 'for the first time Lydgate was feeling
the hampering thread-like pressure of small social
conditions, and their frustrating complexity' (210).
This episode remains 'a sore point in his memory as a
case in which the petty medium of Middlemarch had been
too strong for him' (217) . Again in connection with
Farebrother, when Lydgate recommmends him to Dorothea as
the Vicar for Lowick, Lydgate recognizes the effect of
the web. To her question as to why Farebrother has not
done more than he has; he replies bitterly; '"I find
myself that it's uncommonly difficult to make the right
thing work: there are so many string pulling at once'
(536-37).
At this point Lydgate has come painfully to
recognize that man's character is shaped from the
interplay between within and without, an idea which he
expresses metaphorically in relation to scientific
research as systole and diastole: 'there must be a
systole and diastole in all inquiry ... a man's mind must
be continually expanding and shrinking between the whole
human horizon and the horizon of an object-glass' (690).
The perception of the object-glass, in other words, is
incomplete unless it is supplemented with the imagination
of the whole human horizon. Without imagination,
perception is incomplete, and this is what Lydgate fails
to understand or apply to his emotional life. The rhythm
of shrinking and expanding reminds us of the narrator's
whole approach to human character. When she introduces
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Lydgate, she says that 'character ... is a process and an
unfolding' during which both virtues and faults shrink
and expand (178). Indeed, contraction and expansion
constitute the primary rhythm of growth as Coleridge's
plant illustrates. Shrinking and expanding are
emphasized in physical terms, as we have already seen in
the unfolding of Casaubon's character, whose lack of
imagination is underlined by the narrow suffocating space
of the vaults where he is wandering about, or by his
shrinking from Dorothea's consolation because 'his was a
mind that shrank from pity' (403).
.Lydgate's fall away from the ideal self is also
associated with narrowness and shrinking. His reliance
on gambling as the easy means of escape from his
financial difficulties shows how 'his mind was as utterly
narrowed into that precipitous crevice of play as if he
had been the most ignorant lounger there' (725). The
crevice of the folding doors of the heart, an image that
originally offered light, degenerates here into the
'precipitous crevice' in which Lydgate has fallen. The
fine contrast and reversal of roles between Fred and
Lydgate is intensely vivid and acutely painful to watch:
Fred's blond face and blue eyes,
usually bright and careless, ready to
give attention to anything that held
out a promise for amusement, looking
involuntarily grave and almost
embarrassed as if by the sight of
something unfitting; while Lydgate,
who had habitually an air of self-
possessed strength, and a certain
meditativeness that seemed to lie
behind his most observant attention,
was acting, watching, speaking with
that excited narrow consciousness
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which reminds one of an animal with
fierce eyes and retractile claws
(724).
Without any hopes for the wide vistas that his
imagination once promised, Lydgate accepts 'his narrowed
lot with sad resignation' (858).
Narrowness and shrinking become even more intense in
his last conversation with Dorothea, when Lydgate is
thankful for her understanding and confides in her his
plans for the future. The circular motion of his life is
apparent here, and full of ironies: '"I must do as other
men do, and think what will please the world and bring in
money; look for a little opening in the London crowd, and
push myself; set up in a watering-place, or go to some
southern town ... and get myself puffed,—that is the
sort of shell I must creep into and try to keep my soul
alive in' (825). Instead of the initial pride in
individuality, we witness his sad sway to conformity. He
moves to London, which he had consciously avoided as the
place that would destroy his professional ambitions. The
crevice of the valves of the heart that offered him the
light of endless vistas is tranformed into a 'little
opening in the London crowd', a shell into which he must
creep. The 'watering-place' also emphasizes the cyclical
motion as it points to the pond of the 'Prelude'; but the
cygnet of the 'Prelude' seems to he here metamorphosed
into one of the ducklings. Lydgate's withdrawal into the
shell is contrasted with Dorothea's riddance of her shell
(the widow's cap) which liberates her from the oppression
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of the past and initiates the journey towards integration
and self-fulfilment.
Through Dorothea, Lydgate comes to understand the
full meaning of ardour, the saving effect that powerful
feeling has on others. Dorothea's trust in him when
everyone else has doubted his innocence, is invigorating,
giving him the strength he needs in order to believe in
the self again; 'the presence of a noble nature, generous
in its wishes, ardent in its charity, changes the lights
for us: we begin to see things again in their larger
quieter masses, and to believe that we too can be seen
and .judged in the wholeness of our character' (819).
Dorothea's ardour radiates, diffuses as the water of a
fountain spreads from a tiny opening. Lydgate's
perception of Dorothea as 'a fountain of friendship
towards men' (826) is another transformation of the
original germ, and precisely of the jewels which Dorothea
did not take off when she resumed her work but thought
'of often having ... by her, to feed her eye at these
little fountains of pure colour' (36). Like a diamond,
Dorothea here radiates light and affects others by her
warmth and sympathy.
Lydgate seems to be returning to the point of
departure, but there is a considerable difference. His
fall is accompanied with, or rather results in, a series
of anagnorises. By means of his suffering he comes to
recognize that beautiful appearance does not always
reveal splendid depths, that 'a pretty covering of
flowers and verdure' can be concealing a swamp (633). By
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painful experiences Lydgate is also trained to foresee
the consequences of his actions rather than to act on
impulse. His financial straits force him to revise his
old motto 'if things were done at all, they must be done
properly' (634), and to begin to see things from a new
point of view: 'having been roused to discern
consequences which he had never been in the habit of
tracing, he was preparing to act ... with some of the
rigour ... that he would have applied in pursuing
experiment' (636). His foresight seems to initiate the
journey towards imaginative seeing. Gradually, Lydgate
moves_beyond the self and pain he himself experiences and
begins to identify with the misery Rosamond feels as she
sees her former dreams and castles in the air demolished
one by one. When Lydgate sees the other as the self, he
has travelled a very long way indeed from his view of
Rosamond as a sylph who would worship and entertain him.
His cry, '"when I hurt you, I hurt part of my own life'
(718), is the culmination of imaginative projection, the
gain Lydgate has acquired through intense suffering, the
moment when Lydgate and Dorothea become the only
characters in the novel that stand in the foreground as
the ones capable of experiencing the sympathetic
imagination.
Yet one feels bitter disappointment with Lydgate's
gain, with his compromise, his willingness to renounce
his goals for Rosamond's sake. For us Lydgate remains a
victim of externals as he moves out of our sight and is
transplanted to London. We'cannot help wondering whether
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his life would have been different if he could have
somehow integrated his emotional and scientific life and
had seen love and marriage through the same kind of
imagination he wanted to apply to research the
imagination 'that reveals subtle actions inaccessible by
any sort of lens, but tracked in that outer darkness
through long pathways of necessary sequence by the inward
light which is the last refinement of Energy' (194).
Indeed, Lydgate's definition of the scientific
imagination as the ability to see the distant and the
imperceptible carries Coleridgean overtones; at the same
time, it seems to be an extension of Will's definition of
the true seeing as taking place within. But Lydgate's
belief seems to be theoretic in matters of everyday
living. Our last glimpse of Lydgate as a successful man
who considers himself a failure reveals the tension
between the self and others, between within and without,
the internal and the external, opposites which, in
Lydgate's case, remain irreconcilable.
Our understanding of Lydgate's character is
incomplete without a consideration of Rosamond and
Bulstrode, the characters primarily responsible for his
fall. At first glance, Rosamond is Dorothea's glaring
opposite—egocentric, vain, unsympathetic; she does
however reflect some of Dorothea's experiences. From her
point of view, she is married to an unsympathetic man,
and, like Dorothea, Rosamond feels the pain of shattered
dreams as the reality of marriage replaces the illusions
of the days of courtship. To Rosamond's delicate taste,
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Lydgate's scientific research seems 'like a morbid
vampire's taste' (711). And, like Dorothea, Rosamond
finds that her husband reveals during their marriage
'peculiar views of things which had never entered into
the dialogue of courtship' (712). Her marriage, which
she had regarded as liberation, turns out to be a bitter
disappointment, since it 'had lost its charm of
encouraging delightful dreams. It had freed her from the
disagreeables of her father's house, but it had not given
her everything that she wished and hoped' (711).
Of course the differences between Dorothea and
Rosamond outweigh the similarities by far. Apart from
moments of ennui (647), or brief conversations with
Lydgate before her marriage, Rosamond's portrait is never
drawn with a window in the background, mainly because her
nature in not disturbed by collisions, or by the
interplay between the external and the internal
fundamental to imagination. In her portrait the window
is replaced by a mirror, for Rosamond is a reflection—
not an original. She is the reflection of her teacher,
Mrs Lemon, and always strains to be a perfect lady, to
please by conforming, not by questioning any set
standards; in fact, Rosamond 'was by nature an actress of
parts that entered into her physique; she even acted her
own character, and so well, that she did not know it to
be precisely her own' (144). Rosamond's narcissistic
nature is exquisitely painted in a picture that serves as
a sharp antithesis to Mary's plainness. Next to the
'nymph-like figure' with 'pure blondness' and 'eyes of
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heavenly blue' stands 'the brown patch'. Thus Mary finds
herself between two Rosamonds, 'two nymphs--the one in
the glass and the one out of it'. Rosamond's portrait in
this scene is completed with another fine touch as she,
acting her role of the perfect lady who can afford to be
/
generous, turns to Mary and utters the cliche, 'beauty is
of very little consequence in reality'. Yet even this
/
cliche is undermined as Rosamond turns her head towards
Mary 'but with eyes swerving towards the new view of her
neck in the glass' (139-40).
The first mirror scene serves as the germ of other
mirror images, as the germ of Rosamond's character which
remains unaltered, without self-revelations, without
growth. There are no significant transformations of the
original image, since there are no changes in Rosamond's
nature. Her egotistical attitude governs her perspective
on others? she cannot imagine other people's states of
mind except 'as a material cut into shape by her own
v/ishes' (834). Even in moments of affection, such as the
scene where Lydgate fastens her plaits, Rosamond's
narcissism prevails; blind to his presence, she accepts
his tender words complacently, 'as if she had been a
serene and lovely image, now and then miraculously
dimpling towards her votary (709). Even her perception
does not involve an inner-outer interplay. Image does
not trigger idea. Rosamond simply cannot break away from
the self, cannot accept that someone else could have a
centre, does not recognize the law of bicentrality; she
is a 'shallow nature' (709), a 'blank unreflecting
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surface', which radiates no light, and even though she
considers herself 'an exquisite ornament' (632), she is
not a precious one, a jewel that radiates light and
affects others by its lustre.
In fact, Rosamond is not identified with the light
or wideness of the imagination, but with the darkness and
narrowness of imperceptiveness. This is poignantly
illustrated in the culmination of her conflict with
Lydgate. To Lydgate's desperate cry for help, Rosamond
responds with a question, '"What can _I do Tertius'", and
later on, '"Are we to go without spoons and forks then?'"
Her inability to feel is directly proportional to her
inability to imagine, since feeling, as we have seen, is
the primary quality of the imagination. Lack of
imagination, or what is pradoxically called 'realistic
imagination' (146), is defined through Rosamond. Affected
only by the immediately perceptible, she cannot see below
the surface, cannot envision the distant and the
imperceptible, cannot learn from the past to foresee the
future. Her attempt to frustrate Lydgate's efforts to
sell their house reveals her short-sightedness as she
congratulates herself on having 'hindered the event which
she immediately dreaded', at the moment when her husband
feels 'bitter disappointment, as if he had opened a door
out of a suffocating place and had found it walled up'
(706) .
There is only a flickering revelation in Rosamond's
life, namely her confession to Dorothea, which is ma<3.e
under 'the subduing influence of Dorothea's emotion'
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(856). Furthermore, Rosamond's brief moments of
affection for Lydgate seem to be 'the reflex' of
Dorothea's 'energy' (857). But since Rosamond's
revelation is not fed from within, it is quickly
extinguished. Like Lydgate's Rosamond's journey is
cyclical; but she reaches the point of departure without
any tranformations. The final scene of her driving in a
carriage with her daughters is merely another role which
Mrs Lemon's student enjoys playing with an intense
awareness of her audience. And Lydgate's comparison of
Rosamond to his 'basil plant' (893), is a manifestation
of the 'soft living substance' that can make its way 'in
spite of opposing rock' (379). Without an interplay of
the external and internal imagination languishes, as we
have seen. And without imagination there is no growth,
no development. Her character remains static throughout.
Another exquisite actor sharing Rosamond's acting
abilities and displaying some of Casaubon's
characteristics is Rosamond's uncle, Mr Bulstrode. His
first encounter with his brother-in-law, Mr Vincy,
reveals his sense of audience; after his little speech on
Fred's extravagances, he is worried about the
'unsatisfactory reflection of himself in the coarse
unflattering mirror which that manufacturer's mind
presented to the subtler lights and shadows of his
fellow-men' (159). A great part of Bulstrode's inward
life is 'made up of the thoughts he believes other men to
have about him' (741), and his primary dread when Raffles
appears is lest Middlemarch should discover that his life
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as a devout Christian has been a sham (782-83).
Bulstrode, then, seems to be able to foresee
consequences, but his foresight is induced only when he
is threatened with public humiliation. In the past,
though, his blindness to consequences is evident in his
concealment of the fact that Mrs Dunkirk's daughter has
been found.
Bulstrode's life demonstrates how past, present, and
future are interwoven, not independent, parts of a man's
whole life: 'with memory set smarting like a reopened
wound, a man's past is not simply a dead history, an
outworn preparation of the present ... it is a still
quivering part of himself, bringing shudders and bitter
flavours' (663). Like modern psychologists, George Eliot
shows the multidimensional nature of memory, involving
space, time, shudders, pain, bitter flavours. Through
Raffles' appearance, Bulstrode is forced to relive the
past which he has conveniently forgotten. In fact the
images of his past become more vivid than those of his
present, as he experiences 'the scenes of his earlier
life coming between him and everything else, as
obstinately as when we look through the window from a
lighted room, the objects we turn our backs on are still
before us, instead of the grass and the trees' (663).
Yet, though the image of the window often represents an
interplay between external and internal, or collisions
within a character, in Bulstrode's case there have been
no such conflicts, since he, unlike Lydgate, can deftly
reconcile what appears irreconcilable. Thus his
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'religious activity could not be incompatible with his
business as soon as he argued himself into not feeling it
incompatible (665). And since the systole/diastole
rhythm is absent, there is no expansion, no growth of his
character.
His imagination is of the Featherstone type, as his
images are also the brood of desire: 'A man vows, and yet
will not cast away the means of breaking his vow ... but
the desires which tend to break it are at work in him
dimly, and make their way into his imagination....
Raffles dead was the image that brought release' (761).
And.since Providence does not help to bring the rescue
Bulstrode needs, Bulstrode helps it along by completely
disregarding Lydgate's orders, that is, by not telling
Mrs Abel when to stop giving Raffles opium and by
allowing her to give the patient alcohol. Bulstrode's
dark figure seems to be drawn in Casaubon-like accents.
Darkness, shrinking and withering—systole without
diastole—are the final touches. Confronted with his
wife, he 'shrank from confession' preferring to postpone
it for a better time, when he would be dying, since then,
he hopes, 'she might listen without recoiling from his
touch' (882). His wife's 'grief-worn face', he feels,
has aged 'to keep sad company with his own withered
features' (883). Bulstrode's 'deep distress at the sight
of her suffering' shows that he is capable of moving
beyond the self to experience someone else's pain; but
his suffering at that moment also illustrates that he can
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be affected only by the immediately perveivable, not the
imaginable—by the near, not the distant.
The 'movement of new compassion and old tenderness'
that Harriet Bulstrode experiences 'like a great wave' at
the sight of her 'withered and shrunken' (807-08) husband
is reminiscent of Dorothea's compassion for Lydgate.
Harriet's silent 'promise of faithfulness' at the sight
of her husband's desolation serves also as a fine
contrast to Rosamond's cold indifference to her husband's
despair. Although Harriet's love of handsome clothes
briefly links her with Rosamond (330), her ordeal allies
her. mainly with Dorothea. After the discovery of her
husband's past concealment, Harriet locks herself in her
room 'to get used to her maimed consciousness, her poor
lopped life' (806). The change of clothes from the
cheerful adorned attire to a 'plain black gown' (807),
also reminds us of Dorothea's change after her night of
intense introspection, and demonstrates a similar desire
to attune the external to the internal.
Humiliation, shame, and disgrace before the world
outside do not quell Harriet's sympathetic imagination
which reaches out for her husband at the moment of
crisis: 'after an instant of scorching shame in which she
felt only the eyes of the world, with one leap of her
heart she was at his side in mournful but unreproaching
fellowship with shame and isolation' (806). The 'leap of
heart' again brings to mind Dorothea's 'impetuous
generosity' that 'would have leaped at once to the
vindication of Lydgate' (789), and, of cource, reminds us
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of Wordsworth's 'My Heart Leaps Up', which extols man's
child-like responsiveness to ordinary events. Harriet's
and Dorothea's reactions illustrate how a strong feeling
characterizes a sympathetic imagination. Like Dorothea,
Harriet grows through constriction and expansion. Her
shrinking within herself is followed by her expanding
towards her husband. It is important that image (the
ritual of the change of clothes) is followed by idea (of
helping her husband) which is in turn embodied by action
(her silent forgiveness).
Harriet's 'good honest glance' (330) is a feature
which connects her with Mary also. Honesty is Mary's
foremost virtue, a quality which, we are told, a painter
would take care to express in her portrait: 'Rembrandt
would have painted her with pleasure, and would have made
her broad features look out of the canvas with
intelligent honesty' (140). Undoubtedly, Mary is
Rosamond's opposite, and the antithesis of the two women
is finely pronounced in the mirror scene when Mary
exclaims without any illusions, '"What a brown patch I am
by the side of you, Rosy!"' This mirror scene, in turn,
brings to mind the first pier glass scene involving Celia
and Dorothea, an image which also serves to underline the
contrasts between the two sisters. Mary in fact is
another reflection of Dorothea. Farebrother's first
comment about her in his conversation with Lydgate
connects Mary with Dorothea. When Lydgate says that Mary
is a quiet girl at Featherstone's whom he has hardly
noticed, Farebrother comments: '"She has taken notice of
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you, though, depend upon it.... Oh, she gauges
everybody"' (205). Mary's keen powers of perception at
this point remind us of Dorothea's imagination: 'she had
looked deep into the ungauged reservoir of Mr Casaubon's
mind' (46). Like Dorothea, Mary is associated with light
and windows. At times, for instance, her smile has 'the
full illumination of fun' and her eyes are 'nothing more
than clear windows where observation sate laughingly'
(167). Featherstone's death brings light—of the fire
and the morning—and windows together in the background
as Mary's figure moves quietly in the foreground after her
honest act (354). And the last image of Mary 'in white-
haired placidity' is also painted at the open window—the
same window where Mary 'in the days of old Peter
Featherstone, had often been ordered to look out for Mr
Lydgate' (892) .
Like Dorothea, Mary seems to display both blindness
and insight. Her blindness to Farebrother's love for her
reminds us of Dorothea's imperceptiveness to Sir James
Chettam's feelings. Mary and Fred seem to take turns
accusing each other of blindness. '"It is impossible
that you should not see it all clearly enough—you who
see everything"' (624), Fred reproaches Mary, alluding to
Farebrother's affection for her; but Mary, in turn,
accuses Fred of an inability to understand that
Farebrother has left them alone to speak to each other:
'"I am disappointed that you should be so blind to his
delicate feeling"'(624-25). Blindness to another's
feeling constitutes Mary's definition of lack of
212
imagination, beautifully illustrated through the story of
Tom, the giant, who knocked down the pretty house of the
ants and thought they did not mind, since '"he couldn't
hear them cry or see them use their pocket-
handkerchiefs"' (693).
Fred, in fact, like his sister Rosamond, seems to be
another version of the giant. His imagination, unless it
is supported by perception, slackens. Preoccupied with
his own wishes, he is unable to understand others, and
his loan from the Garths illustrates his inability to
imagine 'the inconvenience and possible injury that his
breach might occasion them, for this exercise of the
imagination on other people's needs is not common with
hopeful young gentlemen' (281). But, unlike his sister,
Fred seems to be shaped and affected by others' feelings.
Thus Farebrother' s confession of how temptingrtwas to let
him be ruined by gambling so that he himself could marry
Mary, moves Fred in much the same way that Dorothea's
ardour affects Lydgate. In the flickering starlight Fred
is 'moved quite newly' by Farebrother's admission: 'Some
one highly susceptible to the contemplation of a fine act
had said, that it produces a sort of regenerating shudder
through the frame, and makes one feel ready to begin a
new life. A good degree of that effect was just then
present in Fred Vincy' (728). Fred's thankful admission,
'"I will try that your goodness shall not be thrown
away'", signals the beginning of a life travelled in the
light of the imagination.
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Farebrother's generous act is a good example of the
generalization that 'the growing good of the world is
partly dependent on unhistoric acts' (896), and it
illustrates Farebrother's sympathetic imagination. In
his interactions with others Farebrother displays an
unusual combination of lucid perception and fine
imagination. His early conversations with Lydgate
demonstrate his awareness of the collisions between the
self and others, the obstacles that can hinder one's good
purposes. To Lydgate's assured conviction that he can
pursue his profession independently, without flattering
others, Farebrother responds sceptically"But then you
must be sure of having the value, and you must keep
yourself independent. Very few men can do that. Either
you slip out of service altogether, and become good for
nothing, or you wear the harness and draw a good deal
where your yoke-fellows pull you"' (204). Farebrother's
perception of Eros as an obstacle rather than, as Lydgate
conveives it, a means of furtherance, again illustrates
Farebrother's insight, foreshadowing Lydgate's fall.
Upon hearing Lydgate's plan to get married sooner than he
had originally planned, in order to pursue his work more
diligently, Farebrother warns: '"Eros has degenerated; he
began by introducing order and harmony, and now he brings
back chaos"' (383). Connected with his allusion to Eros
is another moment of sharp perception, when he realizes
Rosamond's estrangement from her husband, in spite of her
seemingly unaltered attitude, and compares her to 'a
sculptured Psyche modelled to look another way' (692)<
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Furthermore, his ability to 'enter into' Lydgate's
'position as a newcomer who had his own professional
objects to secure' (207) demonstrates Farebrother's
sympathetic imagination and serves as an antithesis to
Lydgate's insensitivity to the clergyman's needs. Unlike
Farebrother, Lydgate at the time had 'no power of
imagining the part which the want of money plays in
determining the actions of men ... and he never entered
into any calculation of the ratio between the Vicar's
income and his more or less necessary expenditure' (209).
With his 'bright eyes' (205), and the inner outer
interplay beaming in his face (when he knows that he has
the Lowick living) Farebrother is linked with both
Dorothea and Will: 'the gladness in his face was of that
active kind which seems to have energy enough not only to
flash outwardly, but to light up busy vision within: one
seemed to see thoughts, as well as delight, in his
glances' (553). Yet capable as he is of entering into
another's place, Farebrother seems to be blind to
Lydgate's innocence. Against Dorothea's eagerness to
vindicate Lydgate, Farebrother's words, though true,
reflect detachment: '"character is not cut in marble—it
is not something solid and unalterable. It is something
living and changing, and may become diseased as our
bodies do"' (790-91). But Farebrother's dim
understanding helps to bring forth the brilliance of
Dorothea's insight. Farebrother's role in this case is
characteristic of him. Although he himself does not
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change, he helps others, like Dorothea and Lydgate, to a
better understaring of themselves and of others.
Whether we consider the major or the minor
characters in Middlemarch, we can see how the novel is 'a
very wonder/ul whole, the slow creation of long
interchanging influences' (444). Dorothea is in the
centre of that whole and all the lines drawn from the
circumference converge upon her alone; she is the
receptive and diffusive centre, because through her
character ideas or images, which seem only fragments in
the portrayal of other characters, reach their
culmination, fruition, completion, wholeness.
Middlemarch pivots on the process towards widening
vision. Perceptual and imaginative seeing are two halves
of the whole--when one is missing, vision is dim or
blurried. The conviction that one can see lucidly is the
biggest obstacle to one's perceptual or imaginative
progress. Such a belief makes minor characters static
rather than dynamic. Mrs Cadwallader, for instance,
remains unaltered thoughout the novel. Her words at the
end, when she hears of Dorothea's marriage to Will, are
similar to those in the beginning—she is certain she can
see what others are unaware of. Addressing her husband,
she remarks triumphantly: '"Another time you will admit
that I have some foresight; or rather you will contradict
me and be just as blind as ever"' (873). And Celia, a
grown woman at the end, believes what she upheld as a
little girl, that she can teach Dorothea how to see more
clearly 'by opening a little window for the daylight of
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her own understanding to enter among the strange coloured
lamps by which Dodo habitually saw' (878). The intended
irony here is obvious since Celia's nature never grows
through the external-internal interplay.
What distinguishes Dorothea from other characters is
her recognition of her own physical and mental short¬
sightedness. Without a trace of vanity, she tells Sir
James that she does not like a dog for a pet because she
is short-sighted and she is 'afraid of treading on it'
(53). When her uncle asks her for her opinion of Will's
sketch, she admits her ignorance on the matter, '"I never
see the beauty of those pictures which you say are so
much praised. They are a language I do not
understand"'(105). And her uncertainty as to the
vocation in her life is expressed in similar terms: 'I
don't b feel sure about doing good in any way now:
everything seems like going on a mission to a people
whose language I don't know' (51). Dorothea's
acknowledgment of her ignorance reveals her receptivity,
the sense of wonder in her nature, a quality often is
described in terms of openness, wideness, expansion—all
of them attributes of the imagination.
Nevertheless, Dorothea's early interactions with
Casaubon demonstrate an imbalance between the internal
and the external perspectives. In the first part of the
novel, during the development of her relationship to
Casaubon, the assertion of Dorothea's inward perspective
takes place. Her illusions about Casaubon, as well as
her later absorption with her disi1lusioment, are given
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in interior terms. It is only after Casaubon's death
that Dorothea moves outward, daring to adopt the exterior
perspective. Through images of antithetical qualities,
George Eliot's imagination 'dissolves, diffuses,
dissipates, in order to recreate'; and it reveals itself
at the end of the novel, 'in the balance or
reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities'. At
the end, Dorothea bridges the interior, the self, and the
exterior, the others, and thus qualities which seemed
incongruous turn out to be integral parts of the whole.
In the beginning of the novel Dorothea's imagination
displays elements of a hubristic consciousness. Unlike
Lydgate, who is proud of his lucid perception, Dorothea
is arrogant about her penetrative imagination, thinking
that she is well able to see beneath the surface:
"It is painful in you, Celia,
that you will look at human beings as
if they were merely animals with a
toilette, and never see the great
soul in a man's face".
"Has Mr Casaubon a great soul?"
Celia was not without a touch of
naive malice.
"Yes, I believe he has", said
Dorothea, with the full voice of
decision. "Everything I see in him
corresponds to his pamphlet on
Biblical Cosmology" (43).
From the beginning of her acquaintance with Casaubon,
Dorothea prides herself on her ability to see 'in him, to
see, as she assumes, his 'great soul', and she believes
that he, unlike either Celia or Sir James, can also
understand 'the higher inward life' and can share with
her 'some spiritual communion' (44).
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The limitations of such a perspective are subtly
depicted in the significant images at the opening of the
following chapter, where 'by this time', Dorothea
believes, she 'had looked deep into the ungauged
reservoir of Mr Casaubon's mind, seeing reflected there
in vague labyrinthine extension every quality she herself
had brought' (46). Because of her inward perspective,
Dorothea fails to see the striking paradox. She is
certain she can look 'deep into', not a lake, but a
'reservoir', and sees there reflected a very narcissistic
image: 'every quality she had brought' in 'vague
labyrinthine extent'. The similarities between Dorothea
and Hamlet are, indeed, striking here. Coleridge's
comments on Hamlet seem to describe Dorothea. Through
Hamlet, so Coleridge believed, Shakespeare intended 'to
pourtray a person in whose view the external world, and
all its incidents and objects, were comparatively dim,
and of no interest in themselves, and which began to
interest only, when they were reflected in the mirror of
his mind' (SC, II, 192).
'Dim' or 'vague', in this case, is significant
because it defines the clarity with which Dorothea sees.
This word also points to the lack of any sensuous details
from the images pertaining to Dorothea's inward
perspective. Such perspective is bound to be incomplete
since it disregards externals. In Casaubon, Dorothea
believes, she can find an inward light by which she can
see. Anticipating her marriage to him she thrillingly
rejoices that she 'would be allowed to live continually
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in the light of a mind that she could reverence' (67),
for Casaubon can 'illuminate principle with the widest
knowledge' (44-5). Yet in spite of so much light,
Dorothea is unable to see anything specific. Her
exclamation, 'I should learn to see the truth by the same
light as great men have seen it by' (51) , is as abstract
as her other remarks concerning her need to rely on
someone else to help her 'see which opinions had the best
foundation'. Or later on, Greek and Latin, we are told,
represent for her the 'provinces of masculine knowledge'
a 'standing-ground from which all truth could be seen
more truly' (88).
Truth, 'seen more truly', knowledge, principles, are
all vague abstractions devoid of any meaning and
significance in spite of all the light Casaubon may shed
on them. Their meaninglessness and vagueness are
emphasized when Dorothea receives Casaubon's proposal and
she is seized by 'the rush of solemn emotions in which
thoughts became vague and images floated uncertainly'
(67). We are never told what kind of images she actually
sees because she is about to enter a 'visionary future'
where the physical and external world are disregarded.
But she is not unaware of the exclusion of the physical
world from her future life; in fact, she sees its absence
not as a deprivation but as a necessity. Objecting to
her uncle's remark that Casaubon is 'a little buried in
books', Dorothea proudly responds, '"when a man has great
studies and is writing a great work, he must of course
give up seeing much of the world"' (62). Her detachment
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from the outer world at this point is obvious during one
of her walks when 'she looked before her, not consciously
seeing, but absorbing into the intensity of her mood, the
solemn glory of the afternoon with its long swathes of
light between the far-off rows of limes, whose shadows
touched each other' (49). Overwhelmed by her exultation
in the world within, Dorothea internalizes even the
external world, thus reminding us again of Hamlet, who,
so Coleridge maintained, had 'thoughts, images, and fancy
... far more vivid than his perceptions, and his very
perceptions instantly passing thro' the medium of his
contemplations, and acquiring as they pass a form and
colour not naturally their own' (S_C, I, 37).
Thus engrossed in her inward perspective, Dorothea
is shocked to discover, through Celia, that she has
misread Sir James's intentions. Celia's indignant
reproach crystallizes Dorothea's problem: '"I thought it
right to tell you, because you went on as you always do,
never looking just where you are, and treading in the
wrong place. You always see what nobody else sees; it is
impossible to satisfy you; yet you never see what is
quite plain"' (59). Dorothea at this point is indeed
imaginative but her perspective is incomplete since it
lacks perception. Her response to Celia's comments
reveals the narrowness of her view. Like a tragic
heroine, she does not heed someone else's admonition, but
is instead exasperated with the 'intolerable narrowness
and the purblind conscience of the society around her'
(60). The visit to Lowick, on the other hand, is an
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example of Dorothea's perception being blurred by her
imagination. Unlike Celia, who is oppressed by the
'melancholy-looking' manor, Dorothea finds the house and
the grounds 'all that she could wish' (99). Perception
here is no doubt modified by anticipation. Since she
believes Casaubon to be an ideal spouse, she has expected
to enjoy everything he loves or admires. Furthermore,
her remark seems to illustrate one of the concepts we
have already examined, that our first reaction to a
perceptual event is emotional and subjective.
Her awareness of the suffocating qualities of the
interior world she has led herself into soon becomes
poignant during her stay in Rome, when the 'new real
future' replaces the imaginary, and for the first time
she feels 'with a stifling depression that the large
vistas and wide fresh air which she had dreamed of
finding in her husband's mind were replaced by ante-rooms
and winding passages which seemed to lead nowhither'
(227-28). From a social l^je 'which seemed nothing but a
labyrinth of petty courses, a walled-in maze of small
paths that led nowhither' (51), she discovers herself
suddenly transferred to 'winding passages which seemed to
lead nowhither'.
To escape from Casaubon's 'winding passages'"
Dorothea withdraws inward as if in an attempt to find
order within. Since her stay in Rome 'with life made a
new problem ... she had been becoming more and more
aware, with a certain terror, that her mind was
continually sliding into inward fits of anger and
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repulsion or else into forlorn weariness' (228). But her
abondonment to 'the depths of her emotion' is as
restrictive as her entanglement in Casaubon's ante-rooms,
because in her absorption with herself 'she was as blind
to his inward troubles as he to hers; she had not yet
learned those hidden conflicts in her husband which claim
our pity. She had not yet listened patiently to his
heart-beats, but only felt that her own was beating
violently' (232). Because she cannot see or hear
Casaubon's pain (his shock at finding his 'young bride'
transformed into a 'cruel outward accuser' (232)),
Dorothea assumes it does not exist, and here she displays
Tom's, the giant's, lack of imagination. Yet painfully
and gradually she comes to recognize the law of
bicentrality, to understand that Casaubon has 'an
equivalent centre of self, whence the lights and shadows
must always fall with a certain difference' (243). Her
internal turmoil partly explains her inability to
understand Rome. Here again Dorothea internalizes the
outward. 'The best galleries', 'the grandest ruins', and
'the most glorious churches' become transformed into an
'oppressive masquerade of ages, in which her own life too
seemed to become a masque with enigmatical costumes'
(224-25). Her experience is completely internalized;
there is no inner-outer interplay. Dorothea's hasty
sightseeing, often interrupted by her drives out to the
Campagna 'where she could feel alone with the earth and
sky' (225) demonstrates the impossibility of an aesthetic
experience when one is preoccupied with personal
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matters. Besides, Dorothea sees too much all at once:
'ruins and basilicas palaces and colossi.... all this
vast wreck of ambitious ideals, sensuous and spiritual'
(225). As a result, her imagination does not have an
opportunity to rest, to find, as Ruskin says, 'places to
lie down and stretch its limbs in; kindly vacancies,
beguiling it back into action, with pleasant and cautious
seguence of incident' (MP, III, 186).
Dorothea's bewilderment with art in Rome also stems
from her lack of knowledge as well as the conflict
between the pagan and the puritanical elements in her
nature, a collision which Naumanrfs portrait of Dorothea
accurately captures: 'an antique form animated by
Christian sentiment—a sort of Christian Antigone—
sensuous force controlled by spiritual passion' (221).
Dorothea's figure against a pedestal near the reclining
Ariadne, 'her large eyes fixed dreamily on a streak of
sunlight", is a transformation of her first portrait with
the diamonds, whose lustre is brought out by a gleam of
sunlight; simultaneously, this picture in Rome sets off a
series of other scenes when imagination overpowers
perception, when the internal dominates over the
external, and Dorothea looks without seeing. Her picture
further reveals the cyclical motion of Dorothea's
imagination. The movement, initiated by her suffering in
Rome, sets Dorothea apart from those characters who do
not see the present in the light of the past, cannot
3
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anticipate the future and are unable to gain a larger
perspective. Present, past, and future, all come
together in Dorothea's thoughts when Will and Naumann
find her oblivious to Ariadne and her surroundings: 'she
did not really see the streak of sunlight on the floor
... she was inwardly seeing the light of years to come in
her own home ... and feeling that the way in which they
might be filled with devotedness was not so clear to her
as it had been' (235). The movement from the past to the
future shows how by means of her imagination Dorothea
attempts to interpret her experience 'in the light of
4
past and future experiences'. Looking back at the past
('as it had been') initiates the widening of Dorothea's
perspective which has so far encompassed only present and
future expectations.
Disenchantment with her marriage forces her to see
the quixotic elements of her imagination in her past
encounters with Casaubon during the days of their
courtship, when she interpreted everything 'as
provisional and preliminary', and when 'Mr Casaubon had
... dwelt on some explanation or questionable detail of
which Dorothea did not see the bearing', she had imagined
that 'such imperfect coherence seemed due to the
brokenness of their intercource, and, supported by her
faith in their future' (228). Here Dorothea recognizes
the danger in completing the incomplete, in expecting the




But Dorothea's greatest attainment in Rome is her
full understanding of the meaning of knowledge, the goal
she has yearned for and believed she could reach with
Casaubon's help. To Casaubon's questions, '"Does this
interest you, Dorothea? Shall we stay a little longer?"'
Dorothea responds with another question, '"But do you
care about them?"', feeling that for Casaubon 'going or
staying were alike dreary' (229). Then she realizes that
Casaubon's mind is of the kind 'in which years full of
knowledge seem to have issued in a blank absence of
interest or sympathy' (229). The moment Dorothea comes
to perceive that knowledge can result in lack of feeling,
her goal becomes valueless, since 'knowledge passing into
feeling' (256) is what she seeks to experience.
Consequently, her assertion in Naumann's studio, '"I
would rather feel that painting is beautiful than have to
read it as an enigma"' (246), seems to be a reaction to
Calsubon's knowledge without feeling; furthermore, such an
idea is congruent with her belief that feeling is
prerequisite to seeing, or that feeling is indeed a way
of seeing. Explaining to Will her confused response to
Rome, Dorothea traces the problem of seeing without
feeling:
"I never could see any beauty in the
pictures which my uncle told me all
judges thought very fine. And I have
gone about with just the same
ignorance in Rome.... I am seeing so
much all at once, and not
understanding half of it.... It is
painful to be told that anything is
very fine and not be able to feel
that it is fine—something like being
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blind, while people talk of the sky"
(238).
Her comments bring to mind Gombrich's emphasis on the
role emotion plays in our enjoyment of art. Without an
individual's own projections, art works, as Gombrich
asserts, remain a 'meaningless armature'
In Rome Dorothea discovers that she can no longer
'expect with her former delightful confidence that she
should see any wide opening where she followed him
[Casaubon]' (229), and her presentiment about her future
is actualized upon her return to Lowick. From this point
on, her house is only a reflection of her inner feelings,
and her inward perspective is depicted in conspicuously
spatial terms. Lowick which had 'no oppression for her'
upon her first visit before getting married, now becomes
suffocatingly restricting, and even the outer landscape
contributes to Dorothea's sense of imprisonment, as she
sadly ruminates: 'the duties of her married life,
contemplated as so great beforehand, seemed to be
shrinking with the furniture and the white vapour-walled
landscape. The clear heights where she expected to walk
in full communion had become difficult to see even in her
imagination' (307). Systole without diastole takes over
as her surroundings become an extension of her inward
anxiety, as she cuts herself off from the past, not just
the imagined future: 'each remembered thing ... was
disenchanted, was deadened as an unlit transparency'
(308).
5
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Her physical and moral isolation (her shrinking) is
further emphasized by Featherstone's funeral during which
Dorothea, along with the others, moves to the window to
watch. But the procession remains apart from her own
consciousness as she watches everything with the
'interest of a monk on his holiday tour'; the funeral
becomes a part of the 'dream-like association of
something alien and ill-understood', which 'with the
deepest secrets of her experience seemed to mirror that
sense of loneliness which was due to the very ardour of
Dorothea's nature' (360). Furthermore, the event, as the
narrator asserts, eventually becomes only part of the
memory of a painful experience 'just as the vision of St
Peter's at Rome was inwoven with moods of despondency',
since 'scenes which make vital changes in our neighbours'
lot are but the background of our own, yet ... they
become associated for us with the epochs of our own
history' (360). Here, Dorothea is associated with the
images of egotism—the mirror and the web ('inwoven').
Her self-pity and self-absorption are only further
aspects of egotism. Though the window is open, Dorothea
remains physically and mentally within—a detached
spectator. Someone else's death is only the background
of her own misery.
But Dorothea tries to reject her melancholy by
concentrating on improving Ladislaw's future, and
convincing her husband to change his will and to allot
some of his property to him. Thoughtfulness for someone
else temporarily dispels the darkness of her mood and is
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welcomed like a revelation: 'the vision of all this as
what ought to be done seemed to Dorothea like a sudden
letting in of daylight, waking her from her previous
stupidity and incurious self-absorbed ignorance about her
husband's relation to others' (407-08). Dorothea's
absorption with Will's future serves as an occasion for
the full definition of her blindness as unorthodox
seeing, imaginative daring: 'She was blind, you see, to
many things obvious to others... yet her blindness to
whatever did not lie in her own pure purpose carried her
safely by the side of precipices where vision would have
been perilous with fear' (408). Carried away by her own
ardour, she does not see Casaubon's outrage, forcing her
into a worse predicament. After having a glimpse of
light, the darkness of her interior imprisonment is even
more unbearable (410).
But Dorothea's imaginative seeing does become finer
during this oppressive stage of her life. Casaubon's
illness produces a step forward in the direction of full
integration. After Casaubon's interview with Lydgate,
Dorothea reaches out for her husband to alleviate his
pain, but he rigidly rejects her and she seeks refuge in
her boudoir, thus, once again, physically and spiritually
isolating herself. Again her isolation takes place by a
window, underlining Dorothea's lack of perception of the
world without, or her internalizing of externals at times
of crisis: 'She threw herself on a chair, not heeding
that she was in the dazzling sun-rays: if there were
discomfort in that, how could she tell that it was not
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part of her inward misery?' (463). Her thinking on this
occasion, however, unlike that in previous similar
scenes, involves a series of concrete auditory and visual
images which convey how true seeing takes place within.
The movement from the self to the other is poignantly
made as Dorothea acknowledges the death of her past
expectations and tries to adjust to the disillusioned
present: 'Like one who has lost his way and is weary, she
sat and saw as in one glance all the paths of her young
hope which she should never find again. And just as
clearly in the miserable light she saw her own and her
husband's solitude—how they walked apart so that she was
obliged to survey him' (463). Once again Dorothea is
able to understand an event in the light of her past and
future experiences. Memory of her past liberates her
from her preoccupation with her present situation.
Simultaneously, the stream of her thoughts seems to prove
that 'memory and all the life of images and words which
goes with it, is one with the age-old acquisition of the
distance senses, and with that development of
constructive imagination ... wherein at length we find
the most complete release from the narrowness of
presented time and place'.6 Indeed the concrete image of
her husband and the imaginative projection into his
unfortunate lot enable Dorothea for the first time to
break her spiritual isolation by identifying with his
misery, by replacing self-absorption with commiseration:
6Bartlett, p. 314.
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'That thought with which Dorothea had gone out to meet
her husband—her conviction that he had been asking about
the possible arrest of all his work, and that the answer
must have wrung his heart, could not be long without
rising beside the image of him, like a shadowy monitor
looking at her anger with sad remonstrance' (464). The
opening of her door signals the movement away from
isolation, depicts the idea incarnate, shows how
imaginative thinking has to be accompanied by, or
embodied in, action—the internal transfigured into the
external: 'She put her hand into her husband's, and they
went along the broad corridor together' (465).
Even after this momentous occasion, Dorothea is
however still confined by the interior, as her conflicts
with her husband continue, culminating in his request for
her promise to abide by his will after his death. But
here the cyclical movement of Dorothea's imagination is
made finer and wider as it binds together not only her
own present and future but merges Casaubon's past,
present, and future: 'Dorothea's pity turned from her
own future to her husband's past—nay, to his-present
hard struggle with a lot which had grown out of that
past: the lonely labour ... the goal receding ... and now
at last the sword visibly trembling above him' (520).
Only after his death does the movement towards the
exterior commence, marking in spatial terms Dorothea's
deliverance and approaching integration. When she
returns to Lowick, after Casaubon's death, the exterior
and the interior no longer remain two distinct entities,
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for 'the shutters were all opened at Lowick Manor, and
the morning gazed calmly into the library ... and the
evening laden with roses entered silently into the blue-
green boudoir where Dorothea chose oftenest to sit'
(582). Since such a movement coincides with Will's
arrival at Lowick, we are inclined to think that he is
part of the reason for its occurrence. As soon as Will
is taken to a room to wait for Dorothea, we are told that
'the window was open; and a winged visitor, buzzing in
and out now and then without minding the furniture, made
the room look less formal and uninhabited' (585). Will,
in fact, has been long associated by Dorothea with the
exterior. During his first visit to Dorothea in Rome,
for instance, she sees him in terms of the outdoors and
she is not in the least tempted to look 'in his soul':
'the first impression on seeing Will was one of sunny
brightness' (241). And while still with Casaubon, 'the
mere chance of seeing Will occasionally was like a
lunette opened in the wall of her prison, giving her a
glimpse of the sunny air' (396).
But it is not only Laaislaw who becomes part of her
outward perspective. Her plans, after Casaubon's death,
involve the outdoors—to construct '"a little colony,
where everybody should work, and all the work should be
done well"' (594). While she is looking forward to her
interview with Lydgate, during which she intends to
vindicate his innocence, she is immersed in thoughts
which flow outward; even 'in her luxurious home,
wandering under the boughs of her own great trees, her
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thought was going out over the lot of others' (817). As
she is convincing herself, later on, that Will is not
involved with Rosamond, we discover that 'Dorothea's
nature was of that kind: her own passionate faults lay
along the easily-counted open channels of her ardent
character' (829). When she envisions her future, before
her visit to Rosamond, she sees herself outdoors, no
longer within the confining walls of a house: 'and in the
long valley of her life, which looked so flat and empty
of way-marks, guidance would come as she walked along the
road, and saw her fellow-passengers by the way' (830).
In moments of crisis, however, Dorothea still
resorts to her inward perspective; her visit to Rosamond
demonstrates this tendency. When she enters Rosamond's
house, 'Dorothea had less of outward vision than usual
this morning, being filled with images of things as they
had been and were going to be'. Under the influence of
the 'inward vision', Dorothea misinterprets Will's
presence there, seeing it as the confirmation of a
presentiment, a 'certainty which filled all outlines'
(832). Dorothea's impression is an apt illustration of
.Coleridge's belief in the role anticipation plays in
perception: 'a likeness in part tends to become a
likeness of the whole'(CCW, Coburn, IV, 118). And the
comment 'a certainty which filled up all outlines'
demonstrates Eliot's knowledge that during perception
'the text of the external world is not so much copied as
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composed'. Dorothea's blindness in interpreting the
'signs' of the scene she has witnessed is again revealed
by Celia, who remarks: '"Dodo, how very bright your eyes
are!... And you don't see anything you look at, Arthur
or anything"' (833). Celia's comments echo her remarks
upon her disclosure of Sir James's attachment to
Dorothea, and they indicate that Dorothea is deceived
about Will as she was about Sir James.
The shock of the encounter triggers a clamorous
collision in Dorothea, which culminates in a holistic
perspective. Indeed Dorothea's introspection in Chapter
LXXX contains the whole book in a terse version, as all
the major images reach their full fruition. In this
chapter the germinal image acquires its 'spatial
saturation' and aesthetic integration is achieved through
the reconciliation of opposites. At the same time, this
aesthetic integration represents Dorotheas psychological
integration, the resolution of conflicts into a
harmonious whole. Dorothea's struggle towards
integration acquires additional significance through
allusions to King Solomon, who dreams of God asking him
what he would like the Lord to give him before his famous
judgement on the dispute about the child. To God's
question Solomon responds: '"Give ... thy servant an
understanding heart to judge thy people, that I may
discern between good and bad', and the Lord endows him
with 'understanding to discern judgment' and a 'wise and
^Merleau-Ponty, p. 9.
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understanding heart'. Solomon wakes and realizes it was
g
a dream and offers 'peace offerings' to God.
Dorothea's collision is represented through 'two
images—two living forms that tore her heart in two' and
the intensity of the conflict is embodied by one of the
most violent images in George Eliot's fiction—Solomon's
order carried out: 'as if it had been the heart of a
mother who seems to see her child divided by the sword,
and presses one bleeding half to her breast while her
gaze goes forth in agony towards the half which is
carried away by the lying woman that has never known the
mother's pang' (844). The two images are antithetical
and are drawn with a series of contrasts which have
already been explored throughout the book. We see light
and darkness; freedom and restraint; outer and inner,
'the spirit of morning visiting the dim vault'; shrinking
and expanding; systole and diastole, as she reaches out
for Will and withdraws when he is a 'parting vision', or
as 'the fire of Dorothea's anger was not easily spent,
and it flamed out in fitful returns of spurning reproach'
(845). Imagination indeed 'diffuses, dissipates, in
order to recreate ... yet still at all events it
struggles to idealize and to unify' (BL, I, 202). Thus
the hindrance becomes liberation as Dorothea wakes, and
the whole experience seems like a dream (like Solomon's
dream), transfigured into a revelation: 'she felt as if
her soul had been liberated from its terrible conflict;
8I, Kings 3, 5-28.
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she was no longer wrestling with her grief, but could sit
down with it as a lasting companion and make it a sharer
in her thoughts' (845).
At this moment Dorothea ceases to see the self as
the whole or the centre of the web, but as a part of the
whole or merely a filament of the web: 'The dominant
spirit of justice within her' enables her to break away
from 'the narrow cell of her calamity' and the image of
Lydgate's ordeal moves her forward to expansion: 'All
the active thought with which she had before been
representing to herself the trials of Lydgate's lot ...
all this vivid sympathetic experience returned to her now
as a power: it asserted itself as acquired knowledge
asserts itself and will not let us see as we saw in the
day of our ignorance' (846). Through true seeing,
'representing to herself' someone else's troubles,
Dorothea feels the other's pain, understands and acts; by
means of her imagination she emerges triumphant over her
self-pity and jealousy. And as she refuses to indulge in
grief, seeking, instead, an answer to the question, 'How
should I act now, this very day if I could clutch my own
pain, and compel it to silence, and think of those
three', Dorothea reaches the greatest vision a noble
human being could possibly achieve. Her imagination and
perception are no longer discordant, but for the first
time we feel them serenely harmonious, as she breaks the
dichotomy between the inward and outward perspectives by
allowing the morning light to flood the dark room, thus
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making possible the complete fusion of the exterior and
the interior:
she opened her curtains, and looked
out towards the bit of road that lay
in view, with fields beyond, outside
the entrance-gates. On the road
there was a man with a bundle on his
back and a woman carrying her baby;
in the field she could see figures
moving—perhaps the shepherd with his
dog. Far off in the bending sky was
the pearly light; and she felt the
largeness of the world and the
manifold wakings of men to labour and
endurance. She was part of that
involuntary, palpitating life, and
could neither look out on it from her
luxurious shelter as a mere
spectator, nor hide her eyes in
selfish complaining (846) .
The ordinary, not something unique, becomes the
focus of her vision. She must have certainly seen the
gates and the fields beyond on innumerable occasions.
But the emphasis here is on an unorthodox perspective,
'the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and
familiar objects' (BL, II, 12); and no doubt the effect
of such a perspective is 'the constant accompaniment of
mental, no less, than of bodily, convalescence' (BL, I,
60). By looking at the world from a new perspective, she
creates a world; infuses life into it; and she is
affected by her creation—experiencing 'mental no less
bodily convalescence'. And here we can see the
reconciling power of the imagination in its fullest
extent. The external is made internal, 'the internal
external ... nature thought, and thought nature' (BL, II,
258). Dorothea's creative vision involves 'the power of
humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions
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of man into every thing which is the object of his
contemplation' (BL, II, 253).
The process becomes especially clear when we see how
smoothly the image and the idea are reconciled. By
looking at the external, the image of 'a man with a
bundle on his back and a woman carrying her baby' from a
new perspective ('she was part of that involuntary,
palpitating life'), she is at once involved in a creative
act. Her act inspires the idea of helping Lydgate and
Rosamond. This is then how the image is transformed into
idea. But the idea has to become externalized again, to
be embodied in a meaningful action. And here the
comparison between Hamlet and Dorothea certainly ends.
But like Shakespeare, Eliot wishes 'to impress upon us
the truth, that action is the chief end of existence—
that no faculties of intellect, however brilliant, can be
considered valuable, or indeed otherwise than as
misfortunes, if they withdraw us from or render us
repugnant to action, and lead us to think and think of
doing until the time has elapsed when we can do anything
effectually' (SC, II, 197). Indeed Coleridge's remarks
on Hamlet could very well apply to Middlemarch.
Dorothea's generous act makes the idea incarnate.
The transformation of the idea into the image or the
image into the idea has to be incessant, otherwise there
can be no growth, no progress. Dorothea's act, for
instance, does not affect Rosamond and the image dies
there, without triggering an idea. Rosamond in a way
represents the unresponsive reader who is not affected by
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the novel. Unless the novel, which is external, is
internalized by the reader, by becoming meaningful in his
own life, it remains coldly external, the author's
feeling has not touched the reader's. This is why the
image of the window is so powerfully effective. By
looking from Dorothea's perspective, the frame disappers,
the scene moves over the edges of the canvas on every
side. From the near ('the entrance-gates'), to the
distant ('the bending sky'), the scene moves on till it
touches the reader's own life. The charm of the picture
is not in its action but in its mood, calm and gentle and
soothing and regenerating. Feeling, not action, and, it
is hoped, the very feeling the author experienced while
composing the novel, will touch the reader.
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CHAPTER 5
CLOSING OUR EYES TO SEE
The carriage, leaving the walls of
Rome behind, rolled through narrow
lanes where the wild honeysuckle had
begun to tangle itself in the hedges,
or waited for her in quiet places
where the fields lay near, while she
strolled further and further over the
flower-freckled turf, or sat on a
stone that had once had a use and
gazed through the veil of her
personal sadness at the splendid
sadness of the scene—at the dense,
warm light, the far gradations and
soft confusions of colour, the
motionless shepherds in lonely
attitudes, the hills where the cloud-
shadows had the lightness of a blush
(II, 328-29).
Systole and diastole, the self and the world, inward and
outward—such is the palpitating rhythm of this scene,
which seems but a transformation of the epiphany Dorothea
reaches after the night of her meditative vigil.
Pathetic fallacy prevails here also as Isabel
externalizes her sadness and mantles the scene in it,
creating a painting which gradually and effectively
removes the impenetrable plane of a canvas. As her eyes
move from 'the gradations and soft confusions of light'
to the 'motionless shepherds in lonely attitudes', the
hills, and the cloud-shadows, the vistas become more and
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more widened, endless till her eyes meet our eyes, till
her sorrow;;: touches our lives.
Unlike the scene which Dorothea sees as she draws
the curtains, the picture here is not framed by a window;
but at this point of the novel, after so many important
images have been framed by windows or doorways, we have
already been trained fairly well to frame pictures on our
own. What is important here, however, is that Isabel's
painting includes almost the same elements Dorothea's
has: fields, the sky beyond, the light, the shepherds.
Only the picture's 'caption' seems to change, becoming
more indirect, compelling the reader to do more work.
Instead of 'she was part of that involuntary, palpitating
life, and could neither look out on it from her luxurious
shelter as a mere spectator, nor hide her eyes in selfish
complaining', the continuity between the self and the
world is evoked more concisely, and the difference
between the scene in Middlemarch and that in The Portrait
of a Lady is almost the difference between a realistic
and an impressionistic painting: 'gazed through the veil
of her personal sadness at the splendid sadness of the
scene'. And whereas the tone in Middlemarch seems
somewhat didactic, in The Portrait we notice the greater
moral indirection.
But there is another important difference between
the two scenes. Unlike Dorothea, Isabel is not inspired
by the image; that is, the image is not transformed into
idea and eventually into action. The scene lacks the
smooth continuity between image and idea present in
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Dorothea's epiphany. Image and idea here stand apart;
they are not yet reconciled. The internal, Isabel's
'personal sadness' becomes external, 'the splendid
sadness of the scene', but it is not again internalized.
The lack of continuity between image and idea depicts
Isabel's moral development at this point in her life.
This scene, nevertheless, is only one of many others
illustrating how beautifully images incubate in the
artist's mind and flower when the opportunity arises. In
fact, The Portrait of a Lady could be described as an
artist's creative criticism of Middlemarch. James's
objections to Middlemarch, in his critical essay in
Galaxy (1873), could very well be regarded as his
imagination's attempts to 'dissolve, diffuse, dissipate,
in order to recreate'. With this in mind, we can see how
The Portrait of a Lady completes, in James's view, what
Middlemarch leaves incomplete.
If we disregard Dorothea, just for a moment, we
could see how James describes very definitely, very
succinctly his germ of Isabel Archer in his essay on
Middlemarch: 'An ardent young girl was to have been the
central figure, a young girl framed for a larger moral
life than circumstance often affords yearning for a
motive for sustained spiritual effort and only wasting
her ardor and soiling her wings against the meanness of
opportunity'."1" Here we have the outline of Isabel's most
"*"The Galaxy, XV, no. 3 (March 1873), 424-428.
Further references are given after quotations in the
text.
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distinct characteristics: her ardour, her passion for a
meaningful life guided by knowledge, truth and beauty are
singular promises for 'sailing' and soaring beyond the
vulgar, petty circumstances hampering common lives. Yet,
like a tragic heroine, she is punished for her wish—she
is 'ground in the mill of the conventional' (II, 415).
In The Portrait James seems to have rescued Dorothea
whom he found 'too superb a heroine to be wasted';
furthermore, he seems to have met his own objection,
namely, that 'she plays a narrower part than the
imagination of the reader demands', and that 'she is of
more consequence than the action of which she is the
nominal centre' (426). Years later in his preface to The
Portrait of a Lady, he took pains to assure the reader
that Isabel was the actual, not the 'nominal centre'and
in so doing he set forth some of the most important
concepts of organic unity. Like Coleridge, who
emphasized that Shakespeare's plots evolved from the main
characters and that the protagonists only served as
diffusive and receptive centres in his plays, James
proudly declared that the germ of his idea for The
Portrait was not a plot, 'nefarious name', but a young
woman whose consciousness was to be the centre of his
subject. But unlike Coleridge, who considered the
mechanical and the organic as antithetical, James
established their continuity by identifying Isabel with
the 'large building' of the novel.
Dorothea was not the only character who seems to
have inspired James. His description of Casaubon in the
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same essay could also serve as an accurate portrayal of
Osmond—'hollow pretentiousness and mouldy egotism'.
Indeed, Casaubon's portrait seems to be the rough drawing
of Osmond's : 'The whole portait of Mr Casaubon has an
admirably sustained greyness of tone in which the shadows
are never carried to the vulgar black of coarser artists.
Every stroke contributes to the unwholesome, hopelessly
sinister expression' (427-28). In fact, Osmond seems to
be a combination of Casaubon and Ladislaw, or rather,
more precisely, the embodiment of James's primary
objection to Ladislaw: 'the impression once given that he
is a dilettante is never properly removed, and there is
slender poetic justice in Dorothea's marrying a
dilettante (426). But is there poetic justice in
Isabel's marrying a dilettante? Dorothea's opposite,
Rosamond, also seems to be transformed into Isabel's
opposite, Madame Merle. Although he enjoyed the
portrayal of Rosamond, James objected to Eliot's
insistence on 'her instincts of coquetry', which he
called 'a discordant note' (427). In his portrayal of
Madame Merle James has" removed any coquetry, but like
Eliot, he has attempted, as it were, to represent 'the
fatality of British decorum' (427).
My main emphasis here is not to compare and contrast
the two masterpieces, but rather to focus on some images
which made such a strong impression on a great artist's
mind that they were never forgotten, never lost but were
recreated. The 'painful' fireside scenes between Lydgate
and Rosamond, for instance, were, according to James,
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'the most perfectly successful passages in the book....
There is nothing more powerfully real than these scenes
in all English fiction, and nothing certainly more
intelligent' (427). His own masterpiece seems to revolve
around fireside scenes. Isabel's meditative vigil, for
example, which he calls a 'landmark' in his preface,
takes place by her dying fire, and Mr Touchett's final
interview with his son is represented in his room
'lighted only by the flickering fire'. As in Middlemarch
so in The Portrait of a Lady the interplay of light with
darkness is the primary rhythm in the novel.
Early in his novel in his portayal of Isabel, James
favours the romantic terms Eliot used in her description
of Dorothea, and he, like Eliot, outlines the qualities
of an imaginative nature, underlining the fact that his
novel is more than anything else a study of the
imagination. Already in the 'Prelude' we become
acquainted with Dorothea's ardent, St Theresa-like
nature, which 'fed from within, soared after some
illimitable satisfaction'. Isabel is also possessed by a
'flame-like spirit' (69), which is often 'soaring' or
'sailing' (II, 70), longing for 'free expansion'
'irresistible action', preferably in the form of heroic
events (6 8-9) .
The comparisons between the two heroines are
certainly endless, but to concentrate on only the points
the two novels share would be to lose sight of each
novel's uniqueness and individuality. It is very
probable that Dorothea served as James's model, as it has
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already been examined by other critics, but who can
possibly ascertain the source, when an artist's 'wind¬
blown germs ... come from every quarter of heaven ...
they are there at any turn of the road. They are the
breath of life ... floated into our minds by the current
of life' (viii). The belief, expressed in organic terms,
echoes Coleridge's definition of genius in Biographia
Literaria, which included the reciprocation between the
external and the internal, an interplay which has been
the core of organicism:
now so to place these images,
totalized, and fitted to the limits
of the human mind, as to elicit from,
and to superinduce upon, the forms
themselves the moral reflexions to
which they approximate, to make the
external internal, the internal
external, the make nature thought,
and thought nature,—this is the
mystery of genius in the Fine Arts
(BL, II, 258).
Isabel's very first picture in the novel displays
the continuity betwen the internal and the external as
she stands silently, unnoticed by Ralph, framed by 'the
ample doorway' (16); she is neither inside nor outside as
yet. This image is preceded by the exterior-interior
dialectic in .the description of Gardencourt, a house
which itself displays human characteristics, since it has
a 'magisterial physiognomy' and has been 'bruised' and
'defaced' in wars (5, 3). Internal becomes external and
the demarcation line between the indoors and outdoors is
very hazy, when we look at 'the wide carpet of turf that
covered the level hill-top' and 'seemed but an extension
of a luxurious interior' or at 'the great still oaks and
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beeches' which 'flung down a shade as dense as that of
velvet curtains' (3-4). As the interior is lengthened
out to meet the exterior, or the exterior takes on
qualities of the interior, we become aware of the dynamic
qualities of the images. Neither the lawn nor the 'great
still oaks' remain static, but establish a rhythm to
which Isabel is alive when she first enters the scene.
Her perspective is constantly enlarged as her eyes move
from the lawn to the 'reedy, silvery Thames', back to the
'beautiful old house' and 'while engaged in this survey
she had made room in it for her companions' (20-21). Her
'clear perception' is dominated by her imagination, for
immediately she finds the house 'enchanting' and, when
she meets Lord Warburton, she spontaneously compares her
situation to a fictional one, "'Oh, I hoped there would
be a lord; it's just like a novel!"' And then, '"Oh, you
adorable creature!" she suddenly cried, stooping down and
picking up the small dog again' (18). From Lord
Warburton to Bunchie, the transition from imagination to
perception is made as effortlessly as the mingling of the
indoors with the outdoors; and, in the meantime, we
become aware of the author's spellbinding 'power of so
carrying on the eye of the reader as to make him almost
lose consciousness of words—to make him see everything—
and this without exciting any painful or laborious
attention' (SC, I, 214). Furthermore, the idea seems to
become, in Eliot's terms, 'thoroughly incarnate', as
Warburton, shortly after Isabel's entrance, tells Ralph,
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'You wished a while ago to see my idea of an interesting
woman. There it is!"' (24).
Perception is constantly modified by imagination
especially when Isabel describes her impressions of
Gardencourt. After seeing the pictures in the gallery,
she asks Ralph whether there is a ghost: '"You do see
them then? You ought to, in this romantic old house"'.
Ralph's response to Isabel's description sounds much like
Will's assertion that true seeing takes place within:
'"It's not a romantic old house.... It's a dismally
prosaic one; there's no romance here but what you may
have brought with you"' (62).
By means of her imagination, Isabel sees Gardencourt
in an unorthodox way, not from Ralph's 'prosaic'
perspective. To her, Gardencourt 'seemed a picture made
real'; and her imagination is linked to her taste in a
Coleridgean sort of way: 'no refinement of the agreeable
was lost upon Isabel; the rich perfection of Gardencourt
at once revealed a world and gratified a need'. Here
again diastole and systole take over and the interplay
between the interior and the exterior continues;
simultaneously, we see the qualities we should be looking
for if we are to enjoy any picture—if, that is, we want
to know what a picture made real means. The rhythm again
in this description is a transformation of the initial
movement—an interplay of the 'large, low rooms, with
brown ceilings' with 'the deep greenness outside, that
seemed always peeping in' (73). In and out, systole and
diastole, seem to be the primary elements of an
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imaginative view which is further amplified by Isabel's
stay in her house at Albany, chronologically prior to her
visit to Gardencourt.
Isabel's imaginative view of the house at Albany is
superbly contrasted with her aunt's 'prosaic'
perspective. To Ralph's inquiries about his as yet
unknown cousin, Mrs Touchett responds, '"I found her in
an old house at Albany, sitting in a dreary room on a
rainy day, reading a heavy book and boring herself to
death. She didn't know she was bored"' (56). Not
knowing that one is bored, in turn, is another quality of
an imaginative being, and is here contrasted implicitly
with Warburton's boredom in the opening scene in the
book. Though Mrs Touchett herself lacks imagination, she
recognizes the fertilizing quality of Isabel's
imagination; when she relates to Ralph her plan to show
Europe to her niece, Ralph objects, '"That sounds rather
dry—even allowing her the choice of two of the
countries"'. '"If it's dry"', Mrs Touchett responds,
'you can leave Isabel alone to water iti She is as good
as summer rain, any day"' (55).
Undoubtedly, Isabel's house at Albany reveals the
primary qualities of her imagination and meets James's
description of the germ of the novel in the preface to
The Portrait of a Lady; 'It came to be a square and
spacious house—or has at least seemed so to me in this
going over it again; but, such as it is, it had to be put
up round my young woman while she stood there in perfect
isolation' (xii). The Albany house is both spacious and
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square, described as 'a large, square, double house'
(27), and it qualifies as the germ, since Isabel in her
office is cerainly in 'perfect isolation'. Her office in
this house is a room considered by others as 'a chamber
of disgrace for old pieces whose infirmities were not
always apparent (so that the disgrace seemed unmerited
and rendered them victims of injustice)'. In this room,
however, Isabel, like Dorothea in her blue boudoir, does
not feel alienated since she had 'established relations
almost human' with the old furniture, and 'she had
confided a hundred childish sorrows' to an old sofa (30).
Her imagination then is 'essentially vital, even as all
objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead' (BL,
I, 202) .
Imagination is further linked to the curiosity for
knowledge and the desire for independence and liberty.
Isabel's constant visits to the house library and her
climbing on chairs to reach books in high shelves remind
us of Lydgate's similar pursuit. Her refusal to attend
school in the Dutch House across the street also
establishes her independence and desire for freedom,
simultaneously fusing liberty with exclusion, a theme to
be developed later on in the novel: 'When the windows of
the Dutch house were open, she used to hear the hum of
childish voices repeating the multiplication-table--an
incident in which the elation of liberty and the pain of
exclusion were indistinguishably mingled' (29).
Isabel prefers isolation and independence, since she
seems to recognize them as the conditions which inspire
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the imagination. But her office, and the way it is
structured, encourages the flights of her imagination at
the expense of her perception. The actual entry to her
office is the second door of the house which had been
condemned and was bolted; Isabel knows that this door
opened to the street:
if the sidelights had not been filled
with green paper she might have
looked out upon the little brown
stoop and the well-known brick
pavement. But she had no wish to
look out, for this would have
interfered with her theory that there
was a strange, unseen place on the
other side—a place which became to
the child's imagination, according to
its different moods, a region of
delight or of terror' (30).
Perception and imagination come in conflict here and
are manifested in physical terms in Isabel's refusal to
look outside by opening the door or removing the geen
sidelights: 'she had never assured herself that the
vulgar street lay beyond' (31). When her aunt Lydia
finds her in her office, 'a crude, cold rain fell
heavily' but Isabel ignores the outdoors, for she 'gave
as little heed as possible to cosmic treacheries' (31).
Isabel's imagination flourishes at the expense of her
perception and the primary conflict in her character
resembles that of Dorothea's . The polarity between the
internal and the external, perception and imagination
occurs in a later passage depicting even more precisely
the collision within Isabel's character, 'the fundamental
contrast', which George Eliot considered to be embodied
by the germ of an organic work: 'Her imagination was by
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habit ridiculously active; when the door was not open it
jumped out of the window. She was not accustomed indeed
to keep it behind bolts; and at important moments, when
she would have been thankful to make use of her judgement
alone, she paid the penalty of having given undue
encouragement to the faculty of seeing without judging'
(42). This image is apparently significant because it
develops the germ more fully and exposes an interplay
between the exterior and the interior even in terms of
Isabel's imagination. Doors and windows become
interwoven with the imagination, and perception is
defined more precisely as judgement. At the same time,
imagination is identified with the outdoors, and
judgement with the indoors. Since, as we have seen, a
creative act, according to Coleridge, as well as James
and Eliot, is possible only through a fusion of
imagination and will or judgement, Isabel, at this point,
seems to be unable to view life from a creative
perspective. Imagination in The Portrait does partake of
the qualities of the same power in Middlemarch, does
involve a projection of the self into others, but the
emphasis is different. James seems to be intent on
cultivating in the reader a creative perspective on life.
His means of achieving this are multifarious. Isabel's
journey, like Dorothea's, leads to reconciliation of
imagination and perception (or judgement). If this
reconciliation is prerequisite to a creative act, then
anyone can lead a creative life by adopting such a
perspective. At the same time, Isabel's life proves the
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fusion of the aesthetic and the moral, and illustrates
how morality and aesthetics meet. Contrasted with
Isabel's aesthetic, moral, and psychological integration,
is Osmond's aesthetic view of life which comes into
conflict with morality. Unless art touches life, it is
as meaningless as the treasures of a museum which are
kept away from any spectators.
Whereas Isabel in the doorway shows the physical
proximity of the exterior and the interior, the apparent
continuity between the house and the garden, the images
in her office illustrate the polarity between the indoors
and the outdoors. This image displays the fundamental
characteristics of the germ, which Coleridge and George
Eliot described: it is at the beginning of a work and
reveals an opposition within the main character's
personality. And since the germ embodies opposites, the
novel naturally grows through opposites, whether these
are characters, events, or images.
But why windows? why doorways? One cannot leave
either Middlemarch or The Portrait without a vivid memory
of either Dorothea at a window or Isabel at a door. Both
windows and doors seem to serve numerous marvelous
functions. To begin with, the internal/external
interplay is smoothly achieved through them. Besides, we
can identify with a character better if we are spectators
of an event, watching, like a character, from a window.
As the character becomes the beholder of events, he is
instantly identified with the reader, who is also a
beholder of events taking place in the novel. A doorway
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also becomes a beautiful frame for the character standing
under it, as in the case of Isabel's first appearance.
But most importantly doors and windows make the
image three-dimensional, add the depth dimension,
cultivate our imagination's penetrative ability.
Throughout this novel, as well as in his other novels,
James takes pains to show that image is picture and
picture is three-dimensional. On numerous occasions,
James associates directly doors and windows with the
depth dimension. In his preface to Princess Casamassima,
for instance, opening a door means entering
imaginatively: 'to haunt the great city and by habit to
penetrate it imaginatively in as many places as possible-
-that was to be informed, that was to pull wires, that
was to open doors' (AN, 77). The penetrative quality of
the imagination, as we have seen, is also connected to
its projective power, the projection into something or
into someone else. Besides, 'the novelist is a
particular window' whose work fails when 'the showing and
giving simply don't come off--the reader never touches
the subject and the subject never touches the reader; the
window is no window at all—but only childish finta'
(HJL, 1, 165) .
Hence the inner-outer interplay. Systole and
diastole is the key rhythm to viewing the image? systole
allows us to be locked within the frame, diastole enables
us to move out. Once we ask what it is like to be there,
we activate our imaginations to push the frame outward
till the picture touches our lives; once we ask what is
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behind the doorway, and then behind, and again, we keep
on extending the spatial and the temporal dimensions of
the image till it touches our lives--'hinged doors
opening straight upon life' (x). We can see then one of
the most important differences between perception and
imagination. While they both are synthetic and both
involve systole and diastole, imagination is more
diastolic than systolic. The systole-diastole rhythm—
what Lydgate defines as 'the expanding and shrinking
between the whole human horizon and the horizon of an
object glass'—is the pervading rhythm in The Portrait.
Other manifestations of the same rhythm are soaring and
sinking, height and depth, in and out.
James simplifies at a stroke the debate over images
vs pictures, by such phrases as 'her uncle's house seemed
a picture made real', or 'the peculiarly English picture
I have attempted to sketch' (2), or Isabel in 'the ample
doorway'. He would very probably have agreed with
Bachelard that images are not 'mere metaphors' (PS,
xxxv), but are, rather, pictures that can be projected
and viewed. Describing Isabel's memories of her travels
in Europe, the narrator speaks about images and pictures
interchangeably: 'These pictures would have been both
landscapes and figure-pieces; the latter, however, would
have been the more numerous. With several of the images
that might have been projected on such a field we are
already acquainted' (II, 32).
Again referring to memories, James gives us
guidelines for the composition of pictures. Since
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ultimately the images of a book move from imagination to
memory, we can understand the emphasis on images of
memory. Here, for example, Isabel is reminiscing about
Ralph's warning against Osmond: 'It lived before her
again—it never had time to die—that morning in the
garden at Florence when he had warned her against Osmond.
She had only to close her eyes to see the place, to hear
his voice, to feel the warm, sweet air. How could he
have known?' (II, 203-4). The beginning of the passage
seems to be an exquisite example of Bachelard's assertion
that images should be lived directly—'it lived before
her again'; simultai^j^ously, it exhibits the svnesthetic
quality of the image and its multidimensional make-up,
involving space, time, sounds, temperature, sensations;
furthermore, the scene reveals the significance of
silence—it is the key to composition. Passiveness here
seems, in Coleridge's words, to 'attain the dignity of
worthy activity'.
Besides, the emphasis on the novel-within-the novel
is also here subtly explained—it is an added dimension
like the windows and the doorways, a way to effect the
fusion of the fictional with the real world. If Isabel
herself is reading a novel, she can give us guidelines
for reading one. We often need to stop, and close our
eyes, and see the place, and hear her voice, and feel the
sweet air. And if we see, and feel, we can understand—
'How could he have known?' More precisely, Isabel's
images seem to illustrate Iser's distinction between
perceiving and imaging, or rather the quality imaging has
256
but perceiving lacks: 'Unlike perceiving, which requires
the presence of objects, imaging depends upon their
absence and brings to life aspects which could not have
2
emerged through direct perception of the objects'.
In his portrayal of his main characters, James, like
Eliot, seeems to follow the techniques of Natural
Idealism, a theory congruent with organicism and its
emphasis on opposites. Indeed, inferior figures
highlight superior ones. Isabel's portrait stands out in
relief from the others. As Dorothea's character is
delineated by her interactions with her opposites,
Rosamond and Celia, so Isabel's portrait is painted with
colours opposite to those used for her opposites, Madame
Merle and Henrietta. Indeed Henrietta seems but a
transformation of Celia, or rather, her liberated
version, constantly reminding Isabel of the real world
which she tends to ignore. Isabel's definition of
happiness as 'a swift carriage, of a dark night, rattling
with four horses over roads that one can't see' (235)
appals Henrietta, whose perception dominates over her
imagination. Unlike everyone else, she does not
congratulate her friend on the bequest because she sees
money as a 'curse in disguise', bricks which Isabel will
use to build her castles in the air. Like Celia, who
accurately describes Dorothea's imperceptiveness ('"you
always see what nobody sees ... yet you never see what is
^The Act of Reading, p. 137.
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quite plain'"), Henrietta unmistakably diagnoses Isabel's
problem:
The peril for you is that you live
too much in the world of your own
dreams. You're not enough in contact
with reality—with the toiling,
striving, suffering, I may even say
sinning, world that surrounds you.
You're too fastidious; you've too
many graceful illusions. Your newly-
acquired thousands will shut you up
more and more to the society of a few
selfish and heartless people who will
be interested in keeping them up
(310).
Henrietta's description coincides with Isabel's isolation
in her office in the Albany house, where 'she spent half
her time in thinking of beauty and bravery and
magnanimity' and preferred 'to regard the world as a
place of brightness, of free expansion' (68). Her love
for Isabel, it seems, enables her to be perceptive about
her friend's paradoxical nature.
But like Celia, Henrietta lacks a sense of wonder,
the receptivity which, as we have seen, is essential to
knowledge, growth, and imagination, for 'she had clear-
cut views on most subjects' and before she even comes to
Europe, she 'knew perfectly in advance what her opinions
would be' (70). Lacking a systolic-diastolic
prespective, the quality of the penetrative imagination,
Henrietta is not framed by doors or windows; in fact,
Isabel admits to Ralph, '"she doesn't sufficiently
recognise the existence of knockers ... she thinks one's
door should stand ajar' (129). There is no inner-outer
interplay in Henrietta, and this is why she is never
identified with houses. Even when she is briefly
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associated with windows, the comparison lacks any depth:
'her remarkably open eyes, lighted like great glazed
railway-stations, had put up no shutters' (II, 382).
For the same reason, the allusions to Henrietta's
search for 'the inner life' of England are ironic, as she
initially believes that she can discover it in Mrs
Pensil's household (236); but when the desired invitation
from Mrs Pensil never comes, Henrietta has to give up her
hope to see inner life in England and moves on to the
Continent, where she is much happier, since 'on the
Continent there was the outer life, which was palpable
and visible at every turn, and more easily convertible to
literary uses than the customs of those opaque
islanders'. Inner and outer become entangled in
Henrietta's imperceptive view: 'Out of doors in foreign
lands, as she ingeniously remarked, one seemed to see the
right side of the tapestry; out of doors in England one
seemed to see the wrong side, which gave one no notion of
the figure' (407). Even Isabel, when she hears about
Henrietta's impending marriage to Mr Bantling, cannot
help remarking, '"You will at last—over here—see
something of the inner life'." (II, 400).
Mrs Touchett, Madame Merle, Osmond, Ralph—all these
characters' responses to Henrietta's loudness and
aggressiveness are contrasted with Isabel's; she can see
what others disregard, somewhat illustrating James's
point about the artist's 'individual vision': 'He and his
neighbours are watching the same show, but one seeing
more where the other sees less, one seeing black where
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the other sees white, one seeing big where the other sees
small, one seeing coarse where the other sees fine' (xi).
To Ralph's objection that Henrietta is too familiar,
Isabel responds imaginatively, regarding Henrietta from a
suggestive viewpoint: '"she's a kind of emanation of the
great democracy—of the continent, the country, the
nation. I don't say that she sums it all up.... But she
suggests it; she vividly figures it"'. Isabel's view of
Henrietta illustrates the imagination's power to see
something as something else, its tendency to idealize,
its expansive, diastolic essence: '"I like the great
country stretching away beyond the rivers and across the
prairies, blooming and smiling and spreading till it
stops at the green Pacific! A strong, sweet, fresh odour
seems to rise from it, and Henrietta--pardon my simile--
has something of that odour in her garments"' Ralph's
humorous comment keys down what would otherwise seem
exaggerated: '"I'm not sure the Pacific's so green as
that.... Henrietta, however, does smell of.the Future—
it almost knocks one down!"' (129-30).
As the novel progresses, Isabel's respect for
Henrietta is fully justified, especially when Henrietta
crosses 'the stormy ocean in mid-winter because she had
guessed that Isabel was sad' (II, 283), or when she
accompanies Ralph in his final journey from Rome to
England. Most importantly, Henrietta, like Caspar
Goodwood, stands out not so much in contrast to Isabel as
to Madame Merle and Osmond, essentially because she is
'deficient in the social drapery commonly muffling, in an
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overcivi1ized age, the sharpness of human contacts' (II,
280) .
Madame Merle's social drapery is so abundant that it
transforms Isabel's life into a 'masque with enigmatical
costumes'. One cannot help but see her as Rosamond's
transformation, 'a public performer, condemned to emerge
only in character and in costume' (II, 39). Intensely
aware of the social dynamics, she is 'completely equipped
for the social battle. She carried her flag discreetly,
but her weapons were polished steel' and made herself a
'firm surface, a sort of corselet of silver' (II, 154-
55). Her discretion in concealing her weapons is so
effective that even Mrs Touchett cannot perveive below
'the firm surface' and considers her complete and
perfect, a perfection which Madame Merle defines as her
willingness to observe and abide by the rules of English
decorum: '"I mean that having no faults, for your aunt,
means that one's never late for dinner—that is for her
dinner.... It means that one answers a letter the day
one gets it and that when one comes to stay with her one
doesn't bring too much luggage and is careful not to be
taken ill. For Mrs Touchett those things constitute
virtue"' (278). Accomplished in the social graces,
music, painting, finesse, she is welcome by everyone, and
like Rosamond (an 'exquisite ornament'), she is an
'ornament to any circle' (II, 156).
Music is the medium that seems to charm Isabel's
imagination upon her first acquaintance with Madame
Merle. She, like Dorothea (who often hears music before
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she sees Rosamond), hears music before she actually meets
Madame Merle; her imagination, that is, is already
captured before her perception has a chance to take over.
James's focusing in this case resembles that of an
experienced cinematographer as he alternates from Isabel
framed by the door of the drawing-room to Madame Merle
playing the piano at the end of the room furthest removed
from the door. As her back is turned to Isabel, she does
not notice her, thus allowing Isabel to admire her
skillful and emotional performance, before 'the new-comer
stopped with her hands on the keys, half-turning and
looking over her shoulder' (246) .
Madame Merle's momentary unawareness of Isabel's
entrance foreshadows another critical image in the novel
when Isabel comes home from a walk to find Madame Merle
with Osmond. Madame Merle's advent is here also
contrasted with Isabel's first appearance in Gardencourt,
which took place on a beautiful, warm summer-day against
the harmonious interplay of the exterior and interior of
Gardencourt. Madame Merle's coming is, on the other
hand, full of negative omens, since it coincides with Mr
Touchett's impending death and the rain, which Isabel
sees through the window, 'washing the cold-looking lawn
and the wind shaking the great trees' (246). But Isabel,
at this point, as in the germinal scene, gives 'as little
heed as possible to cosmic treacheries' and greets Madame
Merle's arrival with happy eagerness, anticipating that
the new guest may play an important role in her life.
Her romantic expectation is ironic, since she does
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discover at the end that Madame Merle has been indeed 'a
powerful agent in her destiny' (II, 322). While
Isabel's imagination is 'dazzled' (271), her judgement is
caught off guard and Madame Merle seems to be the
incarnation of the 'penalty' Isabel must pay of giving
'undue encouragement to the faculty of seeing without
judging'.
In her response to Madame Merle, Isabel resembles
Lydgate in his misjudging of Rosamond. Her beautiful
surface, her 'expressive communicative, responsive face'
cannot possibly be, in Isabel's view, 'of the sort which
... suggested a secretive disposition'. By seeing her
'as if she were a Bust ... a Juno or a Niobe' (249),
Isabel swiftly removes Madame Merle into the realm of the
imaginative and refuses to judge her in any negative way.
Isabel's initial positive impression of Madame Merle
serves as the germ of her subsequent responses to her
captivating friend; it seems to take over and Isabel has
difficulty controlling it. This is perhaps why even when
she finds Madame Merle 'too flexible, too useful ... too
ripe and too final' with 'her angles too much rubbed
away' by custom, she disregards her own misgivings and
hopes that 'a charming surface doesn't necessarily prove
one superficial.... She was deep' (273-74). Like
Dorothea, who looks into Mr Casaubon's soul, Isabel, in
her search of depth, disregards the surface.
A beautiful surface is what Madame Merle capitalizes
on; indeed, her definition of one's self crystallizes her
preoccupation with appearances: '"What shall we call our
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'self'?.... It overflows into everything that belongs to
us.... I know a large part of myself is in the clothes I
choose to wear. I've a great respect for things 1 One's
self—for other people—is one's expression of one's
self, and one's house, one's furniture, one's garments,
the books one reads, the company one keeps—these things
are all expressive"' (287-88). Isabel's expansive
outlook is contrasted with Madame Merle's as she objects
to her friend's definition: '"Nothing that belongs to me
is any measure of me; everything's on the contrary a
limit, a barrier, and a perfectly arbitrary one.... My
clothes may express the dressmaker, but they don't
express me. To begin with it's not my own choice that I
wear them; they're imposed upon me by society"' (288).
Captivated by Madame Merle's 'exterior', Isabel
confides in her and begins to trust her as she never did
anyone else before: 'The gates of the girl's confidence
were opened wider than they had ever been; she said
things to this amiable auditress that she had not yet
said to any one. Sometimes she took alarm at her
candour: it was as if she had given to a comparative
stranger the key to her cabinet of jewels' (267). The
presence of gates here is necessary to emphasize the
inner-outer interplay characteristic of Isabel but
lacking in her friend. At the same time we can see how
Dorothea's jewels, which make her think of 'spiritual
emblems', are here transformed into internal treasures,
'spiritual gems', which 'were the only ones of any
2 6 4.
magnitude that Isabel possessed, but there was all the
greater reason for their being carefully guarded' (267).
Like Rosamond, who cannot imagine other people's
states of mind except 'as a material cut into shape by
her own wishes', Madame Merle lacks the ability to see
the distant and the imperceptible, to penetrate beneath
the surface, to project herself into others. Her
disappointment with Pansy's failure to captivate Lord
Warburton demonstrates what George Eliot termed
Rosamond's 'realistic imagination': '"I had set my heart
on that marriage; the idea did what so few things do—it
satisfied the imagination"'. Isabel's remark, on the
other hand, brings forth the diastolic part of the
imagination, which Madame Merle's lacks: '"Your
imagination, yes. But not that of the persons
concerned"' (II, 324).
Madame Merle's preoccupation with the external is
also revealed in her final interview with Isabel at the
convent, when she discloses Ralph's role in providing
Isabel's inheritance. Here we have a perverse
transformation of the 'spiritual gems' Isabel had
entrusted to Madame Merle: '"He imparted to you that
extra lustre which was required to make you a brilliant
match' (II, 388). Yet Madame Merle's baseness highlights
Isabel's nobleness, and this is why Isabel's picture in
the convent is framed both by a window and a door. Like
Dorothea, who in moments of intense introspection has no
awareness of the external world, Isabel at the time does
not see what she looks at: 'On the other side of the
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window lay the garden of the convent; but this is not
what she saw; she saw nothing of the budding plants and
the glowing afternoon. She saw, in the crude light of
that revelation which had already become a part of
experience ... the dry straining fact that she had been
an applied handled hung-up tool, as senseless and
convenient as mere shaped wood and iron' (II, 379). The
intensity of the inner vision blurs the externals, and
Isabel's reaction to her recognition of the perverse fate
of her spiritual gems ('an applied handled hung-up tool')
resembles Dorothea's reaction to Casaubon's rejection of
her affection; 'But the struggle changed continually, as
that of a man who begins with a movement towards striking
and ends with conquering his desire to strike. The
energy that would animate a crime is not more than is
wanted to inspire a resolved submission, when the noble
habit of the soul reasserts itself' (464). Although
there is no 'resolved submission' here, arrested violence
is the essence of Isabel's revenge: 'There was a moment
during which, if she had turned and spoken, she would
have said something that would hiss like a lash. But she
closed her eyes, and then the hideous vision dropped....
Isabel's only revenge was to be silent still—to leave
Madame Merle in this unprecedented situation.... Isabel
would never accuse her, never reproach her; perhaps
because she never would give her the opportunity to
defend herself' (II, 379-80). Her hand on the latch
(reminding us of the bolts of her imagination), she seems
in full possession of her judgement when she opens the
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door and she responds to Madame Merle's disclosure: '"I
believed it was you I had to thank!"' (389). Again she
is framed by a door at this critical point when she has
seen beneath Madame Merle's surface and has finally
judged her.
Like a tragic heroine, Isabel (resembling Lydgate),
gains knowledge by means of suffering, and part of that
kncvl^dge is her recognition that she can learn from those
she has considered her inferior. When she first
perceives Madame Merle's trap, Isabel thinks of her aunt,
Mrs Touchett, who 'had made this discovery long before,
and had mentioned it to her niece; but Isabel had
flattered herself at this time that she had a much richer
view of things, especially of the spontaneity of her own
career, and the nobleness of her own interpretations,
than poor stiffly-reasoning Mrs Touchett' (II, 329).
Madame Merle's lack of imagination is associated
with her lack of strong feelings, since feeling is the
primary quality of the imagination. Like Rosamond, who
congratulates herself on her civilized responses in her
confrontations with either her husband or her brother,
Madame Merle is 'a woman of strong impulses kept in
admirable order', a characteristic which Isabel mistakes
as an 'ideal combination' (250). Her analogy of
emotional experiences to the chips on a cup serves as the
germ of her own character, a shallow, impaired nature:
'"I flatter myself that I'm rather stout, but if I must
tell you the truth I've been shockingly chipped and
cracked. I do very well for service yet, because I've
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been cleverly mended; and I try to remain in the
cupboard—the quiet, dusky cupboard where there's an
odour of stale spices—as much a I can. But when I've to
come out and into a strong light—then, my dear, I'm a
horror!"' (275). This image prefigures the other cup in
Madame Merle's apartment which she believes to be a
'precious object' but which, so Osmond tells her, is
worthless since it has a crack.
Like other characters in the novel, Madame Merle is
represented by the house she lives in, especially since
she herself has declared that one's possessions represent
one's self. We are led to think of her in terms of her
little salon where she receives her guests and displays
her treasures—'small and densely filled with furniture;
it gave an impression of faded silk and little statuettes
which might totter if one moved' (II, 91). But there is
no interplay between the external and the internal in her
house, no windows or doors framing Madame Merle, because
her character, like Rosamond's lacks any collisions, any
intense feeling, the systolic-diastolic movement
essential to an imaginative perspective.
Like Madame Merle, Lord Warburton appeals
immediately to Isabel's imagination even though she
watches him from a distance, even though she has not met
him at the moment: '"Oh, I hoped there would be a lord;
it's just like a novel"' (18). Her first impression of
him is so powerful that it becomes the germ, as it were,
of her later regard of him and it is not modified by her
subsequent encounters with him. When he stays in
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Gardencourt, for instance, and she has a chance to know
him better, she still sees him as 'a hero of romance'
(91). Lord Warburton's house has a similar appeal to her
imagination: 'it seemed to her a matter of course that it
should be a noble picture'. But it is not the interior
of the house which had been modernized and had lost some
of its 'purity' that inspires her as much as the
exterior: 'as they saw it from the gardens, a stout grey
pile, of the softest, deepest, most weather-fretted hue
rising from a broad, still moat, it affected the young
visitor as a castle in a legend' (108). Again we can see
here a manifestation of the germinal image. Since her
imagination is inspired by the outdoors, by what lies
outside her window, it is no wonder that in this case
also it is enthralled by the externals—Warburton's
appearance and the exterior of his house.
Isabel's impressions of Lockleigh, like her thoughts
about Warburton at this time, do not involve an inner-
outer interplay, but are rather the result of external
observations. Her attraction to Lord Warburton's
external appearance is reflected in the comments
regarding him and are but a manifestation of her first
impressions: 'His smile was peculiarly friendly and
pleasing, and his whole person seemed to emit that
radiance of good-feeling and good fare which had formed
the charm of the girl's first irrkjpression of him. It
surrounded him like a zone of fine June weather' (142).
And later on, when Lord Warburton proposes to her, Isabel
still attributes to him qualities of the outdoors: 'These
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words were uttered with a breadth of candour that was
like the embrace of strong arms—that was like the
fragrance straight in her face, and by his clean,
breathing lips, of she knew not what strange gardens,
what charged airs' (152). Since Warburton excites her
imagination, fond as it is of externals, it is inevitable
that Isabel should consider him in terms of the external
world. Warburton himself becomes aware of Isabel's
preoccupation with the 'exterior' rather than with the
'interior'. Very early in their acquaintance, when
Isabel exposes her theories about England, Warburton
remarks, '"You judge only from the outside"' (112).
When Lord Warburton proposes to her, however, Isabel
is conscious of the effect her 'undisciplined'
imagination has upon her, and the penalty she would have
to pay if she had given 'undue encouragement' to the
faculty of 'seeing without judging'. Her enthusiasm and
excitement for Lord Warburton do not overwhelm her
altogether, and 'though she was lost in admiration of her
opportunity, she managed to move back into the deepest
shade of it, even as some wild, caught creature in a vast
cage' (152-53). Unlike Dorothea, she recognizes that her
fascination for the 'exterior' (her imagination) can
transfer her to 'vast worlds'; but these worlds can,
paradoxically, be confining, and can offer her, instead
of the liberty which she seeks, the enslavement and
entrapment of a cage. Aware of her flaw, her
uncontrolled imagination, she retreats to her judgement
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(her interior), the 'deepest shade', refusing to let her
imagination lead her to a 'strange unseen place'.
Lord Warburton, however, appeals to her judgement
also. Although a marriage with him would restrict the
liberty which she values so highly, it would also offer
her a sense of security. As she is going away from
Lockleigh, while greeting Miss Molyneux, she looks into
'her quiet eyes a moment, and for that moment seemed to
see in their grey depths the reflexion of everything she
had rejected in rejecting Lord Warburton—the peace, the
kindness, the honour, the possessions, a deep security
and a great exclusion' (189). The last three qualities
are those we usually attribute to comfortable houses. As
in the germinal image, so in this passage, liberty and
exclusion are 'indistinguishably mingled'. For the sake
of her independence, Isabel must give up the exclusion
she could have cherished by Lord Warburton's side.
Indeed, throughout the book, Isabel associates Lord
Warburton with houses. Initially, she is charmed with
Lockleigh and when she rejects his proposal, she mentions
his houses: 'I am not, I am really and truly not, able to
regard you in the light of a companion for life; or to
think of your home—your various homes—as the settled
seat of my existence"' (166). Again, later on, when she
meets him in Rome accidentally, she concentrates on his
appearance, 'his bronzed complexion', 'his multitudinous
beard', 'his manly figure', and she reflects that she
'was glad she had always liked him. He had kept,
evidently in spite of shocks, every one of his merits—
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properties these partaking of the essence of great decent
houses, as one might put it; resembling their innermost
fixtures and ornaments, not subject to vulgar shifing and
removable only by some whole break-up' (417—18). And
when the possibility of Pansy's marriage to him arises,
she cherishes for a while the idea of 'Pansy's becoming
the wife of the master of the beautiful Lockleigh' (II,
173). Like Madame Merle then, Lord Warburton is the
house in which he lives.
In her relationship with him, Isabel is caught
within the conflict present in the germinal image.
'Exterior' and 'interior', imagination and judgement, are
'indistinguishably mingled' in her thoughts about Lord
Warburton. Why does she reject him then? It is obvious
that Lord Warburton represents a threat to her 'free
exploration of life' (155). Simultaneously, in his early
conversations with her, he irritates her in much the same
way as Sir James annoyed Dorothea with his
imperceptiveness or with his tendency to agree with her
even when she contradicted him. Lord Warburton exhibits
a similar lack of imagination when he describes 'the
peculiarities of English life' to Isabel, and she finds
herself 'amused at his explicitness and at the small
allowance he seemed to make either for her own experience
or for her imagination. '"He thinks I'm a barbarian",
she said "and.that I've never seen forks and spoons"; and
she used to ask him artless questions for the pleasure of
hearing him answer seriously' (96). Both Isabel and
Dorothea feel superior to their suitors only to be
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startled later at their own imperceptiveness. Like
Dorothea, who is blind to Sir James's intentions, Isabel
shows similar lack of insight when she believes that Lord
Warburton is no longer attached to her and wants to marry
Pansy because he is truly in love with her.
Caspar Goodwood is Lord Warburton's opposite; the
son of a self-made American, who made his fortune in the
cotton-mills industry, he has nothing to do with
aristocracy. And although he was a student at Harvard,
he was famous in that school 'rather as a gymnast and an
oarsman than as a gleamer of more dispersed knowledge'
(163). Like his father, Goodwood owns a cotton-mill
factory, which leaves Isabel's 'imagination absolutely
cold' (165); unlike Lord warburton, Goodwood does not at
all appeal to her imagination, does not meet her
'exterior' standards. She wishes, for instance, that he
looked a little differently: 'His jaw was too square and
set and his figure too straight and stiff'. His way of
dressing also irritates Isabel, since it reflects lack of
imagination: 'it was not apparently that he wore the
same clothes continually, for, on the contrary, his
garments had a way of looking rather too new. But they
all seemed of the same piece; the figure, the stuff, was
so drearily usual'. Although she regards her own
criticism rather superficial, she admits that it would be
'frivolous only if she were in love with him' (165). But
Goodwood 'had never corresponded to her idea of a
delightful person and she supposed that this was why he
left her so harshly critical' (166).
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Like Warburton, Goodwood is judged from outside and
he also constitutes a threat to her freedom and
independence. And though Goodwood 'never supposed she
hadn't wings and the need of beautiful free movements',
and reassures her that he will not 'curtail' her liberty
(228), Isabel never ceases to believe that he wants 'to
deprive her of her sense of freedom. There was a
disagreeably strong push, a kind of hardness of presence,
in his way of rising before her' (162). Even when he
looks tenderly at her,Isabel regards him as an oppressor;
his eyes, she feels 'seemed to shine through the vizard
of a helmet' (218) and his love-confession makes her
think only of hardness and coldness: 'she came back ...
to her old sense that he was naturally plated and
steeled, and armed essentially for aggression' (219-20).
Ironically, Goodwood is himself aware of his own hardness
but does not see the intense dislike Isabel has of it; in
his interview with her in Florence, after Isabel has
informed him about her engagement, he asserts, '"I'm
selfish as iron"' (II, 51); and during his final critical
encounter with her at Gardencourt he tries to recommend
himself to her with the unfortunate words, '"Here I
stand; I'm as firm as a rock"' (II, 434).
Unknowingly, when he describes the sense of
suffocation he experiences in European trains, he seems
to describe Isabel's stifling feeling around him: 'He
hated the European railway-carriages, in which one sat
for hours in a vise, knee to knee and nose to nose with a
foreigner ... with all the added vehemence of one's wish
274
to have the window open' (II, 243). It is as if to
relieve her sense of suffo. cation that Isabel turns to a
window when she meets him unexpectedly at Pratt's Hotel
in London (225) , or when he comes to see her in Palazzo
Crescentini (II, 49).
Again when she hears of Goodwood's visit to Europe
after her marriage to Osmond, Isabel feels threatened by
his impending appearance and reminisces about her last
meeting wihjt1 him in terms of conflict and violence:
He had left her that morning with a
sense of the most superfluous of
shocks; it was like a collision
between vessels in broad daylight.
There had been no mist, no hidden
current to excuse it, and she herself
had only wished to steer wide. He
had bumped against her prow, however,
while her hand was on the tiller,
and—to complete the metaphor—had
given the lighter vessel a strain
which still occasionally betrayed
itself in a faint creaking.... He
had not been violent, and yet there
had been a violence in the
impression. There had been a
violence at any rate in something
somewhere' (II, 279).
Isabel's revival of the scene in Florence in
imaginative terms illustrates Bachelard's assertion that
'the imagination ceaselessly revives and illustrates the
memory'. The meeting itself had been quite prosaic, but
her imagination seems to colour 'the paintings it wants
to see again' (PS, 20, 105). Simultaneously, we can see
that metaphors are the colours the imagination uses in
translating or verbalizing entangling emotions. Isabel
continues to regard Goodwood in violent terms, as we
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shall later see, even when he offers to deliver her from
Osmond's imprisonment.
Goodwood's greatest shortcoming, his lack of
imagination, is revealed in, what he believes will be,
his last meeting with Isabel. At the same time, the
scene illustrates how imagination depends on clear
perception and how anticipation can blur perception:
'Now that he was alone with her all the passion he had
never stifled surged into his senses; it hummed in his
eyes and made things swim round him. The bright, empty
room grew dim and blurred, and through the heaving veil
he felt her hover before him with gleaming eyes and
parted lips'. Yet, we are told, 'if he had seen more
distinctly he would have perceived her smile was fixed
and a trifle forced—that she was frightened at what she
saw in his own face' (II, 317). His exclamation, '"I
can't penetrate you!"' (II, 318), demonstrates Goodwood's
lack of a clear perception and a penetrative imagination,
attributes which Isabel believes she had discovered when
she meets Osmond.
In her view, Osmond seems to represent a happy
synthesis of the qualities Goodwood and Warburton lack.
It is significant that Isabel meets Osmond in Italy, in
Florence, when her imagination is already sent soaring by
her daily visits to museums and ancient places, and even
by her stay in Palazzo Crescentini. Her life in Italy,
as well as her encounters and disappointments with
Osmond, represent all the qualities of the imagination to
the exploration of which this study has been devoted.
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At the beginning of her stay in Florence, Isabel,
like Dorothea, seems to be overcome by 'all those acts of
mental prostration'—'she went to the galleries and
palaces; she looked at the pictures and statues that had
hitherto been great names to her'. But unlike Dorothea,
she is not burdened by personal problems yet and can
respond spontaneously, emotionally, to everything she
sees: 'she felt her heart beat in the presence of
immortal genius and knew the sweetness of rising tears in
eyes to which faded fresco and darkened marble grew dim'
(354). The passage seems to illustrate Ruskin's
generalization that imagination 'is based upon,
and appeals to, a deep heart feeling' (MP, II, 298). At
that time Mrs Touchett's palazzo inspires Isabel's
imagination too: 'But the return, every day, was even
plesanter than the going forth; the return into the wide,
monumental court of the great house ... and into the
high, cool rooms where the carven rafters and pompous
frescoes of the sixteenth century looked down on the
familiar commodities of the age of advertisement' (354-
55). As in Gardencourt so in Palazzo Crescentini there
is a harmonious interchange between the indoors and
outdoors, an interplay to which Isabel's imagination is
keenly responsive: 'the brightness of a garden where
nature itself looked as archaic as the rugged
architecture of the palace and which cleared and scented
the rooms.... To live in such a place was, for Isabel,
to hold to her ear all day a shell of the sea of the
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past. This vague eternal rumour kept her imagination
awake 1 (355) .
In these surroundings, under these circumstances,
Osmond's first visit to Isabel takes place, and it is no
wonder that his presence affects Isabel's already-
stimulated imagination. Her meeting with Osmond is also
a case in point of perception modified by anticipation.
Quite clearly, Madame Merle's description of Osmond as a
'demoralized prince in exile' has already fired Isabel's
imagination. Consequently, her reaction to him is full
of projections, allowing a free rein to her imagination,
while holding her perception in check. Dismissing her
perception that Osmond's conversation with Madame Merle
had 'the rich readiness that would have come from
rehearsal', she adopts the attitude of a spectator of a
play, or rather of a beholder of a fine work of art.
Very soon she judges that 'his face, his head, was
sensitive; he was not handsome, but he was fine, as fine
as one of the drawings in the long gallery above the
bridge of the Uffizi'(355-6). Her response to Osmond is
very similar to her initial impression of Madame Merle;
like Madame Merle, he is seen as a work of art and is
then swiftly removed from the perceptual into the
imaginative realm. Without knowing it, unfortunately,
Ralph stimulates even further Isabel's imagination,
establishing a connection between Isabel and Osmond when
he offers her the information she wants: '"He's a vague,
unexplained American ... he may be a prince in
disguise.... He used to live in Rome .... Rome has grown
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vulgar.... He has a great dread of vulgarity' (358).
Ralph does not realize that vagueness inspires Isabel's
imagination ('the vague eternal rumour kept her
imagination awake') and that vulgarity is also what
Isabel dreads, as we have seen in the germinal image:
'She had never opened the bolted door nor removed the
green paper ... from its sidelights: she had never
assured herself that the vulgar street lay beyond' (31).
Her evaluation of Osmond during her first visit to
his house on the hill-top further demonstrates her
intense dislike of vulgarity: 'a man living alone away
from vulgar troubles thinking about art, beauty and
history' (378). As in her first meeting with Osmond, so
during her visit she resists her judgement, and indulges
in an imaginative view. Although she notices the
dichotomy betwen the outdoors and the indoors ('it was
cold even in the month of May'), she disregards her
judgement and does not hesitate to enter: 'there was
something grave and strong in the place; it looked
somehow as if, once you were in, you would need an act of
energy to get out. For Isabel, however, there was of
course as yet no thought of getting out, but only of
advancing' (364).
To Isabel, Osmond represents an original: 'her mind
contained no class offering a natural place to Mr Osmond-
-he was a specimen apart' (376). Indeed, her initial
feelings about him are so much Dorothea-like that one
connot ignore the resemblances. Like Dorothea, who
interprets Casaubon's Locke-like appearance as signifying
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a great soul, Isabel moves below the surface, hurriedly
following her imagination to 'impalpabilities. His
dense, delicate hair, his overdrawn, retouched features,
his clear complexion... these personal points struck our
sensitive young woman as signs of quality, of intensity,
somehow as promises of interest' (376). The immensity of
her projections culminates in the remark, 'it was not so
much what he said and did, but rather what he withheld'.
Vagueness, silence, suggestiveness keep Isabel's
imagination awake and hold her judgement under control.
And when Osmond gives an account of his life, Isabel's
imagination is given its opportunity to complete the
incomplete: 'This would have been rather a dry account
... if Isabel had fully believed it; but her imagination
supplied the human element which she was sure had not
been wanted' (382-83).
The image, which Isabel carries away with her after
her first visit to Osmond, is full of projections, like a
'germ' continually expanding in her mind: it was 'the
image of a quiet, clever, sensitive, distinguished man,
strolling on a moss-grown terrace above the sweet Val
d'Arno and holding by the hand a little girl.... The
picture had no flourishes, but she liked its lowness of
tone and the atmosphere of summer twilight that pervaded
it' (399). Like Warburton, Osmond seems to be seen 'from
the outside' as his appearance is blended with the
outdoor surroundings. Since she does not know Osmond
well, the qualities she attributes to his character seem
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to be merely the result of the impression the
'atmosphere' has upon her.
The influence of the surroundings upon Isabel's
imagination has been evident during her first visit.
Referring to Osmond's garden, Isabel thinks that 'the
scene had an exraordinary charm. The air was almost
solemnly still, and the large expanse of the landscape,
with its gardenlike culture and nobleness of outline ...
lay there in splendid harmony and classic grace' (380).
After she goes away, Isabel internalizes the external;
she transforms image into idea, as she finds the
qualities of this landscape in Osmond's character,
believing that she sees in him 'an element of nobleness;
of a care for beauty and perfection so natural and so
cultivated together that the career appeared to stretch
beneath it in the disposed vistas and with the ranges and
the steps and fountains of a formal Italian garden' (399—
400). At this point Isabel not only thinks of Osmond in
the same terms employed about his garden, but explicitly
compares him with 'a formal Italian garden'. It is these
surroundings that enchant her imagination—sensitive as
it is to exteriors. Isabel's impressions of Rome are
implicitly compared to her feelings for Osmond. Moving
from museums to historic sights, she, we are told, 'went
about in a repressed ecstasy of contemplation, seeing
often in the things she looked at a great deal more than
was there' (413-14); simultaneously, she demonstrates
what Gombrich describes as 'the beholder's share in the
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reading of the artist's image'--an attribution of
3
meanings which do not really exist.
Silence and solitude are the conditions necessary to
an aesthetic experience and Isabel seems to understand
and feel this very intensely when she is left alone in
the 'glorious room, among the shining antique marbles'
and she sits down 'in the centre of the circle of these
presences, regarding them vaguely, resting her eyes on
their beautiful blank faces; listening, as it were, to
their eternal silence'. The transformation is achieved
through the kind of passiveness which Coleridge extolled
as having the dignity of great activity. Isabel's
experience here seems to embody the pictorial culmination
of the organic theory of imagination. Becoming the
diffusive and receptive centre of the aesthetic
experience, she projects the self into the object and the
object becomes part of herself, while the external and
the internal are reconciled and we feel the power of
'infusing the thoughts and passions of man into every
thing which is the object of his contemplation' (BL, II,
253) . Undoubtedly she is here the active perceiver
attributing qualities to the scene, experiencing a
reciprocity with elements without. Like Dorothea, she
sees the 'blank faces' of the statues, but she is not
overwhelmed by their silence because she infuses life
into them and can feel the 'effect of their noble
quietude'. While Isabel is experiencing an artistic
3
Art and Illusion, p. 155.
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vision, we can feel the systolic-dystolic process. The
dimensions expand to touch us, as her eyes move from the
external to the internal and back again to the external,
keeping the images palpitating with life, illustrating
the dynamism of the imagination. From the 'beautiful
blank faces' we are led to sense the 'effect of their
noble quietude', which 'as with a high door closed for
the ceremony, slowly drops on the spirit the large white
mantle of peace'. From the internal, mental, door to the
external actual windows the dimensions constantly expand.
Perception and imagination are 'twin demons' as her
heightened perception acquires imaginative hues, becoming
aware of the inner-outer interplay: 'the blinds were
partly closed in the windows of the Capitol, and a clear,
warm shadow rested on the figures and made them mildly
human'. Indeed, 'imagination is essentially vital, even
as all objects (a_s objects) are fixed and dead' (BL, I,
202). And the scene expands to touch life and involve
us, affect us, draw us into the circle of her creative
experience as she is 'wondering to what, of their
experience, their absent eyes were open, and how, to our
ears, their alien lips would sound' (II, 7-8). The
senses intercommunicate—warmth stimulates the visual
which in turn brings forth the auditory.
Why is all this interrupted by Osmond? His response
to art has already been contrasted with Isabel's in St
Peter's and is further underlined by Isabel's response to
the statues. Osmond exhibits no strong feelings in his
encounters with art; in fact, he remains in full
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possession of the self, so the subject and object can
never merge. In St Peter's, for instance, he thinks only
of himself. The statues which intensely move Isabel have
no effect on him. Rather, his first question, when he
sees Isabel has to do with Lord Warburton who had just
been rejected once more by Isabel. Osmond's discovery of
Lord Warburton's attachment presents 'a new attraction in
the idea of taking to himself a young lady who had
qualified herself to figure in his collection of choice
objects by declining so noble a hand' (II, 9). Unlike
Isabel, Osmond is incapable of expansion.
Isabel's aesthetic experience is implicitly
contrasted with her feelings about Osmond. Like Lydgate,
who is unable to transfer his scientific theory to his
emotional life, Isabel is incapable of applying her
aesthetic perspective to her relationship with Osmond.
No inner-outer interplay takes place in her view of him
because, as she admits even after she is completely
disillusioned with him, 'there was something in her
imagination he could always appeal to against her
judgement' (II, 354). When Osmond proposes to her, he
instantaneously disarms her judgement. As the tears come
into her eyes, 'they obeyed the sharpness of the pang
that suggested to her somehow the slipping of a fine
bolt--backward, forward, she couldn't have said which'
(II, 18). Her imagination is no longer under any
restraint—the bolts 'slip'. Because Isabel can no
longer 'make use of her judgement alone', she must pay
the penalty of 'having given undue encouragement to the
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faculty of seeing without judging'. All she can see when
Osmond proposes is what is not there: 'The words he had
uttered made him, as he stood there, beautiful and
generous, invested him as with the golden air of early
autumn' (II, 18). With Osmond, Isabel cannot 'move back
into the deepest shade' of her judgement as she did with
Warburton; and though her imagination hangs back for a
few moments with apprehension, Isabel advances as she
walks into Osmond's house in spite of her reservations:
'there was a last vague space it couldn't cross—a dusky,
uncertain tract, which looked ambiguous and even slightly
treacherous, like a moorland seen in the winter twilight.
But she was to cross it yet' (II, 22). She must fulfill
her tragic destiny.
Osmond's house turns out to be the 'strange unseen
place', 'the region of terror', foreshadowed in the
germinal image. Soon after her marriage, Isabel regards
it as 'the house of darkness, the house of dumbness, the
house of suffocation', where she feels 'an incredulous
terror' (II, 196). And although Osmond seemed originally
to have brought to her 'the light of the stars' (II, 82)
that she had longed for ('deep in her soul .. lay the
belief that if a certain light should dawn she could give
herself completely' (71-72)), after her marriage she
discovers that he 'deliberately almost malignantly had
put the lights out one by one'. Osmond himself,
ironically, seems to understand his role when he
describes his marriage to Goodwood: '"She speaks for me,
my wife; why shouldn't I speak for her? We're as united,
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you know, as the candlestick and the snuffers"' (II,
309). Coldness and darkness are associated with Osmond
and, in this respect, as in many others, he seems but
Casaubon's transformation. In fact, Isabel's
disillusionments are echoes of Dorothea's. For the first
time when Isabel visits Osmond, she loses her sense of
superiority and becomes Dorothea-like in her worries lest
her remarks should reflect 'grossness of perception'
(379) ; then she looks up to Osmond as the 'kindest of
ciceroni' who will lead her to knowledge and beauty
(378). Madame Merle has also identified Osmond with
Casaubon when she said, '"as cicerone of your museum you
appear to particular advantage"'(348).
After her marriage, however, she moves beneath the
surface, discovering that 'under all his culture, his
cleverness, his amenity, under his good-nature, his
facility, his knowledge of life, his egotism lay hidden
like a serpent in a bank of flowers' (II, 196). Instead
of the anticipated 'infinite vista of a multiplied life',
Isabel finds herself in a Dorothea-like predicament, 'a
dark narrow alley with a dead wall at the end'. Again
the tra'sformation from Middlemarch is more concise and
more concrete but the resemblance is striking, since
Dorothea discovers in Rome also 'with stifling depression
that the large vistas and wide fresh air which she had
dreamed of finding in her husband's mind were replaced by
ante-rooms and winding passages which seemed to lead
nowhither' (227-28). Mistrust is the result of both
marriages, which are based on a lopsided relationship.
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Osmond's regard for Isabel is also but a transformation
of Casaubon's. Like Casaubon, who does not 'find his
spirits rising' at his approaching marriage, Osmond does
not experience the anticipated excitement, once he is
certain he has won Isabel's love: 'the elation of
success, which surely now flamed high in Osmond, emitted
meanwhile very little smoke for so brilliant a blaze'
(II, 78). And like Casaubon, who believes that he
deserves Dorothea's love, Osmond is convinced '"If I do
succeed before I die, I shall thoroughly have earned if'
(II, 11).
Osmond's egotism, like Casaubon's, is also reflected
in his expectations of his spouse as an intelligent but
submissive creature. The glass, which is the image of
egotism in Middlemarch is present here when Osmond utters
his conception of ideal marriage: 'What could be a finer
thing to live with than a high spirit attuned to
softness? For would not the softness be all for one's
self .... What could be a happier gift in a companion
than a quick, fanciful mind which saved one repetitions
and reflected one's thought on a polished, elegant
surface?' (II, 79).
Like Dorothea, Isabel becomes intensely aware of the
nature of her relationship during her vigil when she
realize^ that her husband had expected 'her mind ... to
be his—attached to his own like a small garden-plot to a
deer-park'(II, 200). The image itself seems but a
pitiable trnasformation of Isabel's garden with
'lengthening vistas' (72), her initial conception of her
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own mind. Like Casaubon, Osmond is shocked to find his
wife turning into his critic: 'He had plenty of contempt,
and it was proper his wife should be as well furnished;
but that she should turn the hot light of her disdain
upon his own conception of things—this was a danger he
had not allowed for' (II, 201). Disappointment with her
marriage forces Isabel to see the quixotic elements of
her imagination, her tendency to mistake 'a part for the
whole' (II, 191), like Dorothea who misinterpreted
everything 'as provisional and preliminary'.
But what keeps Isabel awake during the night of
intense introspection is not only her evaluation of her
past and her marriage, but also the haunting image which
she witnesses when she comes back from one of her walks
and finds Madame Merle and Osmond 'unconsciously and
familiarly associated' (II, 205). While the image is
projected 'just beyond the threshold of the drawing-
room', it is also framed by the doorway. What Isabel
sees, lasts only a moment but it 'made an image', which
acquires in her mind multiple transformations, 'strange
visions; she seemed to see her husband and her friend—
his friend—in dim, indistinguishable combination' (II,
165, 278). Once again the significance of doorways as
frames is signalled by this image.
But this image has been preceded by another more
important one, Isabel's picture in Palazzo Roccanera, in
the house of her suffering and her recognitions. As she
enters the reception room where Rosier among other guests
is waiting to see her for the first time after years 'she
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looked high and splendid ... and yet oh so radiantly
gentle!.... The years had touched her only to enrich
her; the flower of her youth had not faded, it only hung
more quietly on its stem'. The image, partaking of
Dorothea's diamond-like radiance, is but a beautiful
transformation of Isabel's full-figure first portrait at
Gardencourt, her first appearance in 'the ample doorway':
'Now, at all events, framed in the gilded doorway, she
struck our young man as the picture of a gracious lady'
(II, 105). Simultaneously, the picture illustrates how
images can have what Coleridge declared 'the effect of
reducing multitude to unity, or succession to an instant'
(BL, II, 16), or how 'one image ... is made to modify
many others and by a sort of fusion to force many into
one' (SC, I, 212-13). Isabel here seems to become one of
the valuable pictures she envies during her last visit to
Gardencourt, since the 'gilded doorway' seems but a
transformation of the 'faded gilding of heavy frames' of
the pictures Ralph showed Isabel when she first came to
Gardencourt. It is significant that it should be Rosier,
a minor character, and not Osmond, who sees Isabel's
picture; his qualifications as a judge precede his
perception of her: "Like his appreciation of her dear
little stepdaughter it was based partly on his eye for
decorative character, his instinct for authenticity; but
also on a sense for uncatalogued values, for that secret
of a "lustre" beyond any recorded losing or
rediscovering, which his devotion to brittle wares had
still not disqualified him to recognise. Mrs Osmond, at
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present, might well have gratified such tastes' (II,
105) .
Unlike Rosier who can transfer his aesthetic view to
life, that is, can see life from an artistic perspective,
Osmond is unable to appreciate life as much as his art-
treasures. His constant preoccupation with Pansy's value
or his regard of her as a work of art is perverse? he
views her with an aesthetic detachment that does not take
into consideration her own feelings and rights as an
individual. His decision to send her back to the convent
illustrates his perverse egotism. There is a subtle
collision between the terms of nature and those of art in
Osmond's terminology, highlighted by irony: 'if he
regarded his daughter as a precious work of art it was
natural he should be more and more careful about the
finishing touches'(II, 349). Aesthetics and morals come
into conflict when Osmond evokes images of Pansy in the
convent and enjoys his own compositions without any
consideration for Pansy herself:
"One's daughter should be fresh and
fair? she should be innocent and
gentle.... Pansy's a little dusty, a
little dishevelled? she has knocked
about too much.... Convents are very
quiet, very convenient, very
salutary. I like to think of her
there, in the old garden, under the
arcade, among those tranquil virtuous
women"... His tone, however, was
that of a man not so much offering an
explanation as putting a thing into
words—almost into pictures—to see,
himself, how it would look. He
considered a while the picture he had
evoked and seemed greatly pleased
with it (II, 347-48).
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Osmond's pictures are illustrations of his inability to
go beyond the picture's frame and follow the picture till
it touches life. The emphasis on his respect for
convention underlines his inability to perceive anything
in an 'unhabitual way' or to resist the tendency of
4
'assimilating impressions in any but the old ways'. His
is the systolic perspective and this is why he cannot see
Isabel framed by the doorway, this is why he can play
'theoretic tricks on the delicate organism of his
daughter' (II, 348).
Guided by her sympathetic imagination, Isabel
immediately projects herself into Pansy after she finds
out about Madame Merle: the effect of the Countess'
disclosure is to make her expand not shrink—'to make her
reach out a hand' (II, 374). Yet Isabel's initial
impression of Pansy is negative, demonstrating her habit
of judging 'quickly and freely'. During her first visit
to Osmond's house, Isabel turns to Pansy to justify her
misgivings about the people there: 'perfect simplicity
was not the badge of his family. Even the little girl
from the convent ... with her small submissive face and
her hands locked before her ... had a kind of finish that
was not entirely artless' (367). Gradually, however,
Pnasy becomes part of Isabel, for she embodies the duty
to which she longs to devote herself in the crisis of her
life. Indeed, Pansy seems.to be Isabel's transfiguration
as she, like Isabel, is framed by windows and doorways.
4 .
William James, p. 328.
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Although a minor character, Pansy is meant to remain in
our memory and this is why her portrait is carefully
framed.
The very first time Pansy is framed by a window is
the first time we meet her, when she 'stared out of the
window; her eyes ... filled with tears' as she waves
good-bye to the nuns who have brought her home from the
convent (338). Madame Merle has come in at the time and
when she and Osmond begin to talk, he suggests that Pansy
leave the room; but Pansy sweetly proposes, '"If you like
I won't listen"' and sits down 'deferentially, near the
door, within sight of the garden, into which she directed
her innocent, wistful eyes' (340). Although inside, she
is mentally outside, resembling Isabel's nature. When
Isabel discovers Pansy's innocence and artlessness,
while Osmond is in Rome, we are again made aware of
windows 'that had been half-darkened, to keep out the
heat, and here and there, through an easy crevice, the
splendid summer day peeped in, lighting a gleam of faded
colour or tarnished gilt in the rich gloom' (II, 26).
The windows here have the same soothing effect they have
on Isabel when she finds herself in the centre of the
glorious statues in Rome. And, just in case we have not
noticed the window, Pansy is framed by the doorway as she
watches Isabel go forward in the world in which she is
not allowed to participate, 'and the small figure stood
in the high, dark doorway, watching Isabel cross the
clear, grey court and disappear into the brightness
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beyond the big portone, which gave a wider dazzle as it
opened' (II, 30) .
But Pansy becomes most clearly Isabel when Isabel
decides to become Osmond. Like Dorothea, who needs to
act for Will's sake in order to escape her egotistical
self-pity and suffering, Isabel clings on to Osmond's
wish to marry Pansy to Warburton, deciding to make his
wish her duty. Pansy in her room with the light out, by
the 'vague firelight' is but Isabel's reflection in the
night of her meditative vigil. Isabel is startled into
an intense awareness of the falsity of her role when
Pansy reveals her perception of Lord Warburton: '"He
knows I don't want to marry, and he wants me to know that
he therefore won't trouble me. That's the meaning of his
kindness. It's as if he said to me: "I like you very
much, but if it doesn't please you I'll never say it
again: I think that's very kind, very noble"'. For the
first time Isabel discovers 'the depths of perception of
which this submissive little person was capable; she felt
afraid of Pansy's wisdom—began almost to retreat before
it.... There was something brilliant in her lucidity,
and it made her companion draw a long breath.... Pansy
had a sufficient illumination of her own' (II, 260).
Pansy, like Mrs Touchett (whom Isabel also considered as
her inferior in perception), proves Isabel's superior in
this scene and her superiority is emphasized as she
stands 'in the open doorway; she had drawn the curtain
for Isabel to pass'. Her declaration that Mr Rosier
looks like a nobleman, reminds us of Ralph's remark to
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Isabel when she first comes to Gardencourt, '"It's not a
romantic old house.... It's a dismally prosaic one;
there's no romance here but what you may have brought
with you"'.
Pansy's voice entreating Isabel to come back is what
remains within Isabel when she returns to Gardencourt:
'"You'll come back?" she called out in a voice that
Isabel remembered afterwards. "Yes—I'll come back"'
(II, 386). Although helpless, submissive, and seemingly
Isabel's opposite, Pansy is in fact Isabel's extension.
Isabel, on the other hand, seems Ralph's extension.
Ralph very early sees her as the embodiment of his sense
of freedom and independence. Their paths, though
divergent, converge at the end; their figures seem to
interchange, like an image superimposed on another, as
Ralph dies, infusing life into Isabel, shaking her out of
her spiritual paralysis. Very early, Ralph perceives
Isabel's originality (87), but he does not class her with
works of art. As he is showing her the pictures in the
gallery in Gardencourt, he decides that she is 'better
worth looking at than most works of art' (61). Unlike
Osmond, Ralph is gifted with an artist's double vision
and sees Isabel from such a perspective:
"a character like that" he said to
himself—"a real little passionate
force to see at play is the finest
thing in nature. It's finer than the
finest work of art—than a Greek bas-
relief, than a great Titian, than a
Gothic cathedral... I had never been
more blue, more bored.... Suddenly I
receive a Titian, by the post, to
hang on my wall—a Greek bas-relief
to stick over my chimney-piece" (86).
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Unlike Osmond, who thinks he can shape life into a
work of art, Ralph sees life as superior to art; and his
double vision, his holistic perspective, ranging from the
exterior to the interior, is displayed in his likening of
Isabel to a house: 'The key of a beautiful edifice is
thrust into my hand, and I'm told to walk in and admire'
(86). Ralph estabishes the continuity betwen the organic
and the mechanical and emphasizes its importance as he
contemplates the key and the edifice: 'He surveyed the
edifice from the outside and admired it greatly; he
looked in at the windows and received an impression of
proportions equally fair. But he felt that he saw it
only by glimpses and that he had not yet stood under the
roof. The door was fastened, and though he had keys in
his pocket he had a conviction that none of them would
fit' (87). Who then is to be allowed to stand under the
roof? If the reader is aware of the inner/outer
interplay, then he will be admitted indoors.
Ralph himself is compared to a house before Isabel
appears. At the beginning of the novel he is contrasted
with Warburton—'tall, lean, loosely and feebly put
together, he had an ugly sickly, witty, charming face,
furnished, but by no means decorated, with a straggling
moustache and whisker' (5). Like a house, Ralph is 'put
together' and is 'furnished'. Ralph is then early
identified with Isabel who is also compared to a house;
indeed, he never ceases to think of her but in terms of
houses. After he hears of Osmond's courtship, for
instance, Ralph is certain Isabel will reject him: 'He
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had no conviction she would stop at a third. She would
keep the gate ajar and open a parley; she would certainly
not allow number three to come in' (395). And when
Isabel tries to conceal her misery from him he is aware
that 'she concealed it elaborately; she was perpetually,
in their talk, hanging out curtains and arranging
screens' (II, 203).
Ralph in many respects seems to be Will's
transformation. Like Will, he represents freedom, and
liberates Isabel from many of her own restrictive ideas.
In her stifling life with Osmond, Isabj1|g/ recognizes the
basis of her husband's hatred for him: 'He wished her to
have no freedom of mind, and he knew perfectly well that
Ralph was an apostle of freedom' (II, 245). Like Will,
he represents the light that brightens other people's
lives: 'He was a bright, free, generous spirit, he had
all the illumination of wisdom and none of its pedantry'
(II, 60). And like Will, who is a lunette in the wall of
Dorothea's prison, Ralph soothes Isabel's suffering and
expands her restriction: 'There was an everlasting
weight on her heart—there was a livid light on
everything. But Ralph's little visit was a lamp in the
darkness.... There was something in Ralph's talk, in his
smile ... that made the blasted circle round which she
walked more spacious' (II, 203). Constantly, Ralph tries
to disburden Isabel from her puritanical notions in order
to encourage her imagination to soar. To Isabel's worry
about her fortune Ralph responds:
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"Take things more easily. Don't ask
youself so much whether this or that
is good for you. Don't question your
conscience so much—it will get out
of tune like a strummed piano. Keep
it for great occasions. Don't try so
much to form your character—it's
like trying to pull open a tight,
tender young rose. Live as you like
best, and your character will take
care of itself.... You've too much
power of thought—above all too much
conscience.... Spread your wings;
rise above the ground. It's never
wrong to do that" (319) .
Through his father's bequest Ralph has tried to give
Isabel what she unknowingly gave him when she first came
to Gardencourt. Her arrival meant for Ralph a liberation
from the burden of his own thoughts; she 'had refreshed
and quickened them, given them wings and something to fly
for' (84). His ardent faith in Isabel's imagination is
not checked by his father's warning that she might fall
the victim to fortune-hunters; Ralph insists that he
wants to 'put wind in her sails', 'to see her going
before the breeze' (262). By playing Isabel's
providence, he seems to try to make his and her paths
converge, since the bequest, or so he believes, will
enable her to meet the 'requirements' of her imagination
and by so doing the requirements of his own imagination
(261, 265). Ironically, Isabel does meet the
requirements of her imagination but Ralph is 'awfully
sold' (320), since he sees her marriage as her
imprisonment, as the rift in their frierfship. From
'unlimited expansion' Isabel comes to define freedom as
one's ability 'to choose a corner and cultivate it' (II,
65), or 'to follow out a good feeling' (II, 73). To
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Ralph's urging for expansion, Isabel remarks, '"You talk
about one's soaring and sailing, but if one marries at
all one touches the earth"' (II, 74).
Isabel's imperceptiveness to Ralph's warning against
Osmond is underlined by her disregard of the beautiful
garden scene until she thinks of it in retrospect and
realizes that he was right. Osmond has managed to
capture Isabel's imagination to such an extent that she
cannot enter into Ralph's concern for her future marriage
to a 'narrow, selfish', 'sterile dilettante' (II, 70-71).
Her terminating their conversation by going into the
house prefigures the last scene when she turns away from
Goodwood and seeks refuge in Gardencourt. At the same
time Ralph recognizes the power of Isabel's imagination
over her perception. Her justification of her love for
Osmond illustrates her ability to complete the
incomplete, to see something as something else: 'It was
wonderfully characteristic of her that, having invented a
fine theory about Gilbert Osmond, she loved him not for
what he really possessed, but for his very poverties
dressed out as honours' (II, 75).
Osmond is the cause of Ralph's and Isabel's
conflict, the reason why their paths diverge for the
first time, but he is also the one to effect their
convergence. Isabel's disillusionment with her marriage
forces her to recognize Ralph's wisdom, whereas his
impending death signals the merging of their spirits.
Anxious to return to Gardencourt, to die in his home,
Ralph thinks of his last wish, 'to extend himself in the
298
large quiet room where he had last seen his father lie,
and close his eyes upon the summer dawn' (II, 299). To
complete the circle, to return to Gardencourt, to die
where his father dies, to be indoors while having
glimpses of the outdoors is the desire of his expansive,
creative spirit. It is not a mere coincidence that
Isabel thinks of Gardencourt as Ralph's final resting
place in the same terms, 'in one of those deep, dim
chambers of Gardencourt where the dark ivy would cluster
round the edges of the glimmering window' (II, 296).
Isabel's restriction in the house of suffocation has
increased her longing for expansion.
She herself completes the circle by her return to
Gardencourt to be by Ralph's side. During her journey
from Rome, while reminiscing about her first visit, she
is aware of the cyclical motion of her life:
'Gardencourt had been her starting-point, and to those
muffled chambers it was at least a temporary solution to
return. She had gone forth in her strength; she would
come back in her weakness, and if the place had been a
rest to her before, it would be a sanctuary now' (II,
391). This indeed seems to be the circumference of the
novel within which other circles are contained. The
pattern of circle within circle emphasizes the cyclical
movement of the imagination, the organic character of the
•novel, its bicentrality, its multidimensional nature—all
features The Portrait of a Lady shares with Middlemarch.
We have already seen Isabel in other 'circles': when Lord
Warburton, for instance, proposes to her, she is proud of
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having 'a system and an orbit of her own' (144); and when
he approaches her in Rome, she is lost in thought: 'from
the Roman past to Isabel Archer's future was a long
stride, but her imagination had taken it in a single
flight and now hovered in slow circles over the nearer
and richer field' (415); and when Osmond finds her in the
Capitol, she is in the centre of the glorious statues.
Her journey from Rome contains images echoing
Dorothea's attitudes and recognitions. Her unawareness
of the exterior signals her movement inward, the
revelations to come. Like Dorothea, who often looks
without seeing and is oblivious to what happens outside
her window, Isabel performs her journey 'with sightless
eyes and took little pleasure in the countries she
traversed, decked out though they were in the richest
freshness of spring'. Imagination, in this case, in
Ruskin's words, spends 'its energy on things past and
future, or out of sight, rather than things present, or
in sight' (MP, III, 181). And like Dorothea who thinks
of her future as 'the long valley of her life, which
looked so flat and empty of way-marks' (830), Isabel
disregards the spring blossoms outside because 'her
thoughts followed their course through other countries—
strange looking, dimly-lighted, pathless lands, in which
there was no change of seasons, but only, as it seemed, a
perpetual dreariness of winter'. But her glimpses of the
future are also mingled with her memories: 'Disconnected
visions passed through it [her mind], and sudden dull
gleams of memory, of expectation'; in fact, past and
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future become interchangeable in the cycle of her
thoughts, as they 'came and went at their will, but she
saw them only in fitful images, which rose and fell by a
logic of their own' (II, 390). By means of her
imagination, she tries to understand her present
experience 'in the light of past and future experience'.
Simultaneously, we can see how, by means of her memory
Isabel is seeking what Bartlett believes is 'the most
complete release from the narrowness of presented time
and place'.^ And what Coleridge says of Shakespeare
could very well apply to James in this case: 'while the
poet registers what is past, he projects the future in a
wonderful degree, and makes us feel, however slightly,
and see, however dimly, that state of being in which
there is neiher past nor future, but all is permanent in
the very energy of nature' (SC, II, 168).
By escaping from the narrowness of space and time,
Isabel is released from the confining barriers of her
life. Performing her journey motionless, 'detached from
hope or regret', with 'sightless eyes', she seems to
acquire the eternal quality of the statues she had once
admired. Her suffering has not been a source of weaknes
but strength, a means to gaining an expansive vision.
Knowledge and suffering have already been fused in
Ralph's early coversation with her in the Gardencourt




house. '"I might show it to you"', Ralph replies, '"but
you'd never see it. The privilege isn't given to
everyone; it's not enviable.... You must have suffered
first, have suffered greatly, have gained some miserable
knowledge. In that way your eyes are opened to it"'
(64). The ghost is then associated with a wider vision—
the tragic vision, which involves suffering and self-
knowledge in the same cycle. The culmination of her
self-knowledge takes place when she drops the mask she
had worn for Ralph's sake, and confesses to him her
unhappiness with Osmond: 'for nothing mattered now but
the only knowledge that was not pure anguish—the
knowledge that they were looking at the truth together'
(II, 414). Ralph infuses life into her, even as he is
dying, widens her circle as he had done in the past:
"It passes, after all; it's passing
now. But love remains. I don't know
why we should suffer so much....
There are many things in life. You're
very young."
"I feel very old," said Isabel.
"You'll grow young again. That's how
I see you.... I don't believe that
such a generous mistake as yours can
hurt you for more than a little....
And remember this ... that if you've
been hated you've also been loved.
Ah but, Isabel—adored I" (416-17).
Isabel is privileged to see the ghost after her last
interview with Ralph. But there is little doubt that the
ghost is Ralph himself since Isabel, when she sees the
ghost, instantly knows that Ralph has died. Her
supernatural meeting takes place at dawn, 'when the
darkness began vaguely to grow grey', a time which
fulfills Ralph's wish, 'to close his eyes upon the summer
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dawn'. As soon as she sees the ghost, 'she quitted the
place and in her certainty passed through dark corridors
and down a flight of oaken steps that shone in the vague
light of a hall-window' (II, 418). In her cetainty she
is aware of a window, because she, like Ralph, can
understand the meaning of windows, the expansive view,
the release they can offer.
Since the ghost appears within the interior of the
house and it appeals to Isabel's imagination
('exterior'), it would not be unjustified to conclude
that suffering becomes the means of reconciliation of her
conflict between the 'interior' and the 'exterior', or
the clash between her imagination and her judgement.
After the vision of the ghost, after the reconciliation
of the conflict within her, Isabel can see through her
tears the external world to which she was blind to during
her journey, and she can feel the soothing effect of
Spring, 'the beauty of the day, the splendour of nature,
the sweetness of the old English churchyard' (II, 420).
Her suffering is regenerative; she has become capable of
looking at life from an entirely new perspective. This
reconciliation also enables her to refuse to follow
Goodwood, who in the final scene excites her imagination
for the first time: 'His kiss was like white lightning, a
flash that spread and spread again, and stayed' (II,
436) .
As Goodwood appears in front of the 'historical
bench' where Warburton had once proposed to her, the
circle is slowly moving towards its completion,
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illustrating, as it were, Coleridge's assertion that the
purpose of all narrative is to make a straight line into
a circle. Within the last few pages we can feel the
palpitating rhythm of the whole book as all the images
are projected in a terse version, achieving the 'spatial
saturation' of the germinal image. A series of
opposites is necessary to make us feel more intensely
their reconciliation which is present in the aesthetic
integration at the end of the book. Here imagination
'dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate'
(BL, I, 202). In Isabel's collision, her last
temptation, we see shrinking and expanding, systole and
diastole, as she 'shrank into herself', yet 'the world,
in truth, had never seemed so large; it seemed to open
out, all round her [again the circle], to take the form
of a mighty sea, where she floated in fathomless
waters'(II, 435). The oceanic images present throughout
the novel are here also in a terse version presented
through the opposites, floating and sinking. The thought
of following Goodwood means escape from restriction,
floating in 'fathomless waters', but at the same time it
is a 'kind of rapture, in which she felt herself sink and
sink. In the movement she seemed to beat with her feet,
in order to catch herself, to feel something to rest on'
(II, 435). Gardens and desert, sweetness and poison
represent Isabel's double vision of Goodwood's
invitation: 'The rest was that she had never been loved
before ... this was the hot wind of the desert, at the
approach of which the others dropped dead, like mere
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sweet airs of the garden. It wrapped her about; it
lifted her off her feet, while the very taste of it, as
if something potent, acrid and strange, forced open her
set teeth' (II, 434).
But darkness and light, outer and inner, restraint
and freedom represent the predominant rhythm in this last
passage as they have throughout The Portrait of a Lady,
and throughout Middlemarch as well. Everything takes
place in the twilight when the interplay of darkness with
light is at its most dramatic. The idea of escape seems
to Isabel 'like a comet in the sky'—soaring again—and
Goodwood's kiss is like 'white lightning'. Overwhelmed
by her chance to escape, Isabel's expansive spirit does
not lose itself in 'the largeness of her opportunity' but
moves beyond the present moment to encompass the past and
the future. Goodwood's kiss initiates a train of images,
representing her past feeling about him, and making her
feel, 'each thing in his hard manhood that had least
pleased her, each aggressive fact of his face, his
figure, his presence, justified of its intense identity
and made one with this act of possession' (II, 436).
Future, past, and present are all captured and
experienced within a single moment in the image of
sinking, by means of Isabel's expansive, penetrative,
synthetical imagination. Escape from Osmond would also
mean restraint by Goodwood, but most importantly
restriction within her own spirit effected by the fall
below her own standards. This would identify her with
Osmond, who was once so fine but whose hatred, distrust,
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and suspicion has made her feel as if 'he was going down-
-down; the vision of such a fall made her almost giddy:
that was the only pain' (II, 275). Sinking, not soaring
(like a comet), is the dominant feeling Goodwood evokes:
'So she had heard of those wrecked and under water
following a train of images before they sink'.
Isabel's judgement and imagination are reconciled at
this crucial moment and become the reins she holds to her
liberation: 'But when darkness returned she was free.
She never looked about her; she only darted from the
spot' (II, 436). Gardencourt serves as the sanctuary
which Isabel had believed it to be. Unlike Dorothea, who
looks outward from her window and seems to move outward,
Isabel turns inward towards the house, but the exterior
and the interior become 'indistinguishably mingled' as
the indoors offer 'a very straight path'. Where does the
path lead? It stretches all the way out to reach our
lives, to lead our imaginations to form it. The promise
of the incomplete, one of the most important aspects of
organicism, draws the reader into the artist's magic
circle of creation:
There were lights in the windows of
the house; they shone far across the
lawn. In an extraorinarily short
time—for the distance was
considerable—she had moved through
the darkness (for she saw nothing)
and reached the door. Here only she
paused. She looked all about her;
she listened a little; then she put
her hand on the latch. She had not
known where to turn; but she knew
now. There was a very straight path
(II, 436).
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With a few strokes James effects the 'spatial saturation'
of the germinal image. The glow of the interior, the
lights of the house, is shining 'across the lawn',
exhibiting a balance between the interior and the
exterior, the sweet harmony we experienced at the opening
of the novel when all was well and the 'wide carpet of
turf that covered the level hill-top seemed but the
extension of a luxurious interior' (3). At the same
time, we can see how images are fused into one: The image
of Isabel standing in front of the door, her hand on the
latch, is but a transformation of her first 'portrait' in
the 'ample doorway' or her picture in Palazzo Roccanera,
'framed in the gilded doorway'. Isabel seems in full
possession of her judgement since she has her hand on the
latch and is no longer in fear of the faculty 'of seeing
without judging'. As she turns from the darkness of the
exterior—her imagination—to the light of the interior—
her judgement—she effects an integration within herself,
and in the process she regains her freedom, the very
liberty which her husband seemed to have smothered.
Turning physically inward, she also moves mentally
inward, liberating herself, finding freedom by not
violating her own standards. To Henrietta's urging to
leave her husband, Isabel had earlier answered in
existentialist terms: '" I don't know what great
unhappiness might bring me to; but it seems to me I shall
always be ashamed. One must accept one's deeds. I was
perfectly free; it was impossible to do anything more
deliberate' (II, 284).
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Since she no longer sees her husband through her
imagination, she follows her judgement--her duty to her
responsibilities—and liberates herself from the bonds of
an entirely external perspective, with her judgement and
her imagination in harmony. The dichotomy between the
external and internal perspectives is broken and their
harmony effects a holistic view, an exquisite fusion of
the aesthetic, the psychological, and the moral.
The final rhythm in The Portrait of a Lady is the
same one which prevails in Middlemarch, whether we
consider the final window scene or the concluding words
of the Finale:
But the effect of her being on those
around her was incalculably
diffusive: for the growing good of
the world is partly dependent on
unhistoric acts; and that things are
not so ill with you and me as they
might have been, is half owing to the
number who lived faithfully a hidden
life, and rest in unvisited tombs.
The key in either novel is growth, an incessant
interchange between the external and the internal, the
image and the idea. From the garden, the external,
Isabel turns to the internal--Gardencourt—but again to
the external—'straight path'. The dramatic use of light
and dark contrast Isabel's figure with deep shadows, and
the frame disappears as Isabel moves and will soon be out
of sight. Since she moves in the same direction as the
light in the picture, we feel that the light (like the
sunbeam in Middlemarch) is a force which helps her and at
the same time increases the importance of her last act.
James does not name that act, perhaps because he is
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intensely conscious of the kind of truth which Coleridge
expressed in reference to The Tempest: 'The power of
poetry is, by a single word perhaps, to instil that
energy into the mind, which compels the imagination to
produce the picture' (SC, II, 174). And by trying to see
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